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ONE 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This dissertation encompasses four studies on the design of R&D alliance contracts. My 
research question can be stated as follows: what factors influence, or are associated with, the 
design of R&D alliance contracts in the biopharmaceutical industry? In order to address this 
general research question, I later spell out four more specific research questions. 
 An interfirm alliance is an arrangement through which partners share resources and 
assets, which can take a variety of organizational forms and refer to a wide range of motives 
and goals (Hagedoorn, 1993; Gulati and Singh, 1998). One specific example of interfirm 
collaborations are R&D alliances (Hagedoorn, 1993). Over the last few decades, R&D 
alliances have become a prominent mechanism by which firms reach beyond organizational 
boundaries. Throughout the 1960s the number of yearly established R&D alliances fluctuated 
between (nearly) 0 and 10, rising to around 700 in the year 1995 (Hagedoorn, 2002). 
Interestingly, the increase in the absolute number of yearly established R&D alliances in the 
period 1960-1998 is accompanied by a relative decrease in the share of joint ventures, i.e., the 
increase in the absolute number of R&D partnerships in the period 1960-1998 can be mainly 
attributed to an increase in the absolute number of contractual partnerships (Hagedoorn, 
2002). Given the proliferation of contractual R&D partnerships over the last decades, research 
in this field has the potential to contribute to an increased understanding of an especially 
salient aspect of firms’ strategies in the high-technology sector.  
 The increased propensity of firms to participate in R&D alliances over the last years did 
not go unnoticed by the academic community (Frankort, 2010). A burgeoning stream of 
literature on alliances developed that covers areas such as the choice of parties to opt for 
particular governance structures (Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Singh, 1998, Oxley, 1997), the 
tension between cooperation and competition (Hamel, 1991), firm performance effects 
(Baum, Calabrese and Silverman, 2000; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994), and more. Only 
recently strategy scholars have started to advance research on alliance governance structures 
by paying specific attention to the actual contracts that govern the relationship between 
alliance partners (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011; Argyres, Bercovitz and Mayer, 2007; 
Argyres and Mayer, 2007; Ariño and Reuer, 2004; Furlotti, 2007; Hagedoorn and Hesen, 
2007; Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner and Malmendier, 2010; Panico, 2011; Reuer and 
Ariño, 2007; Reuer, Ariño and Mellewigt, 2006; Ryall and Sampson, 2009). This dissertation 
aligns with research on alliance governance structures, and more in particular, with research 
that investigates the design of (R&D) alliance contracts. Given the plethora of different 
contractual clauses that firms can implement in their contracts, cruder measures to distinguish 
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between different governance structures might provide a somewhat blurred, i.e., 
disaggregated from reality, picture of the actual contracts underlying alliances. As such, this 
dissertation seeks to provide a more fine-grained perspective on the governance of alliances 
by specifically investigating R&D alliance contracts. To do so, I first need to define the notion 
of a ‘contract’, especially in the context of R&D alliances. 
1.2 Contracts 
As already stated by Adam Smith; “[the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing 
for another] is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to 
know neither this nor any other species of contracts” (Smith, 1979; p. 12). For instance, 
consider the following exchange of goods: 
 
Illustration: Seller agrees to deliver books to Buyer. In return for this delivery of books, Buyer 
agrees to pay Seller $400 within 14 days. 
 
Such voluntary commitment is essentially a contract whereby Buyer promises to exchange 
cash for books, delivered by Seller (Farnsworth, 1969). A fairly common, legal, definition of 
‘contract’ is specified in the Restatement of Contracts: “A contract is a promise or set of 
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law 
in some way recognizes as a duty” (Cited in Goldberg, 1976; p. 46 and Macneil, 1974; p. 
693). Economists somewhat diverge from this definition by defining a contract as “an 
agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior – 
a bilateral coordination arrangement” (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002; p. 3). Over the years, 
legal scholars have proposed alternative views on the notion of contract (law) (Hesen, 2010). 
By and large, legal scholars distinguish between classical, neoclassical, and relational contract 
law (Macneil, 1978).1 An important role in distinguishing between different perspectives on 
contract law is reserved for the concept of ‘discrete transactions’. Macneil (1978; p. 856) 
describes a discrete transaction as follows: 
“A truly discrete exchange transaction would be entirely separate not only from all other 
present relations but from all past and future relations as well. In short, it could occur, it 
at all, only between total strangers, brought together by chance (not by any common 
social structure, since that link constitutes at least the rudiments of a relation outside the 
transaction). Moreover, each party would have to be completely sure of never again 
seeing or having anything else to do with the other. (…) Moreover, everything must 
happen quickly lest the parties should develop some kind of a relation impacting on the 
transaction so as to deprive it of discreteness. For example, bargaining about quantities 
or other aspects of the transaction can erode discreteness, as certainly does any effort to 
project the transaction into the future through promises.” 
                                                 
1 The objective here is not to fully specify all differences between classical, neoclassical and relational contract 
law. Rather, I point towards differences between classical and neoclassical contract law relevant for introducing 
my four studies. It suffices to state here that a particularly salient difference between neoclassical and relational 
contract law is that under the former the contract still maintains its function as a reference point. 
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One example that comes close to being characterized as a truly discrete exchange transaction 
would be a foreign traveler purchasing an apple at a local grocery store. Classical contract law 
supports such discrete transactions (Ring and van de Ven, 1992), and offers, as stated by 
Hagedoorn and Hesen (2007; p. 344), some specific legal recommendations:  
“The classical contracting perspective can also be characterized by the following legal 
recommendations: account for as much of the subject matter of the contract as possible; 
avoid open-ended agreements; restrict the sources used to define the content of the 
agreement, i.e., formal documents are preferred over informal communication; limit the 
amount of contractual remedies available to parties; and court enforcement is the 
preferred method of dispute resolution.”  
Although the above adequately describes a plethora of simple day-to-day transactions, for 
many transactions classical contract law falls short (Goldberg, 1976). A large number of 
transactions take place over a somewhat longer period of time, where parties frequently 
exchange goods and engage in complex and uncertain activities where transaction costs 
inhibit the drafting of complete contracts (Goldberg, 1976; Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007; 
Macneil, 1978; Ring and van de Ven, 1992; Williamson, 1979; 1985). One example of the 
foregoing are R&D alliance agreements that describe collaborations between firms that take 
place over several years, include complex technologies, and where the ultimate pay-off is 
inherently uncertain. It is conceivable that in such a complex and uncertain setting contracts 
are inevitably incomplete, i.e., it would strain credulity to assume that R&D alliance parties 
are able to ex-ante specify all contingencies and contractual responses and not able to make 
ex-post efficiency alterations (Furlotti, 2007). It is indeed very likely that practitioners, even 
when assuming ‘farsighted contracting’ (Williamson, 1996), cannot draft complete contracts 
(Mellewigt, Decker and Eckhard, 2012). Incomplete contracts are especially problematic if 
we assume that alliance parties are given to opportunism (Williamson, 1981). Neoclassical 
contract law recognizes that contracts in many real-world settings are incomplete, and that an 
abrupt ending of an alliance entails severe economic costs for one or both parties involved, as 
is common when joint R&D is involved (Pisano, 1989). A contract is therefore not to be seen 
as a mere summation of legal rules, but also as a guiding mechanism for interfirm 
collaboration. Following amongst others Llewellyn (1931), Macneil (1978; 2000) and 
Williamson (1979; 1996), a contract can serve as a framework that governs the relationship 
between organizations. Assuming contracts are inevitably incomplete (Williamson, 1996), 
certain important contract design decisions emerge relating to control (Adegbesan and 
Higgins, 2011; Elfenbein and Lerner, 2012; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Haeussler and 
Higgins, 2009; Lerner and Merges, 1998), coordination in a broad sense (Adler, 1995; 
Grandori, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Reuer and Ariño, 2007; Salbu, 1997; van de Ven, 
Delbecq and Koenig; 1976), dispute resolution (Allison, 1990; Bernstein, 1992; Bonn, 1972; 
Eisenberg and Miller, 2007; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Lumineau and Oxley, 
2012; Rubinstein, 2004; Williamson, 1991), and particular contractual safeguards such as 
limitations on parties’ hiring behavior (Hamel, 1991; Hyde, 2012; Reuer and Ariño, 2007; De 
Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004; Somaya, Williamson and Lorinkova, 2008). These four elements 
of contract design guide the four empirical chapters incorporated in this dissertation. 
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1.3 Research questions 
In broad terms, the four studies reported here seek to answer which factors influence, or are 
associated with, the design of R&D alliance contracts. Recently, several studies have 
attempted to shed a light on the design of alliance contracts (e.g. Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Reuer and Ariño, 2007), thereby moving beyond a traditional view 
on contracts as mere legal safeguarding mechanisms and recognizing their role in controlling 
alliance partners’ behavior and promoting interfirm coordination (Mellewigt, Decker and 
Eckhard, 2012). By and large, the bulk of studies on alliance contract design have focused on 
the notion of contractual complexity (Anderson and Dekker, 2005; Barthélemy and Quélin, 
2006; Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Reuer and Ariño, 2007; Ryall and Sampson, 2009; 
Sobrero and Roberts, 2002), largely inspired by Parkhe’s (1993) measure for ex-post 
deterrents. By now, several studies have investigated the antecedents of contractual 
complexity of alliance contracts (e.g. Anderson and Dekker, 2005; Barthélemy and Quélin, 
2006; Poppo and Zenger, 2002, Sobrero and Roberts, 2002), and the consequences of 
contractual complexity (Ariño, Ragozzino and Reuer, 2008; Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 
2002; Helm and Kloyer, 2004). Although these contributions have provided valuable insights 
in the design of alliance contracts, many suffer from an inherent weakness, i.e., contractual 
complexity is an aggregate measure that subsumes many different contractual functions. 
Reuer and Ariño (2007) brought attention to the multidimensional nature of alliance 
complexity, and contracts in general, by dividing Parkhe’s (1993) measure in enforcement 
provisions and coordination provisions. Although it would strain credulity to claim that all 
individual contractual provisions fall neatly within a predefined categorization of contract 
functions, the main idea is that a general measure of contractual complexity oversees many of 
the idiosyncrasies of individual contracts, and that one needs to examine contracts more in 
detail to get a well-balanced grasp of alliance contract design (Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  
 The studies reported here examine the multifaceted nature of R&D alliance contracts. In 
that sense, I seek to answer the call by Coase (1992) who encourages more research that 
studies the process of contracting between companies in a ‘real-world setting’. In order to 
answer my overall research question, I seek to answer four sub questions that recognize 
distinct functions of R&D alliance contracts. Because of the more exploratory nature of many 
of the studies incorporated in this dissertation, three out of the four sub questions are 
formulated quite generally. First, previous literature signals the importance of ‘control’ when 
contracts are inevitably incomplete (Grossman and Hart, 1986), and several contributions 
consequently study the allocation of control rights in interfirm arrangements (e.g. Adegbesan 
and Higgins, 2011; Higgins, 2007; Lerner and Merges, 1998). Given that contracts are 
inevitably incomplete, control, whether through asset ownership or specific decision making 
rights, is important as it delineates which (alliance) contract party can make certain decisions 
when contingencies arise (Hart, 1989). Most previous work on control rights studies the 
allocation of control rights in a ‘small biotechnology – large pharmaceutical’ setting, based on 
a set of control rights identified by Lerner and Merges (1998). Based on the argument that the 
market structure since the late 1990s has changed, I divert from previous contributions by 
studying the allocation of intellectual property control rights to the primary, initial technology 
supplying firm, irrespective of its size and its industry background. More specifically, I ask: 
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How is the bargaining power of initial, primary technology supplying firms associated 
with the number of intellectual property control rights allocated to these firms in R&D 
alliance contracts? 
Essentially, chapter 2 investigates a more narrow set of control rights, i.e. intellectual property 
control rights, compared to most of the previous literature (e.g. Lerner and Merges, 1998), 
while incorporating a broader set of conditions that might influence the bargaining position of 
the initial, primary technology supplying firm. 
 Second, in chapter 3 I aim to highlight the coordination aspect of contracts by focusing on 
coordination committees. Prior work indicates that when contracts are incomplete, i.e., when 
it is prohibitively costly to incorporate responses to all possible contingencies in a contract, 
the contract serves an important function as a framework that promotes social order and 
cooperation (Llewellyn, 1931; Macneil, 1978; 2000; Williamson, 1979; 1996). Although 
coordination within firms has received substantial attention in previous literature (e.g. Adler, 
1995; van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig, 1976), the coordination aspect of R&D alliance 
contracts has received only scant attention in literature. Therefore I ask: 
What factors are associated with the stipulation of more or less interfirm coordination 
provisions in R&D alliance contracts? 
This second research question takes a more supportive and cooperative perspective on R&D 
alliance contracts compared to many previous contributions that (Furlotti, 2007), for instance, 
study the allocation of unilateral control rights. Moreover, chapter 3 moves beyond equating 
contractual complexity with interfirm coordination, by specifically investigating contractual 
mechanisms aimed at facilitating interfirm coordination. Studying interfirm coordination is 
important, as several previous contributions hint at the proposition that alliances lacking a 
certain level of interfirm coordination are more likely to fail (Doz, 1996; Park and Ungson, 
2001). 
 Third, in chapter 4 I seek to explore contractual mechanisms that determine how alliance 
parties will resolve any future disputes. In complex and uncertain environments it is inevitable 
that alliance parties will have to deal with disputes during their collaboration (Mayer and 
Teece, 2008), i.e., around two thirds of all alliances run into serious disputes within the first 
two years of collaboration (Das and Teng; 2000a; Koza and Lewin, 2000). It is therefore not 
surprising that alliance parties foresee the possibility of their collaboration ending in a dispute 
and design contracts accordingly. Previous contributions that touch upon dispute resolution 
highlight that over time alliance parties more clearly stipulate roles and responsibilities to 
avoid future disputes (Argyres and Mayer, 2007; Argyres, Bercovitz and Mayer, 2007), or 
aggregate dispute resolution clauses in more general measures of contractual complexity 
(Lumineau and Quélin, 2012; Parkhe, 1993; Reuer and Arińo, 2007). Nevertheless, the 
literature on alliance contracts seems conspicuously bereft of any empirical evidence 
regarding dispute resolution clauses. I intend to contribute to existing literature by asking: 
What factors are associated with the stipulation of particular dispute resolution clauses 
in R&D alliance contracts? 
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In broad terms, this third research question contributes to a burgeoning stream of literature on 
non-traditional dispute resolution mechanisms (e.g. Bonn, 1972; Bernstein, 1992; Mattli, 
2001). Studying these non-traditional dispute resolution mechanisms is important, as it can 
point towards inefficiencies of the traditional legal system. Moreover, chapter 4 highlights 
that different contractual dispute resolution mechanisms are associated with different factors. 
 Fourth, in chapter 5 I investigate contractual limitations on the hiring behavior of 
collaborating firms. Prior work indicates that over time alliance parties get a good feel for 
each other’s resources and capabilities (Das and Teng, 2000b; Hamel, 1991), such as key 
employees. Absent an R&D collaboration, specific contributions of individual employees to 
the overall success of ‘Firm A’ are, to a large extent, unobservable to ‘Firm B’. It is 
reasonable to suspect that firms are concerned about employee poaching during or after a 
collaboration. Recent contributions illustrate that within collaborative endeavors it indeed 
occurs that one firm entices employees of the other firm to cancel their employment in 
response to a job offer (see De Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004). Although the literatures on 
alliances, employee mobility, and employee poaching are generally well-developed, our 
knowledge about contractual limitations on the hiring behavior of firms participating in an 
R&D alliance is limited. Reducing the risk of employee poaching is important for firms, as it 
diminishes the chance of information leakage as a negative byproduct of an alliance (Oxley 
and Wada, 2009). Therefore I ask: 
What factors are associated with the stipulation of employee mobility restrictions in R&D 
alliance contracts? 
This fourth research question combines literatures on alliances, employee mobility, and 
employee poaching. It that sense, it moves beyond general measures of contractual safeguards 
(Parkhe, 1993), and specifically investigates those cases in which parties voluntarily limit 
their hiring behavior. Chapter 5 complements a study by Reuer and Ariño (2007), who 
highlight that alliance parties can limit each other’s hiring behavior via contract, but leave 
further examination of these clauses to future research. In addition, chapter 5 speaks to a 
recent stream of literature on competitor recruitment that highlights the frequent use of 
employee poaching by firms to gain a competitive advantage (e.g. Horn, 2011), especially in 
more research-intensive industries. 
1.4 Across the chapters 
Each chapter in this dissertation revolves around a distinct element of contract design. Across 
the chapters some key similarities emerge along with restrictions on the scope of this 
dissertation. 
1.4.1 Theoretical perspectives and literatures 
Across and within each chapter I employ a range of different theoretical perspectives and 
literatures. For instance, in chapter 2, where I study the allocation of intellectual property 
control rights to the primary technology supplying firm, I take a bargaining view on R&D 
alliance contracts in which more dominant firms are assumed to be able to extract more 
favorable contracting terms. By comparison, in chapter 3, drawing from more general 
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organizational economics, strategy, and organization literatures on the design of contracts, I 
postulate relationships between the degree of interfirm coordination as suggested by the actual 
contracts, and the nature of alliance activities, geographical distance, and a more dynamic 
element relating to previous alliance experience. Then, in chapter 4, I couple elements of 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory with literature on alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms to derive predictions regarding the use of certain contractual dispute resolution 
mechanisms in R&D alliances. Last, in chapter 5, I rely on parts of TCE theory to form 
predictions regarding the use of contractual employee mobility restrictions while 
simultaneously acknowledging the role of the institutional environment in which firms reside. 
The use of different theoretical perspectives and literatures epitomizes my conviction that, 
based on empirical findings by Reuer and Ariño (2007), contract design is multidimensional. 
As such, lest I am to provide but a partial picture of contract design, I cannot solely rely on 
one theoretical perspective or stream of literature to explain the use of various contractual 
provisions by parties. 
1.4.2 Setting 
All studies in this dissertation focus on R&D alliances within the biopharmaceutical industry 
in the period 1996-2005. The biopharmaceutical industry is a well-suited arena to test my 
theoretical predictions for three reasons.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: New molecular entity (NME) approvals. 
Notes: Data retrieved from the FDA. Adjusted after 2004 because of inclusion Biologic License Applications. 
 
First, biopharmaceutical alliances closely match the setting depicted in literature as they are 
inherently complex, uncertain, and costly (Lerner and Merges, 1998). Therefore, by and large, 
biopharmaceutical alliance contracts will be inevitably incomplete giving rise to, for instance, 
control and enforcement issues (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Lerner and Merges, 1998). 
Moreover, since biopharmaceutical alliances are costly and risky – figure 1.1 shows that only 
a limited number of NME’s (substances that have never, in any form, been approved for 
marketing before) get approved each year by the FDA – parties will diligently design the 
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associated contracts, i.e., contracts in the biopharmaceutical industry are unlikely to be 
characterized by a haphazard collection of clauses. Second, the potential pay-off of 
biopharmaceutical projects. i.e., alliances, is substantial which leads to strong competitive 
pressures between firms (Shan, Walker and Kogut, 1994). While the number of NME 
approvals seem to fluctuate around 20 per year (see figure 1.1), industry R&D expenses 
appear to be increasing. In terms of the design of R&D alliance contracts, these competitive 
pressures can cause friction between parties as they seek to balance cooperation – for 
instance, by stipulating contractual coordination committees – with competition – for 
instance, by implementing contractual restrictions on hiring behavior – in the design of their 
collaboration agreements (Das and Teng, 2000a). Third, firms in the biopharmaceutical 
industry are responsible for a large share of the total alliance activity in the high-technology 
sector. More specifically, Roijakkers and Hagedoorn (2006) show that in the year 1999 out of 
approximately 500 newly established R&D partnerships, around 150 newly established R&D 
partnerships were formed in the biopharmaceutical industry, i.e., roughly 30%. As such, given 
the potential generalizability to the realm of high-technology alliances, R&D alliances in the 
biopharmaceutical industry are suitable subjects for this dissertation as they represent a large 
share of all R&D alliances. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness and with regards to the 
scope of the current dissertation, I note that particular findings of this dissertation might be 
idiosyncratic to the biopharmaceutical industry and should be extrapolated with care, 
especially to non-high-technology alliances. 
1.4.3 Alliance types and conditional sampling 
I focus on collaborative R&D alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry for which an actual 
contract was drawn up. These contracts were obtained from the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and Pharmaventures’ clients. In addition, alliances were excluded in case 
(1) one of the parties is a government agency or university or (2) an alliance is a renegotiation 
or restatement of a previous alliance between firms or (3) one firm has a controlling interest in 
the other firm or (4) more than two parties are involved. In that sense, I created a population 
free of undesirable heterogeneity akin to the procedure followed by Lerner and Merges 
(1998). The aforementioned directly implies that certain interfirm arrangements (e.g. 
multiparty alliances) fall outside the scope of the current dissertation. 
 By and large, I examine the inclusion of certain clauses in R&D alliance contracts, and 
therefore take these contracts as a given. Implicit in my analyses is that, per observation, two 
firms engage in a collaborative R&D alliance in the biopharmaceutical industry and that a 
contract is drawn up to guide their collaborative endeavor. As already mentioned by Frankort 
(2010), this form of selective sampling is quite common, but poses limitations on the extent to 
which I can generalize findings to, for instance, all firms. Previous research suggests that 
firms that engage in R&D alliances are likely to differ systematically from firms that do not 
(Frankort, 2010). For instance, compared to firms that do not engage in alliances, firms that 
engage in R&D alliances may be in a better position to evaluate external opportunities (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990), be characterized by their strategic vulnerability (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996), pursue different strategies (Koza and Lewin, 1998), or have more 
complementary assets to offer (Hagedoorn, 1993). Referring to the stipulation of contracts, 
previous research hints at the proposition that formalized transactions differ from non-
formalized transactions in a number of aspects (Mellewigt, Decker and Eckhard, 2012). By 
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merely focusing on alliances for which an actual contract is created, this dissertation might 
underrepresent trusting relationships (Macaulay, 1963), or overly represent those alliances 
characterized by substantial exchange hazards (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). One should take 
care when extrapolating findings in this dissertation to those firms that do not engage in R&D 
alliances or to interfirm arrangements for which no formal contract is stipulated. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Overview of the dissertation and the specific research questions. 
1.5 Outline  
In figure 1.2 an overview of the dissertation and the specific research questions is given. Each 
of the following four chapters addresses one of the research questions described in section 1.3 
and shown in figure 1.2. Chapter 2 will investigate how the bargaining power of the initial, 
primary technology supplying firm is associated with the number of intellectual property 
control rights allocated to this firm. As the alliance process is often more cooperative than 
envisioned in much of the literature (Grandori, 1997), chapter 3 will move away from a focus 
on control and highlight another function of contracts as devices to promote interfirm 
coordination. Then, chapter 4 will revolve around the contractual stipulation of particular 
dispute resolution clauses. The chapter responds to the emerging role of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms (Bernstein, 1992), by investigating the use of specific dispute 
resolution clauses in R&D alliance contracts. Chapter 5 will seek to answer how parties 
design contractual limitations on hiring behavior, and when these clauses are most likely to be 
implemented by contract parties. All four chapters that revolve around answering each 
individual research question postulated in section 1.3 are fully self-contained and can be read 
separately. Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of this dissertation, highlights its implications, 
and gives some possible research directions for future contributions to the field of alliance 
contract design using the shaded area in figure 1.2 as a starting point.  
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TWO 
The Allocation of Intellectual Property 
Control Rights in R&D Alliances:  
The Bargaining Power of Primary 
Technology Supplying Firms2 
Abstract 
This study examines intellectual property control rights that refer to contractual obligations 
regarding the ownership and decision making on the use of inventions, technology, and 
technology transfer, allocated to R&D alliance contract partners. The empirical setting is 
found in the biopharmaceutical industry. In recent decades the biopharmaceutical industry has 
developed beyond the stereotype large pharma – small biotech dichotomy in R&D alliances. 
In that context, it appears relevant to pay special attention to the role of the alliance partner 
that can be characterized as the primary, initial technology supplying firm, irrespective of its 
size and its industry background. More in particular, I take a closer look at the allocation of 
intellectual property control rights to the primary technology supplying firm. The findings 
show that the stronger the bargaining power of the primary technology supplying firm vis-à-
vis its partner in terms of its innovative capabilities asymmetry, rather than a firm size based-
asymmetry, the more intellectual property control rights are allocated to that firm. Also, the 
technological breadth of an R&D alliance, based on the initial technology input from the 
primary technology supplying firm, generates a larger number of intellectual property control 
rights assigned to that firm.  
  
                                                 
2 This chapter is based on collaborative work with John Hagedoorn. I thank Hans Frankort, Carolin Haeussler, 
Geerte Hesen, Matt Higgins, Aija Leiponen, Ammon Salter, participants at seminars at Grenoble Graduate 
School of Business, Imperial College London, Maastricht University, and the Sorbonne Graduate Business 
School, and participants at the Society for Empirical Legal Studies conference at Yale University and the 
American Law and Economics Association conference at Columbia University for helpful suggestions and 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
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2.1 Introduction 
In recent years there is a gradual increase in the number of empirical studies on contract 
design, including studies that focus on interfirm alliances and the allocation of control rights 
to alliance partners. These control rights refer to provisions in alliance contracts that give a 
contract party, i.e., an alliance partner, certain rights with regard to ownership and decision 
making. In the current contribution I study control rights allocated to the firm that is the initial 
source of the technology that is developed further or used within an R&D alliance in the 
biopharmaceutical industry. Control rights are critical to any sort of interfirm alliance but, 
compared to other alliances, for instance manufacturing or marketing alliances, even more so 
in case of R&D alliances. In particular with R&D alliances it is difficult for firms to ex-ante 
calculate future innovation rents created by their joint R&D and to decide about the actual 
distribution of these rents among partners. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that the allocation 
of control rights plays an important role in the negotiation of alliances and the design of 
alliance contracts.  
 The empirical setting for this study is the biopharmaceutical industry, which has become 
one of the main fields, if not the main field, of R&D partnering and as such it is very 
representative for the high-tech setting of R&D alliances (Hagedoorn, 2002). In that context, 
my paper differs from the existing body of empirical literature with respect to a number of 
crucial elements. Most previous studies (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011; Bosse and Alvarez, 
2010; Haeussler and Higgins, 2009; Higgins, 2007; Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner, Shane 
and Tsai, 2003; Panico, 2011) consider a typical ‘large pharma - small biotech’ alliance 
setting that appears to have been most relevant for understanding the market structure of the 
biopharmaceutical industry during the 1980s and early 1990s. However, since the 1990s the 
biopharmaceutical industry has developed towards an industry that is less characterized by a 
dual market structure. As explained in both the academic and the practitioner’s literature 
(Chiaroni, Chiesa and Frattini, 2008; Cooper, 2007; Ohba and Figueiredo, 2007; Roijakkers 
and Hagedoorn, 2006), in recent decades  many small biotech firms, that were not acquired, 
have developed to medium sized firms and some have even developed into ‘regular’ 
pharmaceutical firms. Such developments have led to a market structure where interfirm 
alliances are established by a range of firms, from large and medium sized pharmaceutical and 
chemical firms, to medium sized product biotech firms, and small and medium sized 
specialist biotech firms. The academic and practitioner’s literature also reveals that with these 
changes, small dedicated biotechnology firms are no longer the primary source of innovation 
that led to the prevalence of small biotech - large pharma alliances as the innovation and 
alliance process is currently distributed over a broader range of firms (see also CATI, 2012). 
In line with both this new market structure and parallel pattern in R&D alliances in the 
biopharmaceutical industry, this paper covers a wider range of collaborative R&D efforts, 
with various combinations of different categories of firms, such as small, medium-size and 
larger biotech firms, medium-size and large pharmaceutical firms, and large diversified 
chemical firms (see also Appendix 2.2, panel B).   
 In the current analysis, given its broader perspective, the allocation of control rights is 
viewed from the perspective of the firm that, irrespective of its size, is the initial source of the 
technology that is developed further or used within the alliance. I label that firm as the 
primary technology supplying partner of an alliance where partners jointly undertake R&D 
with various degrees of R&D input, while building on the initial technology input from one 
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partner. For this primary technology supplying partner of an R&D alliance, one can expect 
that, given its critical technological input, it is vital to negotiate a range of intellectual 
property control rights for its R&D alliance contract as a claim on future innovation rents. 
Most prior research, based on property rights theory (see below), assumes that the primary 
technology supplying firm, in those studies the small biotech firm, should, given its 
bargaining power, retain control rights when research is non-contractible although it might 
have to sacrifice some rights if its resources are constrained. In this study, I focus on an 
extended set of dimensions of this bargaining power, both at the level of firms and the level of 
transactions (alliances), that are expected to affect the number of intellectual property control 
rights the primary technology supplying firm retains.  
 As such my approach extends a number of interesting directions for empirical research on 
contract design (see Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011; Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Elfenbein and 
Lerner, 2012; Higgins, 2007; Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner, Shane and Tsai, 2003). I 
concentrate my analysis on four dimensions of bargaining power that are expected to affect 
the allocation of control rights from the perspective of the primary technology supplying firm. 
At the firm level, I develop hypotheses on the bargaining power of firms in terms of their size 
asymmetries and the asymmetry in the innovative capabilities of partners that are both 
expected to impact the allocation of intellectual property control rights. At the transaction 
(alliance) level, I formulate hypotheses that guide my understanding of the bargaining power 
of the primary technology supplying firm in the context of the scope of alliances. This scope 
of alliances is understood in terms of both the focus on different stages of the innovation 
process where the primary technology supplying firm is expected to play a crucial role in the 
early research phase of an alliance, and the breadth of an alliance as indicated by the number 
of potential technology applications that originate from the initial input by the primary 
technology supplying partner.  
 Finally, although previous work has taken a look at intellectual property as a sub-category 
of control rights, the main focus of these studies is on the allocation of control rights in 
general. These more general control rights refer to the combined management, governance, 
planning, and property aspects of alliances (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011; Higgins, 2007; 
Lerner and Merges, 1998). In the following, I study the allocation of intellectual property 
control rights, that refer to ownership and decision making rights regarding the use of 
inventions, technology, and technology transfer, as a specific category of control rights sui 
generis. Given the nature of R&D alliances where firms jointly perform R&D or this R&D is 
shared between partners, intellectual property control rights are a crucial element in the 
contract design for this specific group of alliances (Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007).  
2.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Inspired by the Aghion and Tirole (1994) qualification of the classical Grossman-Hart-Moore  
(GHM) approach to property rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), I take 
the relative bargaining power of alliance partners as an important condition associated with 
the allocation of control rights (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). The original Aghion and 
Tirole (1994) framework envisioned an alliance as a collaboration between a small research 
firm (e.g. a dedicated biotechnology firm) and a large contracting firm (e.g. a pharmaceutical 
firm), see also Higgins (2007) and Lerner and Merges (1998). In that framework, the small 
research firm has the technical know-how but it lacks certain resources, related to its 
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relatively small size, that are in abundance with the large contracting firm and that do provide 
more bargaining power to the larger partner and less bargaining power to the small firm. 
Aforementioned literatures consider these biotech firms as the main suppliers of R&D input 
into alliances, somewhat similar to what I label as the role of primary technology supplying 
partners.  
 Earlier industrial organization contributions to the alliance literature had already indicated 
that the size of firms and in particular size asymmetry of alliance partners can play a role in 
the relative bargaining position that firms attain during the alliance formation process (for 
instance Berg, Duncan and Friedman, 1982; Mytelka, 1991). This literature suggests that the 
size asymmetry of partners, that also indicates market power asymmetry, generates a higher 
appropriability hazard for the smaller firm due to the potentially opportunistic behavior of its 
larger partner. For instance, the literature on interfirm cooperation through licensing indicates 
that when firms of different sizes engage in technology collaboration, larger firms attempt to 
dominate the agreement based on size-related bargaining asymmetries that affect the terms of 
the agreement (Bessy and Brousseau, 1998; Caves, Crookell and Killing, 1983). In other 
words, the relative size of firms participating in an alliance appears to affect their relative 
bargaining position. 
 Recent property rights literatures on bargaining power asymmetries in terms of size 
differences between alliance partners reveal that these asymmetries affect the actual control 
rights assigned to alliance partners (Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Leiponen, 2008; Lerner and 
Merges, 1998). I expect these size and market power asymmetries, or lack thereof, to also 
affect the allocation of intellectual property control rights in the context of R&D alliances. 
The less the primary technology supplying firm is subject to size asymmetry vis-à-vis its 
partner, as it is either larger or relatively close to its partner’s size, the stronger I expect its 
bargaining power for negotiating more intellectual property control rights. Hence: 
Hypothesis 1. The less a primary technology supplying firm is subject to size asymmetry 
vis-à-vis its partner, the more intellectual property control rights are allocated to that 
firm. 
I see the technological strength of the primary technology supplying partner, reflecting its 
innovative capabilities, as an important, but often neglected, element of the bargaining power 
of that firm (for an exception, see Das and Kumar, 2007). As the primary technology 
supplying partner is the initial source of the technology used or developed further through the 
alliance, I expect that the greater the technological strength of the primary technology 
supplying partner, based on its long-term innovative capabilities, the more instrumental that 
firm is to the success of the alliance. The greater the technological strength of the primary 
technology supplying firm vis-à-vis its partner, i.e., the higher its positive innovative 
capabilities asymmetry with its partner, the more crucial its role in the R&D alliance.  
 As efforts made by the primary technology supplying firm are expected to be crucial to 
the technological success of the alliance, this firm may demand allocation of more intellectual 
property control rights than it would retain otherwise. The partner firm might relinquish these 
control rights to the primary technology supplying firm to generate adequate incentives for the 
latter. As such, the bargaining power of the primary technology supplying firm in terms of its 
relative technological strength vis-à-vis its partner is expected to condition the allocation of 
intellectual property control rights to the primary technology supplying firm. Hence: 
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Hypothesis 2. The larger the positive innovative capabilities asymmetry in an R&D 
alliance, from the perspective of the primary technology supplying firm, the more 
intellectual property control rights are allocated to that firm. 
So far I considered the bargaining position of primary technology supplying firms in terms of 
their relative (asymmetric) bargaining power in an R&D alliance at the firm level. However, 
the bargaining power of firms can also be seen at the transactional level, the alliance itself. In 
that context, I look at the bargaining position of the primary technology supplying firm in 
terms of its specific contribution within the scope of the alliance. I understand this scope of an 
alliance to refer to both its focus and breadth. The focus of an R&D alliance concerns the 
different R&D activities undertaken within the alliance, i.e., the stage of development at 
which the R&D alliance finds itself, while its breadth refers to the number of (potential) 
technology applications.  
 Following previous research (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011; Haeussler and Higgins, 
2009; Higgins, 2007; Lerner, Shane and Tsai, 2003), I posit that an R&D alliance may focus 
on either an early research phase or a later development phase. A major characteristic of the 
first phase is that research, be it basic or applied, is experimental and full of uncertainties. At 
this stage, collaborating firms face a range of research options and, therefore, potentially a 
variety of directions for their joint research projects (Freeman and Soete, 1997; Nelson, 1961; 
1982). In general, the open nature of the range of options that firms still have at this early 
stage indicates that there is little or no information on the concrete new products and 
processes that will eventually be developed. In this early research stage, research efforts of the 
primary technology supplying partner are expected to be paramount to alliance success. 
However, technological uncertainty prevents ex-ante contractual specification of all efforts to 
be made by the primary technology supplying firm during alliance execution. Therefore, as 
the success of an alliance that focuses on an early research stage rests to a large extent on the 
non-contractible efforts of the party that introduces the technology to the alliance, i.e. the 
primary technology supplying firm, this firm is likely to have a strong bargaining position to 
negotiate a larger number of intellectual property control rights. 
 On the other hand, development projects are far less uncertain in technological and 
economic terms because they usually start from a predetermined set of technologies that will 
be developed further into commercial applications (Freeman and Soete, 1997). During this 
later phase, firms increasingly focus on the implementation of innovations and the actual 
introduction of new products and processes. In this later development stage, because of 
reduced technological uncertainty, efforts of the primary technology supplying firm are more 
easily contractually specified and less critical to alliance success as commercial application of 
the innovative effort becomes of the essence. 
 The above illustrates that, for an early research stage, the non-contractible efforts of the 
primary technology supplying firm are a critical contribution to the success of the alliance. 
Therefore, given its crucial role in the early research phase, I expect the initial technology 
supplying firm to obtain a relatively strong bargaining position and to retain a larger share of 
intellectual property control rights in the earlier stages of an R&D alliance. Hence: 
Hypothesis 3. The earlier the innovation process stage of an R&D alliance, the more 
intellectual property control rights are allocated to the primary technology supplying 
partner. 
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Previous research (e.g. Kalaignanam, Shankar, and Varadarajan, 2007) has considered the 
breadth of alliance scope in terms of functional activities that partly overlaps with alliance 
focus as referred to in my previous hypothesis. As suggested by Hansen and Higgins (2008), 
I, however, understand the breadth of the scope of R&D alliances in terms of the number of 
application areas that could be affected by the technology stipulated in the alliance contract. I 
take the number of potential applications of a technology as an ex-ante indication of the 
expected demand for this technology and its products (see also McGrath, 1997). 
 Higher expected demand for a technology that is developed further in an R&D alliance 
puts the initial provider of that technology in a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis its 
partner firm. Higher expected demand for a technology and its products developed through an 
R&D alliance can potentially create higher innovation rents. If realized, both partners can 
benefit from these innovation rents but the primary technology supplying partner plays a 
crucial role through its initial technology input in the R&D alliance. Thus, given this crucial 
input for reaching the potential of these technology applications, we anticipate the primary 
technology supplying firm to retain a larger number of intellectual property control rights. 
Hence:  
Hypothesis 4. The higher the number of potential technology applications for an R&D 
alliance, the more intellectual property control rights are allocated to the primary 
technology supplying partner. 
2.3 Data, methods, and sample description 
My sample covers a set of nearly 300 R&D alliance contracts in the US biopharmaceutical 
industry obtained from Pharmaventures, a UK-based information and consulting firm. 
Pharmaventures has identified thousands of alliances in the healthcare and biopharmaceutical 
sector in their PharmaDeals database. The collected deals are grouped into a number of 
categories, such as collaborative R&D, distribution/marketing, manufacturing/supply, and 
business acquisition. For each agreement, the PharmaDeals database provides information on 
the names of the partners, type of contractual relationship, date deal signed, equity 
investment, relevant product areas and technology fields, press releases and, where available, 
the actual contracts. These actual contracts were obtained from the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and Pharmaventures’ clients.3  
 My dataset covers R&D alliance contracts and additional information for the period 1996 
through 2005. I collected information on alliances where the main focus is on R&D and for 
which PharmaDeals includes an actual legal document (contract). Using this sample I am able 
to generate a set of contracts in a homogeneous contracting space, which facilitates the 
comparison of key contract features across alliances. In this manner, I can be assured that 
variation in contracting terms and control rights does not come from a variation in the 
underlying industrial contracting environment.  
 The preliminary sample comprised 587 deals for the period 1996-2005. To avoid further 
unnecessary heterogeneity I excluded all the agreements where: 
                                                 
3Publicly traded firms are required by the SEC to file material documents. Firms tend to interpret this 
requirement conservatively and often file contracts specifying alliances as amendments to 10-K, 10-Q, S-1 or 8-
K statements. In addition, a number of state governments in the USA require privately held firms with employee 
stock options to file material documents, which are then made available to the public.  
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• one of the parties is a government agency or university 
• the alliance is, as stated in the contract, a renegotiation or restatement of a previous 
alliance between the firms 
• there is no R&D component to the alliance 
• one firm has a controlling interest in the other firm (greater than 50%) 
• contracts involve more than two parties. 
 The final contract database contains a set of 304 contracts which was reduced to 289 
contracts due to various missing values. These contracts represent the first interaction between 
the firms as found in the PharmaDeals dataset for the period 1996-2005. Consequently, an 
alliance between firms A and B appears only once in the final dataset. 
 The agreements include both US (domestic) contracts, i.e. the contracting parties are both 
US-based firms (170 alliances), and international contracts, i.e. a US-based firm collaborates 
with a non-US based firm (119 alliances). About 45% of the agreements were concluded 
between a biotech firm acting as a primary technology supplying firm and a pharmaceutical or 
a chemical firm acting as a partner firm.4   
 I collected additional information on for instance the size of firms, their R&D 
expenditures, their US patents, and alliance experience for the firms participating in these 289 
deals. My complete dataset combines information from PharmaDeals with data retrieved from 
firm annual reports, Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators (CATI), Datastream, 
Compustat, Corptech, Deloitte Recap, Thomson One Banker, Thomson Platinum SDC 
alliances, and the USPTO. 
2.3.1 Dependent variable 
Control rights. In previous studies, a variety of control rights allocated to either 
pharmaceutical firms or their biotech partners have been used as a dependent variable 
(Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011; Higgins, 2007; Hansen and Higgins, 2008; Haeussler and 
Higgins, 2009; Lerner, Shane and Tsai, 2003; Lerner and Merges, 1998). My dependent 
variable differs from these previous studies in two dimensions. First, the sample covers a 
broader set of alliances than those between large pharmaceutical firms and small biotech firms 
and hence, regardless of the size of firms, I view the allocation of control rights from the 
perspective of the firm that, according to information provided by Pharmadeals, acts as the 
primary, initial technology supplier within the alliance (see Appendix 2.2, panel B, for an 
overview of the different size combinations). Second, given the R&D nature of the alliances 
in my sample, I consider intellectual property control rights as the main focus of my study. As 
a concrete measure of the allocation of control rights I take the actual fraction of a total 
number of six intellectual property control rights allocated to the primary technology 
supplying firm within an alliance as the dependent variable. These six intellectual property 
control rights are derived from a combination of categorizations of relevant control rights as 
found in Adegbesan and Higgins (2011), Higgins (2007), and Lerner and Merges (1998). See 
Appendix 2.1 for a list of intellectual property control rights in these contracts.  
                                                 
4 A biotech firm is categorized as such, regardless of its size. The remaining 55% of these alliances refer to the 
other possible combinations, as pictured in the introduction and in Appendix 2.2. 
18 
2.3.2 Independent variables 
Size asymmetry. To proxy size asymmetry, I use a variable based on the number of employees 
of the firms participating in an alliance. This variable is defined as the logarithmic value of 
the number of employees of the principal technology supplying firm, minus the logarithmic 
value of the number of employees of its partner firm. 
 Innovative capabilities asymmetry. Given the importance of R&D as an input indicator of 
innovative capabilities and patents as an output indicator of these capabilities in an R&D and 
patenting intensive, high-tech industry, such as the biopharmaceutical sector, I measure 
innovative capabilities asymmetry in terms of both R&D intensity and patenting intensity.  
 R&D intensity indicates the degree to which a firm invests in its R&D as a major source 
of its future innovativeness. R&D intensity asymmetry indicates the difference between a 
primary technology supplying firm and its alliance partner in terms of the degree to which 
firms devote resources to develop their innovative capabilities. For each firm I collected data 
on its R&D expenses in millions of US dollars. Average R&D expenses are calculated based 
on the R&D expenditures during the year of deal conclusion and the previous year. Assume A 
is the primary, initial technology supplying firm and B its partner, this variable is defined as 
follows: 
 
 
 
Where R&D Intensity is defined as follows: 
 
 
 
If one would consider R&D asymmetry from the perspective of the larger firm in an alliance, 
a mere division of R&D expenses could be used to identify the R&D asymmetry between 
partners. However, as I take the perspective of the primary technology supplying firm, 
whether this firm is larger or smaller than its partner, such a division could prove to be 
statistically problematic.5 Hence, I propose the variable given above, which generates a value 
between -1 and +1.6 
 As a second indicator, I apply patenting intensity asymmetry as an output indicator of 
innovative capabilities asymmetry, measured in a similar way as R&D intensity asymmetry. 
See Appendix 2.3 for further details about this second indicator.  
                                                 
5 If the R&D expenses of the partner firm equal or exceed those of the primary technology supplying firm, such 
division would generate a value between [ )1,0 . In the opposite case, when the R&D expenses of the primary 
technology supplying firm exceed those of the partner firm, such division would fall in the domain [ )→,1 . 
6 For some R&D alliances, one firm has an extremely high R&D intensity close or even higher than 1 whereas its 
partner has a more moderate R&D intensity. Well-known examples of this are found in the cooperation between 
small biotech research firms and large pharmaceutical firms. Depending on the number of cases in my sample, 
this very large asymmetry might drive the results of the analysis. In an additional unreported analysis, I exclude 
those observations in which the R&D intensity asymmetry is either very low (5% lowest), or very high (5% 
highest). Results remain consistent with those reported here. 
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 Innovation process stage. The PharmaDeals database provides information on the stages 
of the innovation process underlying each deal. These stages refer to an early stage of 
collaborative research and a later stage of co-development of new products. I use a dummy 
variable which equals 0 if the alliance contract concerns collaborative research and 1 if it 
refers to the co-development of products. 
 Potential technology applications. For each R&D alliance, PharmaDeals lists the number 
of possible technological interest areas for the products and/or technologies developed 
through that alliance, with a maximum of eight interest areas. I interpret these interest areas 
for a product and/or a technology in terms of the number of potential technology 
applications.7 
2.3.3 Control variables 
Equity investment. For each R&D alliance contract, PharmaDeals reports whether or not 
equity is involved. Equity participation generates control in the alliance and this control might 
affect the allocation of intellectual property control rights (Hagedoorn, Cloodt and van 
Kranenburg, 2005; Oxley, 1997).  A dummy variable was created which equals 1 if the 
contract involves an equity stake and 0 otherwise. 
 R&D Plus. Many alliances include additional activities such as marketing, distribution 
and/or manufacturing. These additional activities have been shown to increase the complexity 
of alliances (Ryall and Sampson, 2009; Sampson, 2004b). Although I expect no specific 
relationship between the variable R&D Plus and the allocation of intellectual property control 
rights to the primary technology supplying firm, I do wish to control for any possible 
confounding effects. I therefore include a dummy variable that equals 1 if any additional 
activities are included besides R&D and 0 otherwise. 
 Time-bound. There is considerable heterogeneity in the duration of alliances. Here, I 
include a dummy variable to indicate whether or not the alliance is time-bound, i.e., whether 
there is a predefined ending date of the alliance as stipulated in the contract. Previous research 
has shown that the contractual structure of time-bound alliances differs considerably from 
more open-ended alliances (e.g. Reuer and Ariño, 2007). This dummy variable takes a value 
of 1 if the contract has a pre-defined ending date, and 0 otherwise. 
 Financial strength asymmetry. As in previous research (for instance, Lerner and 
Malmendier, 2010) I take net income as an adequate proxy of financial strength of the 
primary technology supplying firm that is expected to impact the bargaining power and the 
allocation of control rights for that firm. I proxy financial strength as the ROA (Return On 
Assets) of the primary technology supplying firm, minus the ROA of its partner firm. 
 Prior ties. Previous literature highlights the role that repeated interactions between 
partner firms play in the choice for different contractual arrangements (Gulati, 1995) and the 
evolvement of contractual provisions (Argyres, Bercovitz and Mayer, 2007). Although this 
literature does not suggest a straightforward relationship between prior ties and the allocation 
of intellectual property control rights to the primary technology supplying firm, adequate 
                                                 
7 It could be argued that instead of being a proxy for potential technology applications, the number of interest 
areas could in fact be a measure of uncertainty. Early stage molecules/candidates will often have multiple 
indications as a result of general uncertainty as to what might pan out in clinical trials. However, as shown in 
Table 2.1, the correlation between potential technology applications and the innovation process stage is only -
0.131. 
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performance in a previous alliance could increase the bargaining power of that firm. As such, 
I choose to control for the number of prior ties between partner firms in a 5-year window 
before the focal alliance. 
 Competition. Contracts between competitors and between a supplier and a customer are 
expected to be different. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that partnerships between 
competitors can bring significant benefits to participants, while simultaneously increasing the 
efforts of these participants in limiting the chance of unintended knowledge leakage 
(Lhuillery and Pfister, 2009). In terms of the fraction of intellectual property control rights 
allocated to the primary technology supplying firm, this could mean that the level of 
competition between alliance partners has an impact on the degree to which intellectual 
property control rights are negotiated, and as a result, divided between alliance partners. As 
such, I control for the level of competition between alliance partners based on SIC codes 
(Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996). Using data from Thomson ONE Banker, this variable 
takes on a value of 2 if both parties operate in the same primary 4-digit SIC code, 1 if both 
parties do not operate in the same primary 4-digit SIC code but do operate in the same 3-digit 
SIC code, and 0 otherwise. 
 Biotech firm. Dedicated biotech firms are known to have been major drivers of 
technological development in the biopharmaceutical industry (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011; 
Higgins, 2007; Lerner and Merges, 1998). In that context, I control for the specific role that 
biotech firms, irrespective of their size, play as primary technology supplying firms in R&D 
alliances with other firms. If the primary technology supplying firm is a biotech firm and its 
partner is a non-biotech firm the dummy variable equals 1 and otherwise 0. 
 Alliance portfolio. The number of alternative partners for a primary technology supplying 
firm’s R&D alliance, is expected to impact the number of intellectual property control rights 
assigned to that firm, as, given these alternative options, it has a stronger bargaining position. 
In theory, the maximum number of alternative options equals the number of qualified other 
firms in the industry that are interested in forming an R&D alliance. As such, there are 
probably a considerable number of alternative options. In practice, however, firms are known 
to prefer forming alliances with earlier or existing partners (Gulati, 1995). I take the number 
of concurrent biopharmaceutical R&D alliance partners, with which the primary technology 
supplying firm is involved at the signing date of the focal alliance, as an indication of the 
number of alternative partnering options it has. The larger the number of concurrent other 
R&D alliance partners, i.e., the larger the pool of alternative partners, the stronger the 
bargaining position of the primary technology supplying firm vis-à-vis its partner because of 
its decreased dependency on this partner. This stronger bargaining position of the primary 
technology supplying firm is expected to affect its ability to retain a larger number of 
intellectual property control rights (see also Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). I measure this 
control variable as the number of alliance partners of the primary technology supplying firm, 
excluding its current contract partner, in a three year period prior to the year of deal 
conclusion. Using the CATI, Deloitte Recap, and Thomson Platinum SDC alliances 
databases, I obtained data on the prior R&D alliance experience of the primary technology 
supplying firm, that is not reported in the PharmaDeals dataset, counting back three years 
from the year of deal conclusion.  
 US  partners. I include a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the partnering firms 
are headquartered in the same country (the US) and a value of 0 if otherwise (international 
deal). Firms are expected to have less information about foreign firms than about domestic 
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firms and trust tends to emerge more readily between firms that share a similar social 
background, for instance those that are domestic partners (Zucker, 1986). This also suggests 
that behavioral uncertainty and opportunistic behavior may be more likely to arise in cross-
border alliances affecting the governance of alliances (see also Hagedoorn, Cloodt and van 
Kranenburg, 2005). This behavioral uncertainty might be compensated by a larger number of 
intellectual property control rights allocated to the primary technology supplying firm. 
 Value. For each R&D alliance, PharmaDeals gives information about the (potential) deal 
value if available. In addition, I collected additional deal value data from the LexisNexis 
database. In line with my bargaining perspective, a larger (potential) deal value might 
influence the bargaining position of one or both firms. As such, I include the logarithmic 
value of the deal value in millions of dollars. If information for this variable is missing, the 
value is set to zero. 8 
 Value dummy. I control for missing information concerning deal value. If information 
concerning the (potential) deal value of an alliance is missing, this dummy variable takes on a 
value of 1 and 0 otherwise.  
 Year fixed effects. As the propensity to engage in R&D alliance contracts may vary during 
the period 1996-2005, I included year dummies. A year dummy equals 1 if the deal is 
concluded within that specific year and 0 otherwise.  
2.3.4 Analysis 
In the following, I present a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) with the fraction of intellectual 
property control rights allocated to the technology supplying firm as the dependent variable. I 
use GLM with a Bernoulli variance function and a logit link function utilizing maximum 
likelihood optimization with robust and clustered standard errors, as proposed by Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996) and applied amongst others by Adegbesan and Higgins (2011). 
Alternatively, in unreported regressions, I applied a basic Tobit model first without and then 
with robust and clustered standard errors. Results are similar to those presented below.9 
 The contracts that I analyze represent the ‘first interactions’ between firms in the 
PharmaDeals dataset for the period 1996-2005 but a small number of firms appear in the 
dataset more than once. This occurs when firm A contracts with firm B and firm C separately, 
in that case both the AB and AC contracts are in the sample. Since firm A’s behavior in 
contract AC is probably not independent of firm A’s behavior in contract AB, error terms may 
not be independently distributed. Correlated error terms at the firm level might cause 
                                                 
8 Although frequently used (see, for instance, Bastos (2010), Griliches (1976), Khorana, Servaes and Tufano 
(2009), Singh (2008); Smith and Huang (1995)), this method of dealing with missing values has its drawbacks, 
as do alternative methods. In unreported analyses, I use four other methods to deal with missing values to 
investigate whether or not results change depending on which method I use. First, I run a regression without 
controlling for value. Second, I run a regression in which I only control for whether or not information on value 
is missing. Third, I limit the sample to only those observations for which I was able to retrieve information on 
the value of alliances. Fourth and last, based on a host of observable variables, I estimate the value of an alliance 
if this information is missing, and use these estimates in the full model. Results do not materially change from 
those presented here. 
9 In Table 2.2, I report Wald χ² tests instead of log likelihood ratio tests as GLM estimators with clustered and 
robust standard errors provide log pseudolikelihoods instead of log likelihoods. Using log likelihoods derived 
from Tobit estimators without robust and clustered standard errors provides similar results. 
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underestimated standard errors for firm attributes that are constant over multiple contracts. As 
such, I clustered the standard errors by firm.10 
2.4 Results 
Table 2.1 provides the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. Additional information 
on the sample can be found in Appendix 2.2. I use R&D and patent-based indicators of 
innovative capabilities asymmetry in separate regressions (see Table 2.2). Correlations 
between relevant variables are in general moderate to very low, except for the correlation 
between value and value dummy. I refer to footnote 8 for a more elaborate explanation of this 
issue. Additional VIF statistics with values between 1.18 and 8.69 indicate that 
multicollinearity does not play a role in the analyses.  
 Table 2.2 presents the results of the GLM regression analyses. Model 1 in Table 2.2 refers 
to the basic model with only control variables. In models 2 - 4 each hypothesis-related 
independent variable is added to the set of control variables, after which models 5 and 6 show 
regressions with all the independent variables included. An alternative procedure where 
hypothesis-related independent variables were added subsequently led to similar results. 
  
                                                 
10 More specifically, I clustered the standard errors based on the ID-numbers of the partner firms, and not the 
primary technology supplying firms. The main argument for this clustering strategy is that, in my sample, partner 
firms tend to occur more frequently than primary technology supplying firms. Nevertheless, clustering by 
primary technology supplying firm ID produces identical results to those shown below. Alternatively, I ordered 
all firm ID’s according to the frequency in which these firms show up in the sample, either as primary 
technology supplying firm or as partner firm. First, I included an additional control variable that equals 1 if an 
alliance includes a frequently occurring firm using various criteria to determine what constitutes ‘frequently 
occurring’. The results presented below remain the same. Second, I included individual firm fixed effects for the 
10 most frequently occurring firms. While some of these dummy variables significantly affect the fraction of 
intellectual property control rights allocated to the primary technology supplying firm, they have little impact on 
the other coefficients. 
 The inclusion of firm fixed effects also alleviates, to some extent, potential endogeneity issues (Lerner and 
Malmendier, 2010). More specifically, it relaxes the concern that unobserved firm characteristics actually drive 
the results.  
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I find mixed support for the set of four hypotheses and the bargaining power perspective 
suggested in the above. The first hypothesis which states that the less the primary technology 
supplying firm is subject to size asymmetry vis-à-vis its partner, the more intellectual property 
control rights are allocated to that firm, is not supported. Additional, unreported, regressions 
where I considered the effect of the quartile where primary technology supplying firms were 
least affected by size asymmetry only generated a marginally significant effect. Hypothesis 2 
predicts that the larger the positive innovative capabilities asymmetry in an R&D alliance, 
seen from the perspective of the primary  technology supplying firm, the more intellectual 
property control rights are allocated to that firm. This hypothesis is supported for the R&D-
based input indicator, as I find the expected significant positive effect, but I find no support 
when using a patent-based output indicator, see models 3 and 6 in Table 2.2. As already 
mentioned in the previous section, in an additional, unreported, analysis I control for the 
effect of a very high R&D intensity asymmetry between the technology supplying firm and 
the partner firm, as found in the cooperation between small extremely R&D intensive biotech 
research firms and large pharmaceutical and chemical firms. The results for the regressions 
without such outliers are similar to those presented here. Hypothesis 3 states that, in terms of 
the focus of an R&D alliance, the earlier the innovation process stage of an R&D alliance, the 
more intellectual property control rights are expected to be allocated to the primary 
technology supplying firm. However, I find no support for this hypothesis in models 4 - 6 in 
Table 2.2. I do find strong support for hypothesis 4 which predicts that the higher the number 
of potential technology applications for an R&D alliance, the more intellectual property 
control rights are allocated to the primary technology supplying firm. See models 4 – 6 in 
Table 2.2, where I find the expected significant positive effect for the breadth of an R&D 
alliance technology scope. 
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Table 2.2 Generalized Linear Model (GLM) estimation results of IP control rights 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable
Size asymmetry 0.030 0.006 0.032 0.009
(0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022)
Innovative capabilities asymmetry (R&D) 0.246 ** 0.247 **
(0.113) (0.111)
Innovative capabilities asymmetry (Patents) 0.043 0.056
(0.078) (0.074)
Innovation process stage -0.013 -0.019 -0.012
(0.120) (0.118) (0.119)
Potential technology applications 0.088 *** 0.088 *** 0.090 ***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Equity investment 0.200 * 0.203 * 0.201 * 0.189 0.190 0.189
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116)
R&D Plus -0.112 -0.107 -0.118 -0.089 -0.083 -0.097
(0.112) (0.111) (0.112) (0.119) (0.116) (0.119)
Time-bound -0.397 ** -0.374 ** -0.392 ** -0.415 ** -0.393 ** -0.408 **
(0.184) (0.184) (0.185) (0.187) (0.187) (0.187)
Financial strength asymmetry 0.221 * 0.272 ** 0.220 * 0.225 * 0.272 ** 0.222 *
(0.124) (0.133) (0.132) (0.123) (0.134) (0.133)
Prior ties 0.478 * 0.510 ** 0.480 * 0.456 * 0.489 * 0.458 *
(0.261) (0.249) (0.258) (0.265) (0.254) (0.261)
Competition -0.070 -0.073 -0.067 -0.059 -0.062 -0.055
(0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.057) (0.059) (0.058)
Biotech firm 0.000 0.022 -0.002 0.006 0.031 0.005
(0.100) (0.110) (0.108) (0.100) (0.110) (0.108)
Alliance portfolio -0.016 -0.015 -0.018 -0.020 -0.019 -0.021
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
US partners 0.129 0.097 0.127 0.128 0.095 0.126
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.114)
Value 0.160 *** 0.158 *** 0.162 *** 0.128 *** 0.127 *** 0.130 ***
(0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
Value dummy 0.311 0.340 * 0.319 * 0.212 0.242 0.220
(0.194) (0.189) (0.192) (0.196) (0.191) (0.194)
Year fixed effects X X X X X X
Constant -0.988 *** -0.997 *** -0.982 *** -1.070 *** -1.073 *** -1.064 ***
(0.201) (0.215) (0.210) (0.204) (0.217) (0.211)
Wald test (χ²) 79.82 *** 87.15 *** 83.01 *** 97.04 *** 105.49 *** 100.06 ***
Wald test versus model 1 (χ²) - 4.78 * 0.32 7.27 ** 12.66 ** 9.21 *
Observations 289 289 289 289 289 289
Notes: GLM model, logit link function, bernoulli variance function, robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.
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Turning to the control variables, a number of these variables have a significant influence on 
the fraction of intellectual property control rights allocated to the primary technology 
supplying firm and appear to provide some additional support to a bargaining power 
perspective on the role of that firm. In line with previous research (for instance Higgins, 2007; 
Lerner and Merges, 1998), I find a positive and significant value for the financial strength 
asymmetry measure in all models. This indicates that as the financial strength of the primary 
technology supplying partner increases, so might its bargaining power and ability to negotiate 
a larger share of intellectual property control rights. Prior ties that could indicate adequate 
performance by the primary technology supplying firm in previous alliances with the same 
partner and imply an increase of the bargaining power of the primary technology supplying 
firm are also associated with the allocation of more intellectual property control rights to that 
firm. Finally, in support of a bargaining power perspective on the primary technology 
supplying firm, the larger the (potential) deal value, the more intellectual property control 
rights are allocated to that firm. In addition, I find that in alliances that are time-bound, the 
primary technology supplying firm is allocated fewer intellectual property control rights.  
 I also considered whether the particular bundle of intellectual property control rights, used 
in the analyses, drives the current results (Higgins, 2007). I sequentially excluded individual 
control rights from my dependent variable to see if a particular control right drives the results. 
Although there are minor differences in the level of significance for individual variables, the 
main findings for these regressions are qualitatively consistent with the findings reported in 
Table 2.2.  
2.5 Discussion and conclusions 
In support of the Aghion and Tirole (1994) qualification of the GHM approach, this research 
finds that some elements of the relative bargaining position of a primary technology 
supplying firm play a decisive role in the allocation of intellectual property control rights to 
that firm. In the context of R&D alliances, it turns out that this relative bargaining position 
when based on asymmetries in innovative capabilities is, as also suggested by Bosse and 
Alvarez (2010), more relevant than the general asymmetry in bargaining power based on firm 
size or market power differentials that was stressed in previous research (Aghion and Tirole, 
1994; Leiponen, 2008; Lerner and Merges, 1998). However, this finding comes with a caveat. 
When using an innovative capabilities input measure (R&D expenses), more innovative 
primary technology supplying firms, i.e. more innovative relative to their partner firms, retain 
a larger number of intellectual property control rights in all specifications. This effect is not 
found for innovative capabilities asymmetry based on an innovation output measure (patents).  
 Referring to the scope of alliances, the second condition that is found to impact the 
allocation of intellectual property control rights is based on the technology breadth of an R&D 
alliance. The higher the number of potential technology applications, the higher the latent 
demand for this technology and the products based on this technology. Again this suggests 
that, following the Aghion and Tirole (1994) qualification of the GHM approach, under that 
condition the primary technology supplying partner has a strong bargaining position for the 
allocation of intellectual property control rights.  
 I also find some additional support for a bargaining power perspective on the allocation of 
intellectual property control rights. The relative financial strength of the primary technology 
supplying firm, the prior ties of partners, and the potential value of the alliance are related to 
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the bargaining power of the primary technology supplying partner and these variables appear 
to affect the allocation of intellectual property control rights to this firm as well. 
 Interestingly, I find no effect of the scope of R&D alliances, in terms of their R&D focus, 
on the number of intellectual property control rights the primary technology supplying firm 
retains. I anticipated that the innovation process stage of R&D alliances would have an impact 
on the intellectual property control rights assigned to the primary technology supplying 
partner. As non-contractible efforts of the primary technology supplying firm are a critical 
contribution to the success of the alliance in early research stages, I expected that this firm 
would retain a larger number of intellectual property control rights at this stage. As such, my 
findings suggest that the focus of R&D alliances on either research or development appears to 
have little or no impact on the intellectual property control rights allocated to the primary 
technology supplying firm.  
 One explanation for this finding could be that in fact the focus of an R&D alliance has 
two contradicting effects on the number of intellectual property control rights allocated to the 
primary technology supplying firm. As I posited, the non-contractible efforts of the primary 
technology supplying firm are crucial in the early research stages of an R&D alliance and thus 
this firm should be able to retain a larger number of intellectual property control rights. 
However, both Lerner, Shane and Tsai (2003) and Higgins (2007) show that when alliance 
products are not yet in clinical trials, more rights flow to the pharmaceutical firm as the 
chance of failure is high and the deal size is usually limited. The latter line of reasoning would 
argue for an alternative positive relationship between the development stage and the number 
of intellectual property control rights the primary technology supplying firm retains. Such 
contradicting effects might explain why I end up with a net non-significant effect of 
innovation process stage on the number of intellectual property control rights assigned to the 
primary technology supplying firm.  
 So far, this study considered the allocation of intellectual property control rights, rather 
than all control rights, from the perspective of the primary technology supplying firm. I 
motivated this more narrow focus by highlighting the importance of these intellectual 
property control rights in my empirical setting, i.e., R&D alliances. Although I believe this 
more narrow focus is warranted, it is subject to the criticism that control rights are not 
negotiated in a vacuum and that other control rights might influence the number of intellectual 
property control rights allocated to the primary technology supplying firm. Also, although I 
claim that intellectual property control rights are a distinct subset of control rights in general, 
the results might be interpreted as representing the total allocation of control rights, rather 
than intellectual property control rights specifically. Therefore, based on relevant literature 
(e.g. Lerner and Merges, 1998), I examined three other control rights.  
 First, with R&D being the main focus in all the alliances, I looked at whether or not the 
primary technology supplying firm has special voting rights in research and/or development 
committees. Second, I also considered any special voting rights of the primary technology 
supplying firm within the overall steering committee or top-management team of the alliance. 
Third, I investigated whether or not the primary technology supplying firm has the right to 
terminate the alliance without cause. When these three control rights are included in 
alternative, unreported regressions, first individually and then as a count variable, I find no 
significant correlations with the number of intellectual property control rights nor do any of 
my results change significantly. Similar to Lerner and Merges (1998), I find that the 
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correlation between these ‘other’ control rights and intellectual property control rights is very 
low.  
 I also investigated whether or not the same factors that I found to drive the allocation of 
intellectual property control rights also account for the allocation of the three ‘other’ control 
rights. Typically, this is not the case. Interestingly enough, whereas I find no significant 
relationship between both size asymmetry and innovation process stage and the allocation of 
intellectual property control rights to the primary technology supplying firm, size asymmetry 
and innovation process stage are found to be crucial factors in explaining the number of 
‘other’ control rights allocated to this firm. Both Lerner, Shane and Tsai (2003) and Higgins 
(2007) already demonstrated that in alliances that focus on later innovation stages, fewer 
control rights flow to the pharmaceutical firm, and thus more to its partner, as the likelihood 
of success is relatively high. I underline these results and add that the significant and positive 
relationship between the number of control rights allocated to the primary technology 
supplying firm and the innovation process stage only holds for other than intellectual property 
related control rights.  
 In sum, the empirical findings of this study indicate support for our understanding of the 
effect of bargaining power, in terms of interfirm asymmetries in innovative capabilities and 
the breadth of the technology scope, on the allocation of intellectual property control rights. In 
that context, I take the position of the primary technology supplying partner as the main focus 
of my analysis, based on the argument that the market structure and the related distribution of 
R&D alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry have changed. As argued in the introduction, 
this change implies that at the turn of the century, this industry demonstrates a less uneven 
distribution in the roles played by different categories of firms where an alliance between a 
large pharmaceutical firm and a small biotech firm has become only one of many options. 
Nevertheless, in this sample of R&D alliance contracts still about 45% of the alliances are 
between biotech firms (of which some have grown substantially over time) and any of the 
other firms. Hence, one might interpret the current findings through an alternative 
explanation, based on previous studies (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011; Higgins, 2007; Lerner 
and Merges, 1998), where by and large these biotech firms, although many of them are no 
longer to be characterized as small firms, still act as the primary technology supplying 
partners in R&D alliances. As such, my analysis of the role of the primary technology 
supplying partner could then still be seen in the context of the ‘classical’ role of the biotech 
firm. Interestingly, the findings clearly show that there is no significant effect on the 
allocation of intellectual property control rights when a biotech firm acts as a primary 
technology supplying partner in an R&D alliance. This result does indeed indicate that the 
biopharmaceutical industry has become ‘normalized’ where the landscape of interfirm R&D 
alliances has moved beyond the stereotype ‘large pharma – small biotech’ collaboration, in 
which the small biotech firm is the quintessential technology supplying partner of the 
industry, towards an industry where a broader range of firms establish R&D alliances 
(Chiaroni, Chiesa and Frattini, 2008; Cooper, 2007; Ohba and Figueiredo, 2007). 
 My findings suggest considerable opportunities for further research, opportunities that 
also point to some of the limitations of the current contribution. Future research could for 
instance consider other industries. My current contribution only studies the allocation of 
intellectual property control rights in the biopharmaceutical industry. This industry is 
important, it is an interesting high-tech sector, but other high-tech industries, as well as 
medium and low-tech industries, are also relevant industrial settings for the study of 
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intellectual property control rights. I do find interesting results but it is of the essence to 
further assess these findings in the light of other industries where intellectual property rights 
play a different role (see Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000). In addition, this work is based on 
the content of the actual contracts that bind partners and I can measure the number of ex-post 
intellectual property control rights in each contract. However, I have no understanding of the 
ex-ante preferences of firms for particular control rights or the weight that partners assign to 
each of these control rights. As such, I have no knowledge regarding the extent to which these 
control rights were subject to negotiations between partners and how intellectual property 
control rights are assigned to partners. Knowledge of both the ex-ante preferences and the ex-
post allocation of control rights would already provide some valuable insights into the 
negotiation process. Also, survey research where partners are questioned on the process of 
contract negotiations could provide us with useful additional information on the actual 
importance of individual control rights for alliance partners. Finally, although a substantial 
share of the partners involved in the alliances and contracts that I studied are not from the 
U.S., these contracts are typically relevant in the U.S. context as they (partly) fall under the 
U.S. legal regime. Given the current international context of many alliances, another 
interesting topic for future research is to be found in the international comparison of alliance 
contracts, intellectual property control rights, and related legal practice in different legal 
regimes under which these contracts are governed. 
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Appendix 2.1 Intellectual property control rights 
Previous studies (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011; Hansen and Higgins, 2008; Haeussler and 
Higgins, 2009; Higgins, 2007; Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner, Shane and Tsai, 2003) 
identified a range of general control rights found in alliance contracts. Given the R&D nature 
of the alliance contracts that I analyze, I selected six control rights that are particularly 
relevant for the intellectual property rights of firms. For each alliance contract, I scanned the 
contract for clauses that indicate whether a particular intellectual property control right is 
given to the primary, initial technology supplying firm. Information on these intellectual 
property control rights were obtained by means of a special text analysis program. 
 The list below provides the six intellectual property control rights and the actual measures 
for these control rights, used to search the contracts for relevant text and clauses. 
Inventions made by the primary technology supplying firm, during the agreement, will be 
owned by that firm. 
All relevant inventions made by the primary technology supplying firm in the context of the 
alliance will be owned by that firm. 
Primary technology supplying firm is the owner of specific inventions. 
Specific inventions, relating to specific technology areas specified in advance, will be owned 
by the primary technology supplying firm. 
Primary technology supplying firm is the owner of trademarks. 
The primary technology supplying firm owns trademarks prior to entering the agreement and 
it will own trademarks developed during the alliance. 
Primary technology supplying firm has the right to sublicense. 
The primary technology supplying firm has the right to grant sublicenses to third parties. 
Primary technology supplying firm grants its partner a partner-specific license. 
The partner firm is the only licensee of the primary technology supplying firm, the license 
specifies the ownership of the technology by the primary technology supplying firm. 
Primary technology supplying firm grants its partner a general license. 
The partner firm receives a general license, as also granted to other firms, that specifies the 
ownership of the technology by the primary technology supplying firm.  
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Appendix 2.2 Summary statistics of the sample 
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Appendix 2.3 Innovative capabilities asymmetry based on patenting intensity 
Patenting intensity as such indicates the degree to which a firm, given its size, has 
successfully obtained patents as a major output of its innovative activities. Patenting intensity 
asymmetry refers to the difference between a primary, initial technology supplying firm and 
its alliance partner in terms of the degree to which these firms have developed their innovative 
capabilities from an innovation output perspective. 
 For each firm I collected data on the number of its US patents obtained filed in a five year 
period prior to signing the alliance contract. Assume A is the primary technology supplying 
firm and B its partner, this variable is defined as follows: 
 
 
 
Where Patenting Intensity is defined as follows: 
 
 
 
 As with the R&D input indicator of innovative capabilities asymmetry, I take the 
perspective of the primary technology supplying firm, whether this firm is larger or smaller 
than its partner. Hence, I propose the variable given in equation (3), which generates a value 
between -1 and +1.  
 For about 11% of the observations in my sample there is no patent registered with the 
USPTO by at least one of the R&D alliance partners. In that case one or both partners had 
either no patent at all or not applied for a patent during a window of five years preceding the 
alliance. These 11% might alter the results since in these cases the value of the Patent 
Intensity Asymmetry measure always takes on a value of 1 or -1, regardless of the Patent 
Intensity of firm A or B respectively. Therefore, in unreported analyses, I exclude the 11% 
where no patent was registered with the USPTO by one or both partners. Results for these 
regressions are similar to the results presented below. 
 Yet another alternative indicator of innovative capabilities that I considered is based on 
the frequently used measure of citation weighted patent counts, to control for the quality or 
value of patents. However, apart from the fact that missing values for patent counts implies 
that I cannot find patent citations for these firms, which already at the start reduces the sample 
with more than 10%, there is a larger additional problem with the citation time lags that affect 
the current sample period. The relevant period between patent granted and patent citation 
covers a period of between two and eight years, with an additional period of at least two years 
between patent application and patent granted (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005). Given the 
data available at the USPTO, I would, even if I limit the citation lag to a maximum of five 
years, only be able to include citation weighted patent counts for the period 1996-1998 which 
would decrease the size of my sample with approximately 70%.  
 Given such limitations, I present the results of the analysis with patenting intensity 
asymmetry, based on patent counts, as a second indicator of innovative capabilities 
asymmetry (see Table 2.2).  
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R&D Alliance Contracts in the 
Biopharmaceutical Industry: the 
Stipulation of Contractual Coordination 
Committees 11 
Abstract 
Alliance contracts between firms serve both to control and to coordinate joint activities. I 
study alliance governance structures that I label as contractual coordination committees, 
implemented in these alliance contracts, designed specifically to coordinate the activities of 
alliance parties. Using a dataset of 304 R&D contracts in the biopharmaceutical industry, I 
find two conditions imperative in explaining the degree to which alliance parties supplement 
their contract with contractual coordination committees to support and guide the alliance 
process. The first condition refers to the nature of the alliance activity, in terms of both its 
transactional complexity and the degree of interfirm dependence between alliance parties. The 
second condition considers a more dynamic factor namely the alliance experience of contract 
parties.  
  
                                                 
11 This chapter is based on collaborative work with John Hagedoorn. I thank Martin Carree, Hans Frankort, 
Geerte Hesen, and participants at seminars at Copenhagen Business School, the European School on New 
Institutional Economics 2011, KU Leuven, Maastricht University, Tilburg University, and participants at the 
2012 Academy of Management conference for helpful suggestion and comments on earlier versions of this 
paper. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Interfirm alliance contracts executed under conditions that are subject to frequent changes fall 
short of comprehensive contracting, i.e., in such a setting it becomes prohibitively costly, if 
not impossible, for firms to draw up complete contracts (Williamson, 1979). Apart from 
foregoing alliances all together or organizing the relevant activities internally, firms can 
search for an alternative, contractually incomplete, interfirm relationship that accounts for 
changing conditions. Such an alternative interfirm contracting relationship not only preserves 
interfirm exchange, but it also supplements the contract with additional governance 
structure(s) that will enable parties to adjust their alliance as it develops (Williamson, 1979). 
Following amongst others Llewellyn (1931), Macneil (1978; 2000) and Williamson (1979; 
1996), I thus perceive an interfirm alliance contract not only as subject to legal rule but also as 
a framework that governs the relationship between organizations (firms). Seen from this 
neoclassical contracting perspective, contracts as a framework for governance are 
characterized by their high degree of adjustability, their informative nature on how the 
relationship between contract partners should work and develop, and their private ordering 
that is geared towards problem solving. This neoclassical contracting perspective also stresses 
that farsighted, incomplete contracting (Williamson, 1996) can use institutions as an effective 
coordination tool. Within interfirm alliances these institutions are to be primarily seen as 
micro-institutions that, as stipulated in an interfirm contract, structure and govern the behavior 
of contract parties through mechanisms for social order and cooperation.12 In short, these 
contractual institutions are set-up to coordinate the activities of contract parties.  
 Following Malone (1987), I understand this coordination within an alliance contract to 
focus on joint decision-making and communication among contract parties to improve the 
performance of a number of tasks in order to achieve broadly pre-defined goals. This 
definition of coordination encompasses the one given by Gulati and Singh (1998) who 
highlight the uncertainty that parties experience at the outset of the alliance, uncertainty which 
results from the anticipation of an ex-post need for mutual adaption and adjustment.  
 I define alliance coordination committees, stipulated in interfirm alliance contracts, as the 
actual coordinating institutions that contract parties use for their alliances. In the following, I 
investigate which factors are related to the number of coordination committees specified in 
R&D alliance contracts, i.e., those alliances for which the joint R&D and R&D based 
technology sharing is a major objective of the agreement. These coordination committees 
define key interfirm personnel to facilitate mutual decision-making and they specify a 
minimum number of meetings per year to promote communication (Adler, 1995). As alliance 
contracts are inevitably incomplete (Williamson, 1985), ex-ante stipulation of a number of 
coordination committees facilitates ex-post communication concerning non-contractible 
alliance activities. By frequently discussing the progress of an alliance activity, parties will 
find it easier to adjust the initial plan laid out in the contract in response to recent 
developments. Referring to Simon’s (1976) differentiation into procedural and substantial 
coordination, the coordination committees stipulated in the alliance contracts that I study are 
both of a substantial and a procedural nature. The main tasks of these coordination 
                                                 
12 Based on Hagedoorn (1993) and Gulati and Singh (1998) I define an interfirm alliance as an arrangement 
through which partners share resources and assets, which can take a variety of organizational forms and refer to a 
wide range of motives and goals. 
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committees are specified in terms of what is to be done in the alliance, the expected behavior 
of contract parties, and the nature of their relationship. 
 The goal of this paper is to fill a gap in the literature on the interfirm coordination aspect 
of alliance contracts. Alliances require considerable coordination efforts aimed at joint-
problem solving to avert alliance failure (see Doz, 1996). Alliance contracts with provisions 
that facilitate real-time information sharing and feedback between alliance parties will help to 
minimize misperceptions and strengthen cooperative behavior (Parkhe, 1993). While the 
literature on interfirm coordination recognizes that different interfirm alliances also require 
different coordination mechanisms (see for instance Grandori, 1997), the claim that the 
contract itself reveals aspects of coordination has received only scant attention in the literature 
(Furlotti, 2007; Reuer and Ariño, 2007). By and large, studies on contract design usually 
associate interfirm coordination with contractual complexity (Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2009; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Reuer and Ariño, 2007; Reuer, Ariño and Mellewigt, 2006; Ryall 
and Sampson, 2009). However, the kind of coordination that is studied in the current 
contribution refers to a more fine-grained construct than contractual complexity as indicated 
previously by studies on intrafirm level coordination (e.g. Adler, 1995; van de Ven, Delbecq 
and Koenig, 1976). That line of research demonstrates that as tasks for teams within 
organizations become more interdependent and uncertain, reliance on formal rules and plans 
tend to decline. Moreover, for uncertain and interdependent tasks the usage of coordination 
committees to facilitate communication and mutual adjustment between teams in 
organizations increases substantially. 
 Similar to the observed variation in coordination in integrated structures, 13 I expect the 
degree of coordination (the intensity of the interfirm coordination) and the kind of 
coordination (relatively rigid use of rules stipulated in a contract or more flexibility through 
committees) to vary with the diversity in alliance contracts. When alliance activities are 
intrinsically complex, as is the case when combining different types of know-how in pursuit 
of a common objective, coordination difficulties are especially profound and designing 
adequate coordination mechanisms in the contract is not a straightforward task and will 
demand alliance experience (Grandori, 1997; Schreiner, Kale and Corsten, 2009). As such, in 
addition to transaction related elements, I also expect a strong experience effect in 
establishing these interfirm coordination mechanisms. 
 In light of the above, this paper makes three contributions to the existing literature on 
contract design. First, it sheds a light on the notion of contracts as frameworks by specifically 
investigating the contractual mechanisms parties put in place to support and guide 
collaborative activities. Second, contingent on the assumption that alliances lacking sufficient 
interfirm coordination are more prone to fail (Doz, 1996, Park and Ungson, 2001), I 
investigate the factors associated with the number of coordination committees. If, at the 
contract signing date, alliance partners are particularly concerned with ex-post coordination 
requirements (Gulati and Singh, 1998), investigating the factors associated with the number of 
coordination committees can provide fruitful insights into the conditions under which parties 
opt for more or less interfirm coordination. Third, previous research mainly stressed the 
proper allocation of unilateral control rights over decisions that cannot be contractually 
                                                 
13 For instance, van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig (1976) find that work units in a firm meet more often through 
committees when the interdependence of their activities increases. However, the use of pre-defined plans and 
rules declines as the interdependence increases.  
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specified as critical to guide and control the alliance as circumstances change (e.g. Lerner and 
Merges, 1998). However, in the context of the R&D alliances that I study, technology 
complementarity is an important motive for the formation of these alliances (Hagedoorn, 
1993). Given this complementarity, changing conditions, unforeseen at the outset of the 
alliance, require mutual adaptations between parties rather than unilateral control of one party 
over another. In fact, as opposed to a zero-sum game approach in which one party wins and 
the other party loses, the R&D alliance process can often be more adequately characterized as 
supportive and cooperative (Grandori, 1997). In this study, I highlight this supportive and 
cooperative nature by investigating the association of several factors with a particular type of 
mechanism, i.e., coordination committees, by which parties can communicate over non-
contractible activities and make alterations to the initial contract if circumstances so dictate.  I 
extend literature on coordination within firms (e.g. Adler, 1995; van de Ven, Delbecq and 
Koenig, 1976), by focusing on the level of interfirm coordination. I believe this shift in 
attention is warranted, as facilitating the supportive and cooperative nature of the 
collaborative R&D process is an important, yet insufficiently highlighted, function of 
interfirm contracts. 
 Inspired by organizational economics, strategy, and organization literatures on the design 
of contracts, I focus on three conditions likely to be associated with the number of 
coordination committees stipulated in an R&D alliance contract. The first condition refers to 
the nature of the alliance activities, underlying the R&D alliance, i.e., I consider technological 
uncertainty, transactional complexity, and interfirm dependence (Brousseau, Coeurderoy and 
Chaserant, 2007; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996; Ryall and Sampson, 2009; Shelanski 
and Klein, 1995). The second condition deals with the geographical distance between alliance 
partners (Andersen, 1999; Grinter, Herbsleb and Perry, 1999; Hoegl and Proserpio, 2004; 
Olsen and Olsen, 2000; Torre and Rallet, 2005; Whittington, Owen-Smith and Powell, 2009). 
The third condition refers to a more dynamic element namely the previous alliance experience 
of alliance parties (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002; Levitt and March, 1988). Throughout this 
paper, the emphasis will, given the possible correlations of error terms with explanatory 
variables and the dependent variable, be on association rather than on causal inference. As 
such, I think that in this particular setting, where I face endogeneity issues, I prefer to obtain 
reliable associations rather than causal effects. 
 I find support for three out of five hypotheses. Transactional complexity, the 
interdependence of alliance contract parties, and the alliance experience of firms are related to 
the number of coordination committees stipulated in an R&D alliance contract. However, 
auxiliary analyses hint at the proposition that the relationship between transactional 
complexity, in terms of additional alliance activities, and the number of coordination 
committees stipulated in an R&D alliance contract appears to be not straightforward, i.e., 
some additional activities appear to be unrelated with the number of stipulated committees. 
Contrary to my expectations, I find no significant relationship between technological 
uncertainty and the number of coordination committees, nor a significant relationship between 
geographical distance and the number of coordination committees stipulated in an R&D 
alliance contract. 
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3.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
3.2.1 Coordination committees 
For alliances pooling complementary knowledge and capabilities, the intrinsic sophistication 
of activities (e.g. R&D) – which requires resources from both firms – increases the need for 
interfirm coordination (Grandori, 1997; Hagedoorn, 1993). For this type of alliances, 
coordination mechanisms are expected to guide collaborative efforts and to facilitate real time 
adjustment of the initial alliance contract within and between activities undertaken in an 
alliance.   
 One particular mechanism through which firms can guide collaborative efforts and 
facilitate mutual adjustments in an alliance is to include coordination committees in an 
alliance contract (Adler, 1995). These coordination committees refer to a subset of 
committees that parties can stipulate in their contract to guide and monitor the alliance. More 
specifically, the literature on contract design proposes two different functions of committees, 
i.e., to control and to coordinate.  So far, much of the previous literature on contract design 
focuses on control through the allocation of unilateral control rights (e.g. Adegbesan and 
Higgins, 2011; Higgins, 2007). In terms of committees, Lerner and Merges (1998) highlight 
the role committees can play in the allocation of these control rights, i.e., they classify the 
decisive vote in a top project management body as a critical control right. However, interfirm 
coordination in general and more specifically the coordination function of committees 
remains relatively unexplored (Grandori, 1997). In the following, I do focus on those 
committees that facilitate coordination, hereafter labeled as coordination committees (see 
Adler (1995) for a similar classification).14 These coordination committees are expected to 
facilitate mutual decision-making and communication, amongst others, by stipulating key 
interfirm personnel and a minimum number of meetings per year.  
 There are three reasons why firms may want to specify a range of coordination 
committees in an alliance contract. First, long-term contracting under changing conditions 
results in incomplete contracts (Williamson, 1985). As such, while executing the contract, 
alliance parties run the risk that particular circumstances have changed (e.g. due to 
technological development) which requires alterations to the original contract. Obviously, at 
the signing date of the alliance, these new circumstances and the required alterations to the 
contract were unknown. Nevertheless, parties do, to some extent, have the ability to look 
ahead and recognize potential problems (Williamson, 1996; 1999). As stated by Macneil: 
“[t]wo common characteristics of long-term contracts are the existence of gaps in their 
planning and the presence of a range of processes and techniques used by contract planners 
to create flexibility in lieu of either leaving gaps or trying to plan rigidly” (Macneil, 1978, p. 
865). Therefore, alliance parties are expected to supplement formal contracts with the 
stipulation of a number of coordination committees for areas of collaboration for which 
flexible, bilateral coordination is most needed. Consistent with a neoclassical view on 
contracting (Williamson, 1979), with the initial contract as reference point, parties can make 
changes to the contract over time as the alliance progresses and conditions change 
(Williamson, 1979). 
                                                 
14 As such, this research purposely excludes those committees that refer to unilateral control rights. 
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Second, in their definitions of coordination, both Malone (1987) and Gulati and Singh (1998) 
highlight communication between parties as an important element of coordination. 
Coordination committees, by requiring frequent meetings between key personnel, can 
facilitate communication between alliance parties. As can be seen in the example presented 
below, an inherent part of drafting coordination committee clauses in an alliance contract 
refers to the specification of minimum ex-post communication requirements. As parties 
discuss recent developments and their impact on the alliance, transparency of (collaborative) 
efforts in pursuit of common goals is increased (Faems et al., 2008). Consequently, it is less 
likely that a situation will occur in which set-backs in research, development or another 
activity will be attributed to sluggishness on the part of one of the alliance parties. Absent 
sufficient coordination committees to facilitate communication, alliance parties might try to 
unilaterally play a coordination role within the alliance while the collaborative activities 
actually call for a bilateral response (Ariño and de la Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996). The above is 
illustrated by the following excerpt from an alliance contract between Dyax and Epix Medical 
(June 20th, 1997): 
“The Steering Committee shall conduct monthly telephone conferences during the 
Research Program, and quarterly telephone conferences during the MRI Development 
Program and RadioPharma Development Program, and shall prepare and deliver a brief 
written report describing the significant issues and discussions that take place during 
such conferences. (…). The Steering Committee shall meet at least once each quarter 
alternately at the parties' locations, or at such other times and locations as the Steering 
Committee determines.”  
Third, joint-decision making is a key aspect of coordination in order to achieve broadly pre-
defined goals (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Malone, 1987). Many coordination committees 
include statements such as “…such amendments to be mutually agreed to by ImClone and 
CombiChem” (excerpt from an alliance contract between CombiChem and ImClone Systems, 
October 10th, 1997), highlighting this joint decision making. The main advantage of this joint 
decision-making as part of coordination is that the outcome is more likely to be acceptable for 
both parties (Malone, 1987), because both parties feel they are actively involved in shaping 
the direction of their collaboration (Faems et al., 2008). 
 As mentioned in the above, the organizational economics, strategy, and organization 
literatures suggest three conditions likely to be associated with the number of coordination 
committees stipulated in alliance contracts. These conditions, elaborated upon further below, 
refer to the nature of alliance activities, the geographical distance between alliance parties, 
and the alliance experience of contract parties. 
3.2.2 Nature of the alliance activity 
Concerning the nature of the alliance activities, I expect three factors to be related to the 
number of coordination committees that parties stipulate in their R&D contract. The first 
factor I consider is the technological uncertainty surrounding the alliance. More specifically, I 
expect a positive association between the technological uncertainty surrounding an alliance 
and the number of coordination committees.  
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As firms are subject to bounded rationality when drafting an alliance contract, there are 
certain limits to the number of possible future disturbances these firms can anticipate. In 
particular in alliances characterized by high technological uncertainty, standardization of 
activities by inclusion of detailed provisions in the alliance contract is difficult as many 
deviations from this contract might be required (Pisano, 1989; van de Ven, Delbecq and 
Koenig, 1976). The trial-and-error method of problem solving, typical for alliances involving 
highly uncertain technologies, makes the non-contractible efforts of parties critical to alliance 
success (Lerner and Malmendier, 2010). Therefore, alliance parties need to frequently 
communicate with each other to monitor the progress of highly uncertain collaborative 
activities to achieve broadly pre-defined goals as specified in their contract (Malone, 1987). 
Also, the non-contractible nature of alliance activities requires flexible adjustment 
mechanisms to alter the work undertaken through the alliance in response to unforeseen 
disturbances. Consequently, I expect parties to an alliance characterized by high levels of 
technological uncertainty to stipulate more coordination committees in their contract. As the 
number of deviations from the initial contract, due to task uncertainty, increases and 
adherence to strict rules becomes more difficult, these coordination committees guide the 
collaboration of firms (Grandori, 1997; van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig, 1976). 
Alternatively, I expect that for alliances characterized by lower levels of technological 
uncertainty, with fewer unexpected changes and disturbances, there is less need for parties to 
frequently communicate with each other and to monitor the progress of their collaborative 
activities. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 1. The number of coordination committees stipulated in an alliance contract is 
larger for an alliance characterized by high technological uncertainty compared to an 
alliance characterized by low technological uncertainty. 
Alliance contracts are also known to vary in their transactional complexity (see, for instance, 
Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2009) which is characterized by the number of interrelated activities 
undertaken within the scope of the alliance. I understand this transactional complexity in 
terms of the number of interrelated activities as a second factor representing the nature of 
alliance activity. 
 Alliance contracts characterized by low transactional complexity include a limited set of 
interrelated activities and require little bilateral adjustment between alliance parties (Grandori, 
1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Ryall and Sampson, 2009). Contracts including a limited 
number of interrelated activities thus put less ex-post coordination strains on alliance parties. 
For example, in an alliance solely focusing on collaborative research with no close-to-the-
market related activities (e.g. production, logistics, or marketing), the main burden of 
coordination will fall on key R&D personnel from both partners that will have to frequently 
communicate with each other. As the alliance focuses on only one particular activity, there is 
no need to communicate with key personnel of both parties that represent other activities 
down the value chain. Therefore, for contracts characterized by relatively low complexity, the 
need to stipulate a multitude of coordination committees is low.  
 Contrary to the above, contracts characterized by high transactional complexity involve a 
larger set of interrelated activities and require more bilateral adjustment between alliance 
parties (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Ryall and Sampson, 2009). A mere summation of activities 
in an alliance is even likely to underestimate transactional complexity as interrelations 
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between activities also bring about additional complexity. For instance, in alliances that 
include joint research activities, production, and marketing, key R&D, production, and 
marketing personnel from both parties will not only have to coordinate efforts within their 
own field but also with each other. This puts additional strains on ex-post coordination 
requirements as the interrelations between activities have to be managed. Parties can stipulate 
more formal rules to facilitate coordination regarding these additional activities. However, 
due to bounded rationality of parties, their farsightedness in anticipating these coordination 
issues is limited (Williamson, 1985; 1996; 1999). As such, for contracts characterized by high 
transactional complexity, I expect parties to implement additional (more flexible) governance 
structures to support and guide the alliance process (Grandori and Soda, 1995). Hence: 
Hypothesis 2. The number of coordination committees stipulated in an alliance contract is 
larger for an alliance characterized by high transactional complexity compared to an 
alliance characterized by low transactional complexity. 
The third factor of the nature of alliance activity refers to the relatedness of the activities of 
partner firms, i.e. their interfirm dependence (Grandori and Soda, 1995; Gulati and Singh, 
1998; Tushman, 1977; van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig, 1976). In terms of interfirm 
dependence, one side of the spectrum is occupied by alliances that require considerable joint 
efforts of parties in order to achieve the goals set forth in the alliance contract (for instance, 
joint research projects). The other side of the spectrum consists of fairly simple alliances (for 
instance, ‘technology for cash’ agreements) where there is little interfirm dependence in the 
actual work being done through an alliance (Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996). 
 At the outset of an alliance, i.e. the contract signing date, the anticipated level of the 
degree to which parties need to work together in order to achieve alliance goals creates 
ambiguity about how to coordinate these efforts (Gulati and Singh, 1998). In alliances in 
which there is a strict separation between both the activities to be performed under the 
contract and the different roles of both parties, the need for mutual adaptation and 
communication can be characterized as low. In contrast, in alliances where it is difficult, or 
even impossible, to attribute individual activities to a particular alliance partner, i.e., the 
activities of firms are highly interdependent, parties need to frequently communicate and 
coordinate their efforts in order to achieve the alliance goals. As such, I anticipate that for 
alliances that involve a higher level of interfirm dependence induced by collaborative 
activities, the number of stipulated coordination committees will be larger compared to 
alliances which are characterized by relatively lower levels of interfirm dependence.15 
                                                 
15 The proposed relationship is to some extent subject to the criticism that both the dependent and the 
independent variable are conceptually related, i.e., the number of coordination committees may itself be a 
measure for the level of interfirm dependence. However, similar to previous contributions (e.g. Gulati and Singh, 
1998; van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig, 1976) I maintain that studying the proposed relationship has merit for 
two reasons. First, studies on the intrafirm level show that increased task interdependence increases the use of 
some coordination mechanisms, but decreases the use of other coordination mechanisms (van de Ven, Delbecq 
and Koenig, 1976). In that sense, a large number of committees stipulated in a collaboration contract may 
actually be a sign of a relatively low level of task interdependence between parties. Indeed, when task 
interdependence is low, firms may be unaware of each other’s day-to-day activities and developments, and 
stipulate several coordination committees to periodically assess each other’s progress under the agreement and to 
make adjustments to their collaboration if necessary. Second, low or high task interdependence may not be 
reflected in the number of coordination mechanisms, but rather in the extent to which they are used ex-post.  
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Hypothesis 3. The number of coordination committees stipulated in an alliance contract is 
larger for an alliance characterized by high interfirm dependence compared to an 
alliance characterized by lower interfirm dependence. 
3.2.3 Geographical distance 
Departing from a focus on the nature of the alliance activity, I turn to the geographical 
distance between firms in explaining their propensity to stipulate coordination committees. 
Based on a number of previous studies, I suggest that the number of coordination committees 
is positively related to the geographical distance between partner firms. 
 Collaborative R&D tasks require an ongoing coordination of activities and interfirm 
communication (Hoegl and Proserpio, 2004). Nevertheless, previous research suggests that 
parties’ ability to engage in information rich and informal communication is largely 
dependent on the geographical distance between them (Andersen, 1999; Grinter, Herbsleb and 
Perry, 1999; Hoegl and Proserpio, 2004; Olsen and Olsen, 2000; Torre and Rallet, 2005; 
Whittington, Owen-Smith and Powell, 2009). For geographically dispersed firms, casual and 
unplanned meetings to discuss progress of collaborative endeavors might be problematic. By 
comparison, geographically proximate firms are likely to be able to rely on informal 
communication to coordinate their collaborative activities. As a result, geographically 
dispersed firms might turn to more formal mechanisms of coordination to substitute for their 
lacking ability to meet on an ad hoc basis (Hoegl and Proserpio, 2004; Olsen and Olsen, 2000; 
Whittington, Owen-Smith and Powell, 2009). Ad hoc communication is just one method by 
which alliance parties can coordinate their activities (Grinter, Herbsleb and Perry, 1999), and 
alternative coordination mechanisms such as coordination committees might substitute for 
them. 
 In light of the above arguments, I expect that alliance partners located in close 
geographical proximity stipulate only few coordination committees. As the geographical 
distance increases, I expect that the number of coordination committees increases to 
compensate for the diminished possibility of meeting informally. Hence: 
Hypothesis 4. There is a positive association between the geographical distance between 
alliance parties and the number of incorporated coordination committees in an alliance 
contract.  
The above four hypotheses all focus on relatively static elements, i.e., transaction related 
features and geographical distance between partner firms, and the relationship with the 
number of stipulated coordination committees in R&D alliance contracts. However, ample 
evidence exists that parties do not contract in a vacuum but learn from previous experiences 
and adapt subsequent contracts accordingly (e.g. Argyres, Bercovitz and Mayer, 2007). For 
relatively complex alliances, such as R&D collaborations, designing adequate contractual 
coordination mechanisms is a non-straightforward task (Grandori, 1997; Schreiner, Kale and 
Corsten, 2009) and I expect strong dynamic, experience-based features in the design of these 
coordination devices.  
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3.2.4 Alliance experience 
From a neoclassical contracting perspective, interfirm contracts serve a twofold purpose. 
First, contracts set out the legal rules and responsibilities parties are deemed to adhere to 
during contract execution. Second, contracts are designed to facilitate collaboration and 
communication in order to achieve the alliance goals. In the latter context, Doz (1996) finds 
that, over time, parties learn to device coordination mechanisms in order to support their 
collaborative endeavors. This is supported by Grandori (1997) and Schreiner, Kale and 
Corsten (2009) who state that designing these contractual coordination mechanisms is not a 
simple and straightforward task but a task that requires experience. Firms with more alliance 
experience often possess dedicated alliance personnel, such as R&D alliance managers, 
primarily tasked with facilitating interorganizational coordination (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 
2002; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). This suggests that inexperienced alliance parties tend to 
underestimate the importance of the coordination aspect of contracts and furthermore lack the 
ability to maintain elaborate coordination committee structures, while more experienced 
alliance parties probably do not.  
 In light of the above, I expect that experienced alliance parties will contractually specify 
more coordination committees for two reasons. First, although drafting complete contracts is 
prohibitively costly and often impossible (Williamson, 1985), parties can learn from previous 
experiences (Levitt and March, 1988) and incorporate subsequent changes in their alliance 
contracts (Argyres, Bercovitz and Mayer, 2007; Luo, 2002). As lack of sufficient interfirm 
coordination is often associated with alliance failure (Doz, 1996; Park and Ungson, 2001), I 
expect that, in terms of the number of contractually specified coordination committees, 
experienced alliance parties are inclined to pay more attention to the second function of an 
alliance contract, namely, to facilitate collaboration and communication. Second, I not only 
expect that experienced alliance firms are more aware of the necessity to collaboratively guide 
the alliance and to frequently communicate with their partner, but they are also more able to 
do so. Compared to relatively inexperienced firms, more experienced firms have a better 
understanding of where and how to tap into their internal resources and to employ these 
resources in support of the alliance objectives (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002; Kotabe, Martin 
and Domoto, 2003). In addition, Schilke and Goerzen (2010) find a significant and positive 
relationship between the alliance experience of firms and alliance structures, i.e., 
“…specialized organizational units and personnel dedicated to the management of strategic 
alliances” (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010, p. 1194). Firms with more alliance experience are thus 
more likely to have dedicated alliance personnel such as alliance managers, R&D project 
leaders, and communication liaisons tasked with interfirm communication and coordination. I 
therefore posit that when both firms have at least some alliance experience, one is more likely 
to observe a range of coordination committees. If one alliance party has none or only limited 
alliance experience, I expect that it will fail to supply the demanded dedicated alliance 
personnel necessary to maintain a host of coordination committees. Hence: 
Hypothesis 5. There is a positive association between the alliance experience of the least 
experienced alliance party and the number of incorporated coordination committees in an 
alliance contract. 
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3.3 Data, methods, and sample description 
My sample covers a set of 304 R&D alliance contracts in the biopharmaceutical industry 
obtained from Pharmaventures, a UK-based information and consulting firm. Pharmaventures 
has identified thousands of alliances in the biopharmaceutical sector in their PharmaDeals 
database. The collected deals are grouped into a number of categories, such as collaborative 
R&D, distribution/marketing, manufacturing/supply, and business acquisition. For each 
agreement, the PharmaDeals database provides information on the names of the partners, type 
of contractual relationship, date deal signed, equity investment, relevant product areas and 
technology fields, press releases and, where available, the actual contracts. These actual 
contracts were obtained from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings 
and Pharmaventures’ clients.  
 My dataset covers R&D alliance contracts and additional information for the period 1996 
through 2005. I collected information on alliances where the main focus is on collaborative 
R&D and for which PharmaDeals includes an actual legal document (contract). In addition, 
all alliances fall within the biopharmaceutical industry. By specifically focusing on the 
biopharmaceutical industry, I can be assured that variation in contracting terms and 
coordination committees does not come from a variation in the underlying industrial 
contracting environment. Moreover, by only including R&D alliances, I do not contaminate 
the sample with alliances that focus primarily on different parts in the value chain that might 
differ in degree and kind in terms of coordination requirements. 
 The preliminary sample comprised 587 deals for the period 1996-2005. To avoid further 
unnecessary heterogeneity I excluded all the agreements where: 
• one of the parties is a government agency or university 
• the alliance is, as stated in the contract, a renegotiation or restatement of a previous 
alliance between the firms 
• there is no R&D component to the alliance 
• one firm has a controlling interest in the other firm (greater than 50%) 
• contracts involve more than two parties. 
 The final contract database contains a set of 304 contracts. These contracts represent the 
first interaction between the firms as found in the PharmaDeals dataset for the period 1996-
2005. Because I look at the first interaction of parties in the period 1996-2005, an alliance 
contract between firms A and B appears only once in the final dataset. 
 The agreements include both U.S. (domestic) contracts, i.e., the contracting parties are 
both U.S.-based firms (176 alliances), and international contracts, i.e., a U.S.-based firm 
collaborates with a non-U.S. based firm (128 alliances). A total of 284 firms were involved in 
the 304 contracts and about 55% of the agreements were concluded between a biotech firm 
and a pharmaceutical or a chemical firm.   
 I collected additional information on the size of firms, their R&D expenditures, their US 
patents, alliance experience, and prior ties between partners for the firms participating in these 
304 deals. The complete dataset combines information from PharmaDeals with data retrieved 
from firm annual reports, the Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators (CATI) 
database, Datastream, Compustat, LexisNexis, Corptech, and the USPTO. 
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3.3.1 Dependent variable 
Coordination committees. I measure coordination committees by counting the number of 
committees stipulated by parties in an R&D alliance contract excluding those which assign 
unilateral control rights. Previous research in this area has mainly equated contingency 
planning with contractual complexity (e.g. Poppo and Zenger, 2002). More specifically, this 
stream of research investigates the determinants of the degree to which contracts between 
alliance parties are customized. Similar to Reuer and Ariño (2007) I sidestep such an 
approach, by taking a more focused look at the specific contractual coordination mechanisms 
through which alliance parties guide their alliance. In addition, I focus on the number of 
bilateral contractual coordination mechanisms that parties stipulate in their contract. Given the 
joint R&D nature of my sample, the alliance process is often perceived as cooperative, 
emphasizing joint problem solving (Grandori, 1997). As such, looking at coordination 
committees that facilitate mutual adjustment between parties (Adler, 1995), seems more 
appropriate. 
 Previous studies on interfirm coordination (e.g. Reuer and Ariño, 2007) look at the 
addition of clauses such as ‘Notification rights for departures from the agreement’ and 
‘Auditing rights’. I subscribe to the importance of contracts as coordination mechanisms, but 
deviate from this line of research on three crucial elements. First, the clauses mentioned in the 
above have a strong control connotation as they seem to be more related to monitoring than to 
interfirm bilateral coordination that requires input from both parties. This could, for instance, 
explain the negative relationship between prior ties and coordination provisions found by 
Reuer and Ariño (2007). Here, I focus on more collaborative interfirm coordination 
mechanisms, i.e., coordination committees. These coordination committees are put in place to 
facilitate mutual problem solving and aid in the collaborative guidance of the alliance. 
 Second, papers focusing on contractual complexity (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Hagedoorn 
and Hesen, 2009) usually assume that more comprehensive contracts include responses to a 
wider array of known contingencies. I extend this perspective by explicitly focusing on 
coordination mechanisms used to promote mutual decision making and to facilitate 
communication concerning contingencies unknown at the signing date of the alliance. 
 Third, in most previous research, interfirm coordination through contracts is measured 
through survey responses (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Reuer and Ariño, 2007). I operationalize 
interfirm coordination through a count of coordination committees as mentioned in the actual 
contract. While most literature does underline that different alliances require different 
coordination mechanisms in support of their formal contracts (see for instance Grandori, 
1997), the number of empirical studies actually focusing on these coordination provisions in 
contracts is limited (Furlotti, 2007). 
3.3.2 Independent variables 
Technological uncertainty. The PharmaDeals database provides information on the stages of 
the innovation process underlying the deal. These stages refer to an early stage of 
collaborative research and a later stage of co-development of new products. Alliances 
focusing on the later development stage often start from a pre-defined set of technologies that 
are further developed into commercial applications (Freeman and Soete, 1997), and hence, 
represent limited technological uncertainty. In contrast to this, alliances that involve more 
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research oriented activities are characterized by a multitude of possible research options and 
inherent uncertainty caused by the experimental nature of these activities (Freeman and Soete, 
1997; Nelson, 1961). I use a dummy variable that equals 0 if the alliance contract concerns 
co-development of products and 1 if it refers to collaborative research endeavors.  
 Transactional complexity. As indicated in the above, all alliances in the sample have an 
R&D component. However, many alliances also include additional activities such as 
marketing, distribution and/or manufacturing. Such additional activities increase the 
transactional complexity of the alliance by broadening its scope (Ryall and Sampson, 2009; 
Sampson, 2004b). Moreover, the interdependent nature of these activities introduces 
additional complexity as these interrelations have to be managed. I therefore include a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if any additional activities are included besides R&D and 0 otherwise. 
 Interfirm dependence. Although all alliances in my dataset involve two firms working 
together in research and/or development, responsibilities for particular tasks are not 
necessarily symmetrically divided. In fact, it is not unusual in the biopharmaceutical industry 
that one firm is responsible for the bulk of the research activities while its partner is more 
involved with market-oriented activities such as marketing (Lerner and Malmendier, 2010). 
An alliance can involve a rather unidirectional work flow whereby, for instance, one firm 
screens validated targets against molecules, i.e., compounds, provided by the other firm (see 
Stuart, Ozdemir and Ding (2007) for a short summary of the drug development process). I 
proxy interfirm dependence by whether or not the alliance involves contract R&D, i.e., 
whether the bulk of the research and/or development is the main responsibility of one the 
alliance parties. In such a case, activities within the scope of the alliance require less mutual 
adaptation which is likely to be reflected in the number of stipulated coordination committees 
(van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig, 1976). Most R&D alliances include an R&D plan with 
specific responsibilities for these R&D activities. If it is stated in the contract that the tasks 
and deliverables defined under the R&D plan guide the efforts of only one party, the 
interdependent nature of alliance activities is relatively low. As such, I use a dummy variable 
that equals 0 if the R&D plan guides the efforts of only one party, i.e., the interfirm 
dependence is low, and 1 otherwise.16 
 Geographical distance. Using data from PharmaDeals I was able to determine the 
geographical locations of both firms participating in an alliance on a city level. Previous 
literature has measured the geographical distance between two regions or cities in various 
ways. Most common are driving time, driving distance, and geodetic distance.  I use the direct 
great circle distance (‘as the crow flies’). Given the latitudes and longitudes of two cities, 
distance is calculated as:  
 
ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁ = ߮ ∗ ߱, with;  
߮ = ݁ܽݎݐℎ	ݎܽ݀݅ݑݏ 
߱ = arccos(cos(90 − ݈ܽݐଶ) cos(90 − ݈ܽݐଵ) + sin(90 − ݈ܽݐଶ) sin(90 − ݈ܽݐଵ) cos(݈݋݊ଶ −
݈݋݊ଵ))	  
And ݃݁݋݃ݎܽ݌ℎ݈݅ܿܽ	݀݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁ = log	(1 + ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁) 
 
                                                 
16 The definition of this variable implies that those alliances that do not include an R&D plan are classified as 
involving high interfirm dependence. I therefore rerun the models on the subset of alliances in which parties 
stipulate an R&D plan. Results are similar to those presented here.  
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I add plus one to the distance to account for a few firms that are located in the same city. 
 Alliance experience. Using the CATI database, I obtained the prior R&D alliance 
experience of both firms in a five year window prior to the start of the R&D alliance. Based 
on interpretations of past alliance experiences (Levitt and March, 1998), firms may alter the 
degree and kind of coordination provisions stipulated in an R&D alliance contract. In 
addition, firms with more alliance experience are more likely to have routines in place to 
support the focal alliance and have a more comprehensive overview of where and how to 
leverage internal resources in support of the alliance objectives (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002). 
For each R&D alliance, I take the five-year alliance experience of the partner firm with the 
least experience.17  
3.3.3 Control variables 
Size asymmetry. This asymmetry indicates a dependence of a smaller alliance party on its 
larger partner in terms of market capabilities (e.g. distribution or marketing) and financial 
resources (Park and Ungson, 2001).18 Consequently, size asymmetry might influence the 
willingness of the larger partner to work things out and to put less effort in collaborative 
decision making mechanisms. I control for the effect of this inequality in interfirm 
dependency on the number of coordination committees by subtracting the logarithm of the net 
sales of the smallest firm from the largest. 
 R&D asymmetry. For complex technologies, the difficulty of transferring knowledge 
across firm boundaries is substantial if the recipient firm does not have the capabilities to 
absorb the technology (Teece, 1977). A large gap in R&D capabilities between partner firms 
might increase coordination difficulties as parties will find it more difficult to coordinate 
technical aspects of the R&D alliance with each other. Therefore, I construct a measure 
similar to size asymmetry by subtracting the logarithm of R&D expenses of the firm with the 
smallest R&D budget from its partner.  
 Alliance experience asymmetry. For my hypothesis 5, I am interested in the alliance 
experience of the firm with the least alliance experience. To rule out any confounding effects 
of the difference in alliance experience between partner firms with the alliance experience of 
the least experienced alliance firm, I control for the former (see the description of the variable 
‘alliance experience’ for a more elaborate description of the data).19 
 Prior ties. Using the CATI database, I searched for the number of prior ties between 
alliance partners, counting back five years from the start of the R&D alliance (see also Gulati, 
1995). I take these prior ties to measure the earlier interaction between parties that indicates 
the degree to which partners have been able to learn about each other’s capabilities (see also 
Argyres, Bercovitz, and Mayer, 2007; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004; Ryall and Sampson, 2009).  
                                                 
17 I also considered whether the results for alliance experience are due to minimum partner size and/or minimum 
partner R&D expenses by explicitly controlling for these factors. These variables do not seem to be significantly 
related to the number of coordination committees and do not alter the current findings for alliance experience. 
Hence, they are not included.   
18 I also considered a more explicit measure of financial constraints asymmetry based on net income. This 
measure was not significant, and left the results unaltered. Therefore, I do not explicitly control for financial 
constraints asymmetry.  
19 Alternatively, I control for the maximum alliance experience. Results remain similar to those presented here. 
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 Competition. Collaborating firms that can be regarded as competitors are likely to be 
more careful in exposing and sharing information via coordination committees. Indeed, 
partnerships between competitors are characterized by an increased effort of firms to limit the 
chance of unintended knowledge leakage (Lhuillery and Pfister, 2009). Therefore, I control 
for the level of competition between alliance participants based on their SIC codes (Mowery, 
Oxley and Silverman, 1996). Using data from Thomson ONE Banker, this variable takes on a 
value of 2 if both parties operate in the same primary 4-digit SIC code, 1 if both parties do not 
operate in the same primary 4-digit SIC code but do operate in the same 3-digit SIC code, and 
0 otherwise. 
 Equity. For each R&D alliance contract, PharmaDeals reports whether or not equity is 
involved. As the acquisition of part of a firm generates control in the R&D alliance (Oxley, 
1997), this could be reflected in the number of stipulated coordination committees. A dummy 
variable was created which equals 1 if one of the firms takes an equity stake in its partner and 
0 otherwise. 
 Potential technology applications. For each R&D alliance, PharmaDeals lists the number 
of possible technological interest areas for the products and/or technologies developed 
through that alliance, with a maximum of eight interest areas. I interpret these interest areas 
for a product and/or a technology in terms of the number of potential technology 
applications.20 
 Finite time horizon. There are two reasons why contracts with a finite time horizon are 
likely to differ from open-ended alliances in terms of the number of stipulated coordination 
committees. First, the anticipated gains from mutual cooperation are likely to be smaller in 
contracts with a finite time horizon compared to more open-ended contracts (Parkhe, 1993). 
This shadow of the future might influence the willingness of parties to stipulate a number of 
coordination committees at the contract signing date. Second, although contracts with a finite 
time horizon are not necessarily shorter in duration compared to more open-ended alliances, 
they often are. The longer the term of the contract, the more difficult it becomes to ex-ante 
specify all possible contingencies. For R&D contracts with a longer time horizon, it can even 
be desirable to fill in some details later during the R&D alliance (Coase, 1937). Especially for 
contracts with no predefined ending date, parties’ ability to ex-ante stipulate responses to all 
possible disturbances is low.  
 In light of the above, I expect that whether or not an R&D alliance has a finite time 
horizon will affect the number of coordination committees incorporated in a contract. This 
dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if there is a predefined ending date of the alliance 
contract, and 0 otherwise. 
 Deal value. For each R&D alliance, PharmaDeals gives information about the (potential) 
deal value if available. In addition, I collected additional deal value data from the LexisNexis 
database. For alliances with a larger deal value, parties have incentives to communicate and 
respond collaboratively to unanticipated contingencies in order to increase the chances of 
success of the alliance (Doz, 1996). Therefore, I control for the effect of (potential) deal value 
on the number of coordination committees by incorporating the logarithm of (potential) deal 
value in millions of dollars. If information about the deal value is missing, this variable is 
equaled to zero. 
                                                 
20 This measure also relates to technological complexity, as the combination of different knowledge sets will 
inevitably complicate the R&D process. 
48 
 Deal value dummy. I control for missing information concerning deal value. If 
information concerning the (potential) deal value of an alliance is missing, this dummy 
variable takes on a value of 1 and 0 otherwise.21 
 Year fixed effects. I control for temporal trends in alliances and include dummy variables 
for the period 1996-2005 with the year 1996 as the reference year. 
3.3.4 Analysis 
In the following, I present a Poisson model using robust standard errors with the total number 
of coordination committees as dependent variable. In addition and in unreported regressions, I 
used a ordered logit estimator, and a tobit estimator that specifically takes into account the 
lower and upper bound of the dependent variable. Results of these analyses are similar to 
those presented in this paper. 
 Some firms in my sample appear more than once. It is probable that firm A’s behavior in 
alliance A-B with partner B is not independent of firm A’s behavior in alliance A-C with 
partner C. Correlated error terms at the firm level can cause underestimated standard errors 
for firm attributes that remain constant over multiple contracts. PharmaDeals makes a 
distinction between the principal technology supplying firm, and the partner firm. I cluster the 
standard errors in the empirical analysis by partner firm, because these firms have the largest 
likelihood of repeat occurrence in the sample. In unreported regressions I additionally, similar 
to the approach followed by Lerner and Malmendier (2010), include firm dummies for the 10 
most frequently occurring firms in my sample. While some of these frequently occurring 
firms seem to consistently and significantly stipulate more or less coordination committees, 
the variables of interest are little affected regarding both their statistical significance as their 
economic magnitude. Besides alleviating the concern that reoccurring firms in my sample bias 
the presented results, this approach also, to some extent, lessens endogeneity concerns. More 
specifically, the approach relaxes the concern that unobserved firm characteristics actually 
drive the presented results. For example, by including firm dummies, we can be more 
confident in the result that the level of interfirm dependence is actually related to the number 
of stipulated coordination committees, rather than certain types of companies only entering 
into agreements with relatively low or high levels of interfirm dependence combined with a 
relatively low or high number of coordination committees. 
3.4 Results 
Descriptive statistics detailing the mean, standard deviations and bivariate correlations of the 
variables are shown in Table 3.1. None of the bivariate correlations exceed the usual 0.7 cut-
off value except for the correlation between deal value and deal value dummy, and the 
                                                 
21 Although frequently used (see, for instance, Bastos (2010), Griliches (1976), Khorana, Servaes and Tufano 
(2009), Singh (2008); Smith and Huang (1995)), this method of dealing with missing values has its drawbacks, 
as do alternative methods. In unreported analyses, I use four other methods to deal with missing values to 
investigate whether or not results change depending on which method I use. First, I run a regression without 
controlling for value. Second, I run a regression in which I only control for whether or not information on value 
is missing. Third, I limit the sample to only those observations for which I was able to retrieve information on 
the value of alliances. Fourth and last, based on a host of observable variables, I estimate the value of an alliance 
if this information is missing, and use these estimates in the full model. Results were not strikingly different and 
in general agreed with the results reported here. 
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average VIF statistics remain well under the cut-off value of 10. I refer to footnote 21 for a 
more elaborate discussion on deal value and deal value dummy. Table 3.2 presents the results 
of the Poisson estimator. Model 1 in Table 3.2 refers to the basic model with only control 
variables included. In subsequent models 2-6, each hypothesis-related independent variable is 
added and in model 7 all independent variables and control variables are incorporated. 
Alternatively, starting with the basic model and for each model adding an independent 
variable does not alter my results. 
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Hypothesis 1 states that parties to an alliance characterized by high technological uncertainty, 
compared to an R&D alliance characterized by lower technological uncertainty, specify more 
coordination committees in their contract. I find no support for this hypothesis in models 2 
and 7. I do find support, see models 3 and 7, for hypothesis 2 which predicts that the number 
of coordination committees stipulated in an alliance contract increases with the transactional 
complexity of that alliance. I also find support for hypothesis 3 that predicts that the number 
of coordination committees specified in an R&D alliance contract is larger for an alliance 
characterized by high interfirm dependence. Models 4 and 7 show the expected significant 
and positive signs. I do not find any support for my hypothesis 4 which posited that 
geographically dispersed firms stipulate more coordination committees, see models 5 and 7. 
Finally, I also find support for hypothesis 5 which states that alliance experience is positively 
related to the number of coordination committees stipulated by alliance parties. Models 6 and 
7 show the expected significant positive relationship. 
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Table 3.2 Poisson model estimation results of coordination committees 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Variable
Technological uncertainty -0.107 -0.122
(0.086) (0.076)
Transactional complexity 0.200 * 0.164 *
(0.102) (0.096)
Interfirm dependence 0.432 *** 0.446 ***
(0.133) (0.125)
Geographical distance 0.029 0.020
(0.031) (0.030)
Alliance experience 0.035 *** 0.037 ***
(0.010) (0.012)
Size asymmetry -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.010 -0.003 -0.008
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
R&D asymmetry -0.062 * -0.062 * -0.058 * -0.063 * -0.061 * -0.067 * -0.063 *
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
Alliance experience asymmetry 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Prior ties 0.160 0.167 0.203 0.205 0.159 0.098 0.191
(0.138) (0.146) (0.135) (0.131) (0.138) (0.135) (0.131)
Competition -0.050 -0.051 -0.052 -0.068 -0.050 -0.053 -0.074
(0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.055) (0.058) (0.057) (0.053)
Equity 0.091 0.090 0.064 0.101 0.094 0.117 0.109
(0.111) (0.109) (0.108) (0.107) (0.110) (0.106) (0.098)
Potential technology applications -0.016 -0.008 -0.012 -0.016 -0.018 -0.031 -0.019
(0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
Finite time horizon -0.046 -0.041 -0.052 -0.109 -0.024 -0.040 -0.088
(0.136) (0.135) (0.133) (0.137) (0.138) (0.132) (0.134)
Deal value 0.283 *** 0.276 *** 0.264 *** 0.283 *** 0.287 *** 0.272 *** 0.249 ***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.043) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046)
Deal value dummy 0.561 *** 0.549 *** 0.505 ** 0.565 *** 0.578 *** 0.568 *** 0.524 ***
(0.198) (0.198) (0.205) (0.189) (0.201) (0.194) (0.193)
Year fixed effects X X X X X X X
Constant -0.468 * -0.404 -0.495 * -0.750 *** -0.640 * -0.425 -0.784 **
(0.265) (0.272) (0.265) (0.286) (0.352) (0.268) (0.370)
Log pseudolikelihood -431.5 -431.0 -429.7 -426.5 -431.0 -428.7 -420.9
Observations 304 304 304 304 304 304 304
Notes: Poisson model, robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
* significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.
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Regarding the control variables, I find consistent significant effects for two variables. First, I 
find that a larger R&D asymmetry is negatively related to the propensity of alliance parties to 
stipulate a number of coordination committees. Second, I find a significant and positive 
relationship between the (potential) deal value of the alliance and the number of coordination 
committees.  
3.5 Alternative explanations 
Coordination committees. Although most coordination committees have a similar function, 
some coordination committees differ in kind. More specifically, I investigated the possibility 
that more hierarchical decision making actually drives the results. To do so, I first excluded 
steering committees from the count of the number of coordination committees when other 
committees are also stipulated in the contract. In these cases, the steering committee often 
functions as a management committee that supervises the other committees and coordinates 
the overall strategy of the alliance. Results remain qualitatively similar to those presented in 
this paper. In addition, I investigated whether committees are incorporated in contracts 
individually, in which case the correlations between the occurrence of different kinds of 
committees can be expected to be relatively low, or as a bundle, in which case I expect higher 
correlations between the occurrence of different kinds of committees. Therefore, I 
investigated the correlations between the most frequently occurring committees (to exclude 
the possibility of spurious significant correlations because of limited observations). I find no 
evidence of clustering of coordination committees as correlations remain (very) low.  
 Also, I excluded committees that allocate unilateral control to one party from my 
dependent variable based on my interest in the interfirm coordination aspect of contracts, 
rather than the interfirm control aspect that is highlighted in much of the previous literature on 
alliance contracts. In an additional and unreported analysis, I control for the number of 
committees aimed at control in the main regressions. I find a significant and negative 
correlation between the number of committees aimed at coordination and those aimed at 
control, while the presented results remain intact. This hints at the proposition that contracts 
seem to be either coordination focused, or more oriented towards control (Salbu, 1997).  
 Transactional complexity and interfirm coordination. The proxy I use for transactional 
complexity refers to the scope of an alliance (Ryall and Sampson, 2009; Sampson, 2004b). 
Stated otherwise, I check whether the parties perform additional activities besides R&D. The 
hypothesis and finding that additional activities in an alliance increase the need for more 
coordination committees perhaps seems obvious at first. It is however possible, that not all 
additional activities will influence the number of coordination committees equally, or even 
significantly. The low level of significance (10%) for the transactional complexity variable 
already indicates the plausibility of such an explanation. Additional analyses provide some 
support for this claim. For instance, inclusion of ‘manufacture/supply’ in addition to R&D 
activities does not seem to significantly increase the number of coordination committees 
stipulated by alliance parties. The aforementioned indicates that in general additional 
activities besides R&D increase the number of stipulated coordination committees, but that 
this finding could depend on the specific types of additional activities. Further research 
leveraging a more detailed dataset could further investigate this.   
 Geographical distance. The hypothesis for geographical distance is largely dependent on 
the claim that proximate alliance parties have informal means of coordination at their disposal 
54 
not directly available to geographically dispersed firms. Of course, this level of informal 
coordination might drop rapidly after a certain cut-off point. Therefore, I empirically 
investigated this possibility using dummy variables for 10, 20, 50, 100 and 250 miles of 
distance between collaborating firms. The presented results remain unchanged as I do not find 
any significant link between the geographical distance between alliance parties and their 
propensity to stipulate coordination committees. 
3.6 Discussion and conclusions 
From my theoretical perspective, interfirm contracts are not to be seen as mere legal devices 
but also as mechanisms to promote adjustability, joint problem solving and communication, 
i.e., I subscribe to a neoclassical contracting perspective. In line with this neoclassical 
contracting perspective, I argue that to some extent parties have the ability to ex-ante include 
institutions in their agreement to govern their behavior and guide the alliance while the legal 
core of the contract still functions as a reference point for adaptations (Williamson, 1979). In 
my current contribution I apply this neoclassical contracting perspective to study several 
conditions associated with varying reliance on coordination committees as stipulated in R&D 
alliance contracts in the biopharmaceutical industry. These conditions stem from farsighted, 
but incomplete, contracting (Williamson, 1996). Thus while parties to an alliance do have the 
ability to ex-ante include responses to contingencies, they only have so to a limited degree. 
Similar to observed variation in coordination at the intrafirm level (e.g. van de Ven, Delbecq 
and Koenig, 1976), I find several conditions critical in explaining the number of stipulated 
coordination committees in these interfirm alliances. More specifically, the nature of alliance 
activities in terms of transactional complexity and interfirm dependence, and the alliance 
experience of partners are found to be relevant in explaining the number of contractually 
specified coordination committees in R&D alliances.  
 Transactional complexity of alliances is one of the elements of the condition that refers to 
the nature of the activities undertaken within the scope of alliances. For R&D alliances 
characterized by low transactional complexity, with only a limited set of interrelated 
activities, parties can be relatively farsighted in terms of including contingencies in their 
contract (Williamson, 1996; 1999). Consequently, parties to an alliance low on transactional 
complexity have the ability to include a wide array of potential disturbances in their alliance 
contract, i.e., these contracts are less incomplete. Hence, the need for interfirm 
communication and mutual adjustment during contract execution is limited. However, for 
alliances characterized by higher transactional complexity, with a wider set of interrelated 
activities, the farsightedness of parties is limited (Williamson, 1996; 1999). These alliances 
involve a larger set of interrelated activities which decreases the ability of parties to ex-ante 
stipulate contingencies in the contract. Therefore, alliances characterized by higher 
transactional complexity require more communication and mutual adjustment during contract 
execution. Hence, R&D alliance contracts characterized by higher transactional complexity 
are associated with the stipulation of a larger number of coordination committees that 
facilitate communication and promote mutual adjustments in response to changing 
circumstances. However, as discussed in the section on alternative explanations, this 
relationship could be contingent on the specific types of additional activities. 
 Another element regarding the nature of alliance activities refers to interfirm dependence, 
i.e., the extent to which partners are dependent on each other for execution of the activities 
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within the scope of the alliance. For relatively simple contracts, i.e., those that require only 
limited joint efforts, I find that the number of stipulated coordination committees is 
significantly lower compared to alliances of a more collaborative nature. In that sense, my 
findings align with studies at the intrafirm level (e.g. van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig, 1976) 
which find that as unit personnel becomes more dependent on each other to execute their 
individual jobs, the number of meetings through committees increases. My results indicate 
that a similar mechanism occurs at the interfirm level, i.e., as the interdependence between 
firms for execution of the activities within the scope of the alliance increases, the number of 
coordination committees to communicate and facilitate joint-decision making also rises. 
 I posited that through previous collaborations with other parties, firms gain experience 
and learn about best practices and adjust subsequent contracts accordingly. As a lack of 
sufficient interfirm coordination has frequently been associated with alliance failure, one can 
expect that experienced firms pay more attention to designing and drafting the coordination 
element of alliance contracts. In addition, besides an increased willingness to adapt 
subsequent contracts based on coordination struggles in the past, more experienced firms are 
also better able to make the required changes in the level of interfirm coordination. These 
firms often have a more comprehensive overview of the required internal resources and they 
know how to configure these resources in order to support collaborative alliance objectives. In 
addition, more experienced firms are very likely to have more personnel available specifically 
tasked with managing and coordinating alliances. Therefore, these firms are better able to 
maintain and support elaborate committee structures to promote interorganizational 
coordination. In line with these arguments, I indeed find that the alliance experience of 
partners is positively associated with the number of coordination committees stipulated in an 
R&D alliance contract.22 This finding extends research on firm learning (e.g. Argyres, 
Bercovitz and Mayer, 2007; Argyres and Mayer, 2007; Luo, 2002; Reuer, Ariño and 
Mellewigt, 2006; Ryall and Sampson, 2009) by claiming that more experienced firms, 
compared to relatively inexperienced firms, draft more contractual coordination mechanisms 
to support and guide the overall alliance endeavors. This finding also speaks to the debate 
about a firms’ ability to tap into internal resources and leverage these resources in support of 
collaborative alliance goals (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002; Kotabe, Martin and Domoto, 2003), 
and their ability to maintain elaborate committee structures by means of dedicated alliance 
personnel (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). Indeed, experienced 
alliance firms seem to have an innate capability to maintain high levels of interfirm 
coordination (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). 
 Contrary to my expectations, there appears to be no relationship between technological 
uncertainty and the number of coordination committees stipulated in an R&D alliance 
contract. I anticipated that higher levels of technological uncertainty could, given unexpected 
changes, potentially lead to more deviations from the initial contract. Under these conditions, 
contract parties would rather translate these deviations into a larger number of coordination 
                                                 
22 Alternatively, one could claim that the total alliance experience rather than the minimum alliance experience 
is what matters in explaining the number of coordination committees. Based on model 7 in Table 3.2, I am able 
to exclude this explanation. .2 DifMinTot +=  Let α be the coefficient for the minimum, and β the coefficient 
for the difference in alliance experience. Now suppose α=2β. Then 
.)2(2 TotDifMinDifMinDifMinY βββββα =+=+=+=  As α≠2β (at the 5% level), I can conclude 
that the distribution within the total alliance experience matters.  
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committees to collaboratively respond to contingencies not accounted for in the initial 
contract. A possible explanation for the lack of empirical support for the aforementioned 
proposed relationship is that technological uncertainty is translated into ex-post usage of 
coordination committees. In the current research setting, I am only to some extent able to 
make inferences about ex-post usage of coordination committees as they stipulate a minimum 
number of meetings per year. To do so, I further inspect the contractual structure of research 
committees. More specifically, I investigate the minimum number of meetings as stipulated 
within these research committee clauses. Most research committees (around 69%) meet a 
minimum of four times per year, followed by not stipulated (15%), two times (9%), twelve 
times (5%), and three times (2%) per year. However, parties can meet more often than the 
minimum number of meetings per year. Therefore, while technological uncertainty is not 
reflected in the number of stipulated coordination committees, technological uncertainty could 
be translated in more intensive ex-post usage of these coordination committees.  
 This paper is susceptible to the criticism that I paint an overly positive image of interfirm 
coordination. Indeed, I assume that more communication between alliance partners is positive 
when pursuing collaborative goals. However, a number of previous contributions point 
toward negative byproducts of (too much) interfirm communication for alliance firms. One 
particularly salient concern for alliance firms is the unintended loss of knowledge through 
extensive coordination mechanisms such as coordination committees (Contractor, Woodley 
and Piepenbrink, 2011; Faems et al., 2008; Gerwin, 2004; Oxley and Sampson, 2004), 
especially when collaborating with a competitor (Gerwin, 2004). My results shown in Table 
3.2 initially seem to provide little support for the claim that competitors limit the number of 
coordination committees in a contract. However, the absence of a relationship between the 
level of competition and the number of coordination committees could be partly attributed to 
the inclusion of many alliances in my sample that include equity investments. Equity 
investments align the incentives of involved parties and generate control (Pisano, 1989). A 
possible relationship between the level of competition and the number of coordination 
committees might therefore only hold in the subsample of non-equity alliances where parties 
can exert little control over each other’s behavior. In order to test the aforementioned, in 
unreported regressions, I run model 7 of Table 3.2 on the subsample of non-equity alliances. I 
indeed find a strong negative relationship between the level of competition between partner 
firms and the number of stipulated coordination committees in the subsample of non-equity 
alliances. This could indicate that absent control induced by equity participation, competitors 
conscientiously try to limit their interaction points via their contract to limit unintended 
knowledge leakage.    
 The empirical findings of my study indicate strong support for our understanding of the 
relation between the nature of the alliance activities, alliance experience, and the level of 
interfirm coordination. In that context, I take a more cooperative and supportive perspective 
on interfirm coordination by moving away from unilateral decision rights as stressed in most 
previous research (e.g. Lerner and Merges, 1998). The motivation for this shift is induced by 
findings about coordination at the intrafirm level, and the claim that alliances are often 
perceived as being much more supportive and cooperative than envisioned in most of the 
literature (Grandori, 1997). The results indicate that although the factors associated with 
varying degrees of interfirm coordination show resemblance to research examining 
coordination within firms (concerning the nature of activities), alliance experience and 
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competitive pressures are paramount in understanding contractually designed interfirm 
coordination.  
3.7 Limitations and future research directions 
Like any other study, this research has its limitations. These limitations offer interesting areas 
for further research. First, similar to other recent studies on contract design (e.g. Bengtsson, 
2011; Lumineau and Oxley, 2011), I am conservative in the empirical inferences I draw due 
to possible correlations of the error terms. Although I tried to minimize this risk by employing 
a range of control variables and performing several robustness checks, I stop short of claiming 
any causal link between exchange features and the inclusion of a number of coordination 
committees in the contract. I encourage future research that aims at unraveling the link(s) 
between exchange features and contractual governance structures. Second, I relate interfirm 
coordination to the stipulation of coordination committees in alliance contracts but I only have 
a limited understanding of the ex-post usage of these provisions. This could explain why I did 
not find a significant positive association between technological uncertainty and the number 
of coordination committees specified in a contract. Future research could focus more on the 
link between ex-ante interfirm coordination intent and the actual ex-post interfirm 
coordination. Third, it would be worthwhile to replicate this study in a different industrial 
contracting environment. In the current contribution, I focus on one industry, i.e., 
biopharmaceuticals, where the interdependence of alliance activities induces mutual problem 
solving. It would be interesting to see how the current findings hold up in different industrial 
contexts. Fourth, although this study leverages unique data while simultaneously controlling 
for a myriad of alternative explanations, the cross-sectional nature of my sample poses some 
restrictions. More specifically, I cannot observe changes in coordination committee clauses 
over time. Therefore, while the current research allows for inferences concerning the factors 
associated with the number of stipulated coordination committees in a contract, future 
research is necessary to focus on the evolving nature of these provisions over time. Fifth, the 
section on alternative explanations and robustness checks shows that not all additional 
activities seem to increase the propensity of parties to increase the number of stipulated 
coordination committees. Further research using a more fine-grained dataset could further 
investigate which specific activities warrant the stipulation of more coordination committees. 
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FOUR 
 
The Contractual Governance of Disputes in 
Biopharmaceutical Alliances23 
Abstract 
This paper examines how exchange complexity, environmental uncertainty, and the presence 
of a high-growth firm, may affect the choice of partnering firms engaging in a collaborative 
R&D alliance, to opt for different dispute resolution mechanisms. I distinguish between 
internal dispute resolution via hierarchy, and arbitration. Hypotheses are tested using a dataset 
of 304 R&D alliance contracts in the biopharmaceutical industry. The results suggest that 
firms experiencing increased exchange complexity shift their focus towards internal dispute 
resolution. More specifically, parties are more likely to place emphasis on internal dispute 
resolution when their alliance focuses on a relatively complex technology, or when the 
alliance has no pre-defined ending date. Parties to an international alliance are more likely to 
opt for arbitration in their contract. For domestic deals, the presence of a high-growth firm in 
an alliance is positively related to the likelihood of observing an arbitration clause in the 
corresponding contract. The results have implications for general TCE literature, and more 
specific literature on non-traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. 
  
                                                 
23 This work has benefited from helpful comments and suggestions by Martin Carree, Ranjay Gulati, John 
Hagedoorn, Geerte Hesen, Josh Lerner, Fabrice Lumineau, Kyle Mayer, and participants at seminars at 
Maastricht University, and participants at the 2012 Academy of Management conference and the 2012 Canadian 
Law and Economics conference. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Parties to an alliance characterized by substantial complexity and uncertainty inevitably have 
to deal with disputes emerging during their collaboration (Mayer and Teece, 2008). More 
general literature on interfirm contracting has recognized that parties conscientiously seek to 
limit the possibility that disputes will occur during their collaboration. For instance, Argyres 
and Mayer (2007) and Argyres, Bercovitz and Mayer (2007) suggest that over time managers 
and engineers more clearly stipulate roles and responsibilities in their contract to limit the 
possibility of future disputes. These contributions suggest that contract parties learn from 
previous disputes and design future contracts in such a way as to minimize the risk of 
potential disputes. Although these contributions significantly add to our understanding of how 
contract parties structure their contracts, they remain silent on predicting in which case what 
particular dispute resolution mechanism is more suitable. The link between alliance and firm 
properties and various dispute resolution mechanisms is conspicuously bereft of any empirical 
evidence. This despite its theoretical relevance as dispute resolution properties of contracts are 
important elements of different governance arrangements (Williamson, 1991). A quite vibrant 
stream of literature has developed which highlights the use of non-traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms in various contexts (e.g. Bernstein, 1992). More descriptive work on 
interfirm technology partnerships (e.g. Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007), has indicated that 
alliance parties have several contractual options available to control how potential disputes 
will be resolved. Here I posit that different contractual safeguards, i.e., dispute resolution 
clauses, are a response to exchange complexity, environmental uncertainty, and the presence 
of high-growth firms. 
 Recent studies show that on average two thirds of all alliances run into serious disputes 
within the first two years, and that failure rates are as high as seventy percent (Das and Teng, 
2000a; Koza and Lewin, 2000). It is therefore not surprising that alliance partners foresee the 
possibility of their collaboration ending in a dispute and design contractual safeguards 
accordingly (Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007; Mayer and Teece, 2008). Here, I make a 
distinction between two particular dispute resolution mechanisms. First, I focus on internal 
dispute resolution through hierarchy. Studies on the intrafirm level have highlighted that 
disputes are often resolved by management intervention (e.g. Elangovan, 1995; Karambayya 
and Brett, 1989; Pinkley et al., 1995). Although in interfirm arrangements senior managers 
have only limited ability to reach decisions through fiat (Williamson, 1994), they can use 
motivational control in the form of threats or incentives (Karambayya and Brett, 1989, 
Sheppard, 1983; 1984), guide resolution of a dispute, and act as a judge on a disputed matter 
(Karambayya and Brett, 1989). Senior manager discussions are seen as a particularly credible 
effort of parties to achieve a negotiated settlement of a dispute. Second, I consider external 
dispute resolution via arbitration which is defined as a voluntary arrangement between parties 
to refer a dispute to a neutral third party and to be bound by the decision of that third party 
(Bonn, 1972; Mattli, 2001).24 Over the last decades, arbitration has become an increasingly 
                                                 
24 Note that by focusing on internal dispute resolution and arbitration, I purposely exclude hybrid forms of 
dispute resolution such as mediation, and other forms of adjudication such as litigation. I believe this focus is 
warranted because, first, mediation and litigation clauses occur much less frequently than internal dispute 
resolution and arbitration clauses, and second, the hybrid nature of mediation makes it difficult to classify. By 
relying on a third-party to structure the dispute resolution process, mediation is neither negotiation nor 
adjudication. Also, the likelihood that parties will opt to have their dispute settled by means of arbitration after a 
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popular method of dispute resolution (Mattli, 2001). Its reliance on custom rather than law, 
and the veil of secrecy surrounding arbitration proceedings, have been lauded as two of the 
most significant benefits of arbitration (Bonn, 1972; Mattli, 2001). However, benefits of 
arbitration can turn into disadvantages in particular situations. For instance, the limited 
grounds under which a party can appeal an arbitral decision can provide certainty when 
collaborating with a firm situated in a country with a different and unknown legal system. In 
domestic alliances, the limited appeal possibilities can be a risk rather than a benefit when 
parties have faith in their respective legal system. Both for theory and managers, we need a 
more fine-grained understanding of what drives contracting parties to opt for certain 
(alternative) dispute resolution mechanisms, despite possible risks.     
  TCE reasoning suggests that alliance parties have different methods available to govern 
their collaboration and that, dependent on certain attributes (see Shelanski and Klein, 1995), 
some governance structures are more suitable than others. The attributes I consider refer to the 
level of exchange complexity (Killing, 1988; Phene and Tallman, 2012), in terms of 
technological complexity and whether or not an alliance has a fixed temporal duration, and 
environmental uncertainty (Killing, 1988; Luo, 2007). In addition, related to the concept of 
leakage stressed by TCE literature (Williamson, 1992), I consider the presence of a high-
growth firm in an alliance. These elements are related to two forms of dispute resolution in a 
discriminating way. Internal dispute resolution is related to the level of exchange complexity 
of an alliance, while arbitration is related to the level of environmental uncertainty 
surrounding an alliance and the presence of a high-growth firm. Parties to an alliance 
characterized by high exchange complexity often possess idiosyncratic knowledge about 
disputed issues that is difficult and costly to transfer to a neutral third-party (Sampson, 2004a; 
Williamson, 1991; 1994). Because humans are subject to bounded rationality, contracts will 
be incomplete when the exchange complexity is high. Disputes between parties to an alliance 
characterized by high exchange complexity will often center around the initial unmet interests 
and expectations of parties rather than their legal rights (Edelman, Erlanger and Lande, 1993). 
Forward-looking disputes aimed at changing the current setup are best addressed by internal 
dispute resolution mechanisms (Elangovan, 1995). As Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 
(2002) put it: “… [the decision of market participants] can be more nuanced than the binary 
decision of liability or no liability that the court must make. (…). [T]hey can consider 
information that cannot be introduced in court, such as impressionistic evidence about 
business trends or judgments about the quality of items sold. They can base their decisions on 
a firm’s behavior over time, on probabilistic patterns that would not be admissible evidence 
in court” (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; p. 229). Therefore, ceteris paribus, one 
would expect to more frequently observe internal dispute resolution mechanisms stipulated in 
contracts as the exchange complexity of alliances increases.  
 Arbitration differs in a number of ways from internal dispute resolution highlighted 
earlier. Most notably, arbitration produces a mandated settlement of a dispute by a neutral 
third party, rather than a consensual solution reached by parties themselves. There are two 
reasons why arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism is particularly well-suited to handle 
disputes arising out of alliances characterized by substantial environmental uncertainty, or 
alliances that include a high-growth firm. First, arbitration allows custom rather than law to 
                                                                                                                                                        
dispute actually emerges, without having stipulated an arbitration clause in their contract, is low (Allison, 1990). 
As such, parties that do not opt for arbitration in their contract, will most likely have their future disputes 
resolved via traditional public forums. 
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guide resolution of disputes (Bonn, 1972). In that sense, arbitration can be an especially 
valued dispute resolution mechanism when parties operate in a uncertain setting where they 
are confronted with unknown legal rules and procedures. Second, arbitration proceedings and 
awards are confidential (Allison, 1990; Mattli, 2001). Indeed, the private nature of arbitration 
proceedings have long been recognized, and criticized, in more law oriented literature (e.g. 
Goldman, 2003). As such, arbitration can serve as a contractual safeguard to hedge against the 
risk of leakage in a broad sense (Hill, 1992; Williamson, 1992), which is an especially salient 
property of arbitration for high-growth firms. 
 I aim to contribute to the literature by viewing the dispute resolution procedures that 
parties contractually specify as clauses sui generis. Much of the previous literature has viewed 
the contractual specification of how disputes are to be solved as part of contractual 
complexity (Lumineau and Quélin, 2012; Parkhe, 1993; Reuer and Arińo, 2007). Although 
this stream of literature has provided valuable insights in the structure of contracts in general 
and the antecedents of contractual complexity more specifically, it speaks little to the debate 
about what drives contracting parties to include particular dispute resolution mechanisms. As 
indicated by Williamson (1991), the dispute resolution properties of contracts are a 
particularly salient feature of alternative governance arrangements (Lumineau and Oxley, 
2012), and the initial contract plays an important role in determining how future disputes will 
be resolved.25 Rather than encapsulating dispute resolution mechanisms in an aggregate 
measure of contractual complexity, this paper aims to show that different mechanisms of 
dispute resolution respond to different factors. To the author’s knowledge, although these 
different mechanisms of dispute resolution are highlighted in more theoretical contributions 
(e.g. Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007), this is a first attempt to more carefully explain their 
occurrence in R&D alliance contracts. Gaining a more comprehensive overview of why 
parties select different forms of dispute resolution has the potential to significantly aid in our 
understanding of the governance structures of alliance contracts (Lumineau and Oxley, 2012). 
Studying different forms of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is theoretically 
important, as it can point towards inefficiencies of the traditional legal system. 
 One can make a distinction between dispute resolution arrangements before and after a 
dispute has arisen. To date, the bulk of empirical studies on dispute resolution in alliances has 
focused on the period after a dispute materializes (e.g. Lumineau and Malhotra, 2011; 
Lumineau and Oxley, 2012; Lumineau and Quélin, 2012), thereby only observing disputes 
that are serious enough to get lawyers involved. However, many contracts contain internal 
mechanisms (Ring and van de Ven, 1992), such as involvement of senior managers 
(Sampson, 2004a), aimed at precisely avoiding involvement of lawyers in the dispute 
resolution process. Most disputes are actually resolved by parties themselves as they are most 
knowledgeable on the issues at hand and need not conform to general legal rules that may or 
may not be applicable to their dispute (Galanter, 1981; Macaulay, 1963). Therefore, in this 
contribution, I focus solely on the period before an actual dispute has arisen to get a more 
comprehensive picture of dispute resolution preferences of alliance parties.  
                                                 
25 As one manager from a large biopharmaceutical company states: “…It is my firm conviction, that the only 
satisfactory way of dispute resolution in alliances is internal, within the governance framework described in the 
contract…”. 
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4.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
A central tenet of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is that alliance attributes should be 
aligned with governance structures. In line with TCE reasoning, alliances subject to 
substantial hazards for parties warrant additional contractual safeguards (Shelanski and Klein, 
1995), such as more extensive enforcement and monitoring provisions (Oxley, 1997). My 
framework is based upon two premises. First, hazards can stem from exchange complexity 
and environmental uncertainty (Killing, 1988; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Phene and Tallman, 
2012; Robson, Katsikeas and Bello, 2008; Shelanski and Klein, 1995). Also, leakage of 
information and know-how is a particularly salient concern for firms (Williamson, 1992), 
especially for high-growth firms. Second, the likelihood of observing various contractual 
dispute resolution mechanisms is a function of the three elements highlighted earlier. More 
specifically, internal dispute resolution provisions are expected to be a response of parties to 
high levels of exchange complexity. Parties are expected to opt for arbitration in their contract 
when they experience substantial environmental uncertainty, or when a high-growth firm is 
involved. 
 Literature to date suggests three underlying mechanisms that drive a positive relationship 
between exchange complexity and internal dispute resolution. First, parties to a dispute have 
idiosyncratic knowledge about their disputed case that is only transferable to third parties at 
great costs (Williamson, 1991). Parties are often quite knowledgeable about the underlying 
intricacies of their collaboration and are therefore well-suited to solve disputes amongst 
themselves. For simple agreements characterized by “[s]harp in by clear agreement; sharp 
out by clear performance” (Macneil, 1974; p. 738), a third party is unlikely to err in its 
judgment over a dispute, thus alleviating the need for extensive governance structures 
regulating dispute resolution. When alliances get more complex, in terms of their technology 
or time dimension, it becomes increasingly more difficult for third parties to verify the efforts 
each party has exerted under an agreement (Hart and Moore, 1988).26 Parties can implement 
contractual safeguards, i.e., internal dispute resolution mechanisms, that allows them to use 
information which would not be admissible under third party adjudication. Third parties are 
often unpredictable in their understanding of issues that involve complex technologies 
(Klitgaard and Mussman, 1992), and therefore disputants will often reach a more satisfying 
solution when they are able to make use of their idiosyncratic knowledge about the 
technology and the dispute. In alliances lacking a predefined end date, parties are prone to 
develop a working relationship different from the one initially stipulated in the contract. 
These alliances without a predefined end date are characterized by substantial exchange 
complexity as parties find it more difficult to include all contingencies in a contract that might 
affect their alliance (Ariño and Reuer, 2004; Crocker and Reynolds, 1993). Firms 
participating in these alliances are therefore expected to promote internal dispute resolution. 
The contract maintains its function as a reference point (Hart and Moore, 2008), but parties 
can use additional (non-legal) information accumulated over time in attempting to solve a 
dispute. Second, by and large, exchange complexity drives contracting difficulties as it 
becomes difficult to draft complete contracts that set out all possible contingencies. As such, 
                                                 
26 As one manager from a large biopharmaceutical company comments: “…Some of our most simple contracts 
such as straight in-licensing agreements do not have formalized governance structures [to solve disputes] as 
they are not the basis for any active collaboration. Hence, arbitration is the only described dispute resolution 
mechanism…”. 
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disputes for highly complex exchanges will often revolve around changing the existing setup 
to accommodate circumstances unforeseen at the start of a collaboration (Elangovan, 1995). 
Internal dispute resolution is most suitable for these future-oriented disputes as the underlying 
goal is to maintain a working relationship with the interests of both parties in mind rather than 
their rights (Edelman, Erlanger and Lande, 1993; Elangovan, 1995; Pinkley et al., 1995). For 
instance, lacking a predefined ending date of their collaboration, disputes may arise between 
parties on how to adjust to an unforeseen contingency. Parties would then most likely rely on 
probabilistic reasoning to choose the most promising way forward, rather than trying to assign 
legal blame. Third, for complex exchanges, the variability of preferences, situations and 
solutions is widespread whereas formal legal rules can only take a subset of this variability 
into account (Galanter, 1981). As a result, for highly complex exchanges, there is an 
inevitable loss of information when transforming a disagreement into legal argumentation. As 
it is quite common that parties refrain from planning their collaboration in a detailed contract 
(Macaulay, 1963), formulating coherent legal arguments encapsulating the full extent of a 
dispute becomes even more difficult. Internal dispute resolution does not need to adhere to 
any formal rules or procedures (Edelman, Erlanger and Lande, 1993; Johnson, McMillan and 
Woodruff, 2002; Pinkley et al., 1995), thereby giving parties the possibility to use all 
information deemed relevant in solving their dispute. 
4.2.1 Technological complexity 
Human actors experience bounded rationality problems when confronted with complex 
problems (Slater and Spencer, 2000). For technological complex alliances, the technological 
development process is relatively ill-defined at the contract signing date (Macher, 2006; 
Nickerson and Zenger, 2004), because parties cannot make causal statements between exerted 
efforts and observed outcomes (Lumineau and Oxley, 2012). From the perspective of a 
neutral third party called in to render judgment on a dispute involving a complex technology, 
the alliance contract offers little guidance about the initial intent under the agreement 
(Klitgaard and Mussman, 1992; Lumineau and Oxley, 2012; Sampson, 2004a). From the 
perspective of the (potential) disputants, i.e., the alliance parties, disputes about complex 
technologies will often revolve around how to change the existing setup to conditions 
unforeseen at the contract signing date. When the development process is relatively ill-defined 
beforehand, disagreements can occur during collaboration about how to proceed when new 
information accumulates. Often, disputes then do not revolve around legally justifiable 
claims, but rather on how to proceed forward in an amicable manner (Edelman, Erlanger and 
Lande, 1993; Elangovan, 1995). Parties possess idiosyncratic knowledge of underlying 
intentions under an agreement (Williamson, 1991), that is often not admissible in adjudication 
proceedings (Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff, 2002), but that is critical in resolving a 
dispute involving a complex technology. As a result, parties themselves are best equipped to 
deal with disputes originating from alliances that involve complex technologies (Klitgaard 
and Mussman, 1992), and as such: 
Hypothesis 1. There is a positive relationship between the technological complexity of an 
alliance, and the inclusion of an internal dispute resolution clause in an R&D alliance 
contract. 
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4.2.2 Time-bound alliances 
Parties to a contract possess feasible foresight, which is defined as the capacity to look ahead, 
recognize hazards, and develop appropriate responses ex-ante as reflected in the actual 
alliance contract (Williamson, 1996). Arguably, this ability of foresight is much greater for 
parties committing to a time-bound exchange, where the likelihood that conditions change 
during contract execution is relatively small (Ariño and Reuer, 2004; Crocker and Reynolds, 
1993; Phene and Tallman, 2012). Therefore, these time-bound contracts can be considered 
more complete when compared to open-ended contracts (Ariño and Reuer, 2004). It is quite 
difficult for firms to create complete contracts for open-ended alliances as changing 
conditions can require alterations to the initial contract (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993; Phene 
and Tallman, 2012). This claim is supported by Reuer and Arińo (2007), who find that in 
time-bound alliances parties place less emphasis on interfirm coordination. In terms of 
internal dispute resolution mechanisms, this hints at the proposition that internal dispute 
resolution procedures are less often used by parties in time-bound alliances, compared to 
open-ended alliances, as the gap between the contract and the actual state of the world will be 
smaller, and there is less need to interpret the contract as it has developed over time.  
 In addition, whereas third-party involvement in disputes has a large potential to signal the 
end of collaborative endeavors (Bonn, 1972; Mayer and Teece, 2008), internal dispute 
resolution mechanisms seek to settle disputes rather quickly and in a manner that preserves 
the exchange relationship. Open-ended alliances signal a long-term interdependence between 
parties which increases the need for fair and internal dispute resolution mechanisms in order 
to make sure disputes, which are inevitable to occur in complex environments (Mayer and 
Teece, 2008), do not threaten continuity of the relationship. The need to preserve continuity in 
time-bound alliances is arguably much weaker as they are designed to last only a pre-defined 
period of time.27 Indeed, the existence of a fixed temporal endpoint shifts attention to each 
individual party trying to maximize its gain under an alliance (Ness and Haugland, 2005). 
Therefore, preserving continuity is not a priority of partners to a time-bound alliance, and as 
such, I expect that: 
Hypothesis 2. There is a negative relationship between the time boundedness of an 
alliance, and the inclusion of an internal dispute resolution clause in an R&D alliance 
contract. 
The above two hypotheses center around factors associated with more or less emphasis on 
internal dispute resolution in R&D contracts. Now, we turn our attention towards the point 
where parties need a binding third party decision, and focus on the choice of alliance parties 
to opt for arbitration in their contract. I expect that arbitration is a response to environmental 
uncertainty, and that arbitration is more likely to be the preferred method of dispute resolution 
if at least one of the firms participating in an alliance can be considered a high-growth firm. 
Firms operating in different legal regimes experience uncertainty as they risk having their 
future disputes heard in unknown legal environments. Taking a firm perspective, high-growth 
                                                 
27 One manager from a large biopharmaceutical company, when asked about the hypothesized relationship 
between time-boundedness of an alliance and internal dispute resolution, states: “…You would expect to have 
less elaborate conflict resolution mechanisms in (…) short term contracts, as the longer term interdependence is 
smaller…”. 
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firms are susceptible to substantial hazards as they face the possibility that the source(s) of 
their recent commercial success leaks out should their current alliance end in a dispute. 
Because arbitration is both based on custom rather than law and facilitates the private 
resolution of disputes, I anticipate that arbitration will be the preferred method of dispute 
resolution in the two situations sketched before. 
4.2.3 International alliances and similarity of legal regimes 
Parties engaging in an international alliance face a wide variety of different legal rules and 
procedures (Oxley, 1999). In most cases, parties are more familiar with their respective 
domestic legal rules and procedures compared to the foreign legal rules and procedures of 
their partnering firm. Partners often distrust each other’s legal regime and fear a potential bias 
of foreign national judicial systems (Eisenberg and Miller, 2007). If not remedied by 
contractual safeguards, parties to an international alliance face substantial ex-ante uncertainty 
that stems from operating in a complex legal setting, where unknown laws and rules might 
govern future disputes. In this context, these contractual safeguards refer to alternative 
methods of resolving disputes that do not rely on foreign legal rules and procedures 
(Bernstein, 1992). Stated otherwise, for international alliances, parties are expected to find 
recourse to a system which avoids party ‘A’ having to submit disputes to the legal system of 
party ‘B’, and vice versa (Redfern, 1976).  
 Parties opting for arbitration voluntarily commit themselves to have disputes resolved by 
a neutral third party and to be bound by the decision of that neutral third party, i.e., the 
arbitrator (Bonn, 1972). The rules that govern the decision of the neutral can be determined in 
the contract by the parties themselves (Mattli, 2001), rather than imposed by a specific legal 
system. Under the New York Convention, arbitral decrees are widely recognized and enforced 
(Eisenberg and Miller, 2007). The chance of eventually ending up in court despite stipulation 
of an arbitration clause is small as the appeal possibilities against the decision of an arbitrator 
are limited, and grounds for refusal of an arbitral award are seldom granted.  
 From a legal perspective, parties experience substantial environmental uncertainty when 
participating in an international alliance as unfamiliar legal rules and procedures might govern 
interpretation of their contract in case of a dispute. With its limited appeal possibilities and the 
ability to let custom, rather than law, guide resolution of disputes (Bonn, 1972), arbitration 
can substantially reduce the perceived environmental uncertainty for parties that participate in 
an international alliance. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 3a. Parties to an international alliance are more likely to stipulate an 
arbitration clause in their R&D alliance contract. 
Different legal systems stipulate certain rules and procedures that are to be followed in order 
to resolve a dispute (Djankov et al., 2003). This suggests that if the legal systems of parties 
are more alike, parties experience less environmental uncertainty, and their propensity to opt 
for arbitration by contract should decline. 
 Common law and civil law traditions differ significantly in the way dispute resolution is 
approached (Elsing and Townsend, 2002). One major difference refers to the very beginning 
of dispute resolution proceedings; the formulation of the statement of claim (Elsing and 
Townsend, 2002). In most common law countries, especially in the U.S., a plaintiff submits a 
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short overview of facts and the basis for the claim, extensive enough for the defendant to 
begin preparing its defense. During later proceedings, the exact details of the claim evolve. By 
comparison, in most civil law countries, cases are expected to be fully developed before they 
are filed (Elsing and Townsend, 2002). To further develop the exact details of a claim under 
the common law tradition, parties rely extensively on discovery procedures (Hagedoorn and 
Hesen, 2007), where parties can through various methods (e.g. requests for production of 
documents), collect evidence which might be relevant to the case at hand, although not 
necessarily so. Discovery procedures are used extensively in common law traditions, but it is 
difficult to overstate the reluctance with which (alliance) parties operating in civil law 
countries participate in common law style discovery procedures (Rubinstein, 2004). In most 
civil law countries, discovery procedures are rarely permitted and viewed upon as intruding 
the inherent confidentiality of private business information (Rubinstein, 2004). Dispute 
resolution under common law versus civil law jurisdictions also differs with respect to the 
role of the judge in the proceedings. In civil law jurisdictions courts take an active stance 
towards investigating the facts underlying a dispute whereas in common law jurisdictions 
courts remain more on the background (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Schleifer, 2008). 
 Although these differences are by no means exhaustive,28 it serves the purpose of 
highlighting the distinctive approach to dispute resolution under the two legal regimes. 
Considering these differences, it is not surprising that arbitration proceedings are often crafted 
in such a way as to strike a careful balance between common law and civil law rules 
(Rubinstein, 2004). As lawyers are usually educated in either civil law or common law rules 
(Rubinstein, 2004), and are mainly responsible for drafting dispute resolution clauses 
(Argyres and Mayer, 2007), I expect that parties experience less environmental uncertainty 
when both parties operate in similar legal regimes. Therefore, I posit: 
Hypothesis 3b. Parties that operate in similar legal regimes are, compared to parties 
operating in different legal regimes, less likely to stipulate an arbitration clause in their 
R&D alliance contract. 
Domestic partners still frequently opt for arbitration. To explain this choice, differences in 
legal rules and procedures is a much weaker argument. This begs the question why parties to a 
domestic alliance would opt for arbitration. 
4.2.4 High-growth firms 
Among the benefits accredited to arbitration, the confidential nature of the proceedings and 
the award is undoubtedly one of the most frequently mentioned benefits (e.g. Allison, 1990; 
Bonn, 1972; Goldman, 2003; Mattli, 2001). In contracts between businesses and consumers, 
the confidential nature of the arbitration proceedings decreases the risk of negative publicity 
for a business (Ware, 2001). In contracts between businesses, the private nature of the 
arbitration proceedings can prevent third parties, most notably competitors, from gaining 
valuable confidential information about a disputed issue (Brenowitz, 2004; Mattli, 2001). As 
such, arbitration is expected to be particularly valued by firms that seek to safeguard their 
                                                 
28 I refer to Joireman (2001) and Legrand (1997) for a more elaborate rendition on common law versus civil law. 
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competitive advantage by preventing leakage of crucial business information to the public, 
i.e., competitors. 
 Following Schumpeter, innovation is a broad concept. Indeed, “[i]nnovation in the 
Schumpeterian sense deals with new products and processes, product differentiation, new 
markets, diversification, new raw materials and new market structures. Furthermore, these 
new combinations will be carried out by new companies replacing the older ones” 
(Hagedoorn, 1989; p. 31). Innovation as referred to by Schumpeter often leads to explosive 
firm growth. Indeed, new processes and products can lead to significant firm growth 
(Mansfield, 1962). “Firms grow by successfully identifying, pursuing, and capturing a 
competitive advantage in an environmental niche” (Fombrun and Wally, 1989; p. 110). 
Irrespective of the specific innovation or competitive advantage that spurs firm growth, firms 
that experience a revenue surge can be expected to try and limit the unintended outflow of 
business information to non-alliance participants when their alliance ends in a dispute. The 
anticipation that high-growth firms are more concerned with information leakage compared to 
firms experiencing low to mediocre growth, or even decline, aligns to some extent with more 
industry level observations where firms operating in high-growth industries are claimed to be 
more protective of their innovation ideas (Gooroochurn and Hanley, 2007). When no standard 
product design has emerged yet in an industry, indicating that individual firms have the 
potential to achieve substantial growth if they can capitalize on the opportunity, firms are 
more protective of their ideas and capabilities (Gooroochurn and Hanley, 2007). Likewise, 
firms that have recently grown substantially by attaining a competitive advantage in a 
particular niche (Fombrun and Wally, 1989), can be expected to be somewhat protective of 
their ideas and capabilities (Slaby, Chapman and O’Hara, 1989). However, while 
collaborating, firms often become aware of each other’s capabilities (Hamel, 1991). While a 
high-growth firm might anticipate and accept some loss of knowledge to its partner firm, 
unanticipated loss of information to non-alliance participants can be prevented by adequate 
contractual safeguards. Negative publicity via public proceedings might stifle firm growth, 
thus providing extra incentives for high-growth firms to limit leakage of information 
concerning their dispute to the environment. When an alliance runs into a dispute, the ability 
of high-growth firms to keep the source(s) of their success secret depends, in part, on the 
chosen dispute resolution method (Brenowitz, 2004). As previously mentioned, arbitration 
proceedings and the associated award are private. Facing leakage hazards (Williamson, 1992), 
high-growth firms are expected to implement additional contractual safeguards in the form of 
arbitration clauses that limit the unintended outflow of crucial business information. 
Hypothesis 4. Parties to a domestic alliance involving a high-growth firm are more likely 
to include an arbitration clause in their R&D alliance contract. 
4.3 Data, methods, and sample description 
4.3.1 Empirical setting 
This paper empirically examines the decision of firms active in the biopharmaceutical 
industry to opt for certain types of dispute resolution mechanisms in their contract. The 
biopharmaceutical industry is a well-suited arena to test my theoretical predictions, because it 
closely matches the setting depicted in the literature (as also noted by Lerner and Merges, 
 69
1998). Biopharmaceutical projects are complex, uncertain, and costly. As a direct result, 
contracting difficulties are an especially salient feature of collaborative biopharmaceutical 
research and development projects. Firms also have constant incentives to unilaterally defect 
from an agreement (Lerner and Malmendier, 2010; Parkhe, 1993), increasing the likelihood 
that a dispute materializes during a collaboration. In case of a dispute, third party enforcement 
is troublesome (Lerner and Merges, 1998). The proposed relationships, if any, will thus most 
likely be observable in the biopharmaceutical industry.29  
4.3.2 Sample description 
The preliminary sample comprised 587 deals for the period 1996-2005 obtained from 
Pharmaventures, a UK-based information and consulting firm. Pharmaventures has identified 
thousands of alliances in the biopharmaceutical sector in their PharmaDeals database. The 
collected deals are grouped into a number of categories, such as collaborative R&D, 
distribution/marketing, manufacturing/supply, and business acquisition. For each agreement, 
the PharmaDeals database provides information on the names of the partners, type of 
contractual relationship, date deal signed, equity investment, relevant product areas and 
technology fields, press releases and, where available, the actual contracts. Pharmaventures 
acquired these actual contracts from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
filings and their clients. To avoid unnecessary heterogeneity, I excluded all agreements 
where: 
• one of the parties is a government agency or university 
• the alliance is, as stated in the contract, a renegotiation or restatement of a previous 
alliance between the firms 
• there is no R&D component to the alliance 
• one firm has a controlling interest in the other firm (greater than 50%) 
• contracts involve more than two parties. 
 The final contract database contains a set of 304 contracts between unique partner sets. 
The dataset covers R&D alliance contracts and additional information for the period 1996 
through 2005. In addition, all alliances fall within the biopharmaceutical industry. As 
elaborated on earlier, the inherent complexity, lengthiness, costs, and low success rate of 
biopharmaceutical projects makes the biopharmaceutical industry an especially appropriate 
arena to investigate how parties intend to solve potential disputes as indicated by their 
contracts. In addition, by specifically focusing on the biopharmaceutical industry, we can be 
assured that variation in contracting terms does not come from a variation in the underlying 
contracting environment. 
 The agreements include both U.S. (domestic) contracts, i.e., the contracting parties are 
both U.S.-based firms (176 alliances), and international contracts, i.e., a U.S.-based firm 
collaborates with a non-U.S. based firm (128 alliances). A total of 284 firms were involved in 
the 304 contracts and about 55% of the agreements were concluded between a biotech firm 
and a pharmaceutical or a chemical firm.   
                                                 
29 One manager from a large biopharmaceutical company states: “…R&D alliances [are] often (…) strategic, 
complex and more or less open-ended and require a lot of complex decisions to be made. Based on this, I think it 
is fair to say that R&D alliances have a lot of potential to end in disputes…”  
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I collected additional information on for instance the size of firms, alliance experience, and 
contract value. The complete dataset combines information from PharmaDeals with data 
retrieved from firm annual reports, the Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators 
(CATI) database, Datastream, USPTO, Compustat, LexisNexis, and Corptech.  
4.3.3 Dependent variables 
Internal dispute resolution. Based on interviews with legal experts, I focus here on one 
particularly credible signal of parties’ intentions to solve disputes internally namely 
mandatory involvement of CEO’s or heads of research in dispute resolution meetings 
(Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007; Karambayya and Brett, 1989; Sampson, 2004a).30 I scanned 
each contract for the inclusion of clauses which mandate that CEO’s or heads of research are 
to meet in case a dispute between parties escalates. The involvement of CEO’s or heads of 
research in the dispute resolution process is envisioned as a last effort of parties to resolve a 
dispute internally (Sampson, 2004a).31 To illustrate, consider the following excerpt from the 
contract between Aerogen and Becton, Dickinson & Company (May, 2000): 
“The Parties shall try to settle their differences amicably between themselves by referring 
the disputed matter to the Chief Executive Officer of AeroGen and the Vice President and 
General Manager of BD Consumer Healthcare for discussion and resolution. Either 
Party may initiate such informal dispute resolution by sending written notice of the 
dispute to the other Party, and within ten (10) days of such notice the Chief Executive 
Officer of AeroGen and the Vice President and General Manager of BD Consumer 
Healthcare shall meet for attempted resolution…”  
These internal dispute resolution mechanisms resemble minitrials highlighted in more law 
oriented literature (e.g. Klitgaard and Mussman, 1992), where senior executives of both 
parties are involved in rendering judgment on a dispute originating from lower hierarchical 
ranks. If the contract stipulates that CEO’s or heads of research are to meet in case of a 
dispute, this dummy variable takes on a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
 Arbitration. Over the years, literature has paid increasing attention to non-traditional 
methods of external dispute resolution (Argyres and Mayer, 2007; Bernstein, 1992; Eisenberg 
and Miller, 2007; Lumineau and Oxley, 2012), most prominently arbitration (Mattli, 2001). 
By opting for arbitration, parties allow a neutral third party to render a binding decision on 
any future dispute (Bonn, 1972). I scanned each contract for the inclusion of clauses which 
mandate that disputes are to be forwarded to arbitration. To illustrate, consider the following 
excerpt from the contract between Progenics Pharmaceuticals and Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company (April, 1997): 
                                                 
30 One manager from a small biopharmaceutical company states: “…Practically speaking, no one wants to be 
embarrassed in front of their boss. If disputes can go straight from the project owner to the legal department, 
there is less incentive for a project owner to be reasonable…”. 
31 One manager from a large biopharmaceutical company states: “…Most of our R&D alliances stipulate our 
CSO [chief scientific officer] as last escalation point…The CEO/CSO should only be a last resort of highly 
strategic disputes…”.  
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“Any dispute (…) shall be (…) settled by arbitration to be held in New York, New York, 
under the auspices and then current commercial arbitration rules of the American 
Arbitration Association.”  
If the contract stipulates that disputes are to be forwarded to arbitration, this dummy variable 
takes on a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
4.3.4 Independent variables 
Technological complexity. For each R&D alliance, PharmaDeals lists the number of 
technological interests areas for the products and/or technologies developed through that 
alliance, with a maximum of eight interest areas. These interest areas are likely to increase the 
potential application areas of a technology. In the context of the current contribution, I 
interpret these technological interest areas as different, albeit related, technological fields 
which parties need to combine in order to advance through technological development. I 
consider an alliance involving a broader technology as more complex compared to an alliance 
solely focusing on one or a few technological fields (Garcia-Canal, 1996). 
 This definition of complexity resembles to some extent the definition given by Nickerson 
and Zenger (2004) and Argyres and Mayer (2007) who define an alliance as more complex 
when parties have to rely on the knowledge sets of multiple individuals and groups within the 
contracting parties, and Oxley (1997) who defines an alliance that involves multiple 
technologies as more complex.32 Similarly, Wang and von Tunzelmann (2000) state that 
combining different bodies of knowledge complicates technology in terms of its breadth. 
 Time-bound. Contracts between alliance parties can be open-ended, i.e., with no pre-
defined ending date, or be bound by a fixed temporal duration (Ness and Haugland, 2005). I 
focus on whether or not an alliance is time-bound, i.e., whether there is a pre-defined ending 
date of an alliance as stipulated in the contract. This dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if 
the contract has a pre-defined ending date, and 0 otherwise.  
 International alliance. Firms involved in cross-border alliances face substantial 
environmental uncertainty as they try to cope with a variety of complex rules and procedures 
when enforcing their contract rights in a foreign legal system (Oxley, 1999). Based on 
information provided by PharmaDeals, I include a dummy variable which equals 1 if firms are 
headquartered in different countries, and 0 if they are both headquartered in the US. 
 Similar legal regimes. The literature classifying the legal origins of countries has largely 
distinguished between common law and civil law jurisdictions. In turn, the civil law countries 
are often subdivided into French, German, socialist and Scandinavian legal origins (Djankov 
et al., 2003). Here, based on Djankov et al. (2003) and for the international alliances, I include 
a dummy variable which equals 1 if the alliance is between a US firm and another common 
law country (i.e. English legal origin), and 0 if the alliance is between a US firm and a country 
with a non-common law background, i.e., civil law. Key features of legal origin are quite 
                                                 
32 This measure has previously been used to establish the number of potential application areas of a technology. 
Firms might consider a technology with multiple potential applications more valuable compared to a single 
application technology, and therefore put additional effort in solving disputes cooperatively. Although I am 
unable to formally rule out this alternative explanation, this explanation is unlikely to dominate the findings 
reported here. The main reason is that if the prime objective of firms is to solve disputes cooperatively, they 
would also be more likely to opt for arbitration as it has stronger continuity-preserving properties compared to 
alternatives. However, I find no support for such a relationship. 
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often preserved in the legal system of individual countries (Djankov et al., 2003; La Porta et 
al., 1998).  
 High-growth firm. Since 1996, Deloitte has made an annual ranking of the 500 fastest 
growing technology companies in terms of revenues in the U.S. and Canada called the 
Deloitte Technology Fast 500. To be eligible for inclusion in the Deloitte Technology Fast 
500, a company must first and foremost be a technology company (Deloitte Technology Fast 
500, 1996-2005). These companies own proprietary technology or IP that contributes 
significantly to their revenues, manufacture a technology-related product, or have well-
developed R&D capabilities (Deloitte Technology Fast 500, 1996-2005). Firms must meet 
certain minimum levels of operating revenues in their base year, be in business for a number 
of years to calculate firm growth, and be headquartered in the U.S. or Canada (Deloitte 
Technology Fast 500, 1996-2005). The rankings are a measure of past growth, thus not 
including current year revenues. Using a listing of high-growth firms resembles the approach 
taken by Oxley and Sampson (2004), who use a different list, i.e., a ranking of the Top 100 
Technology Companies, to separate market leaders from laggards. The measure that I use has 
two advantages. First, it compares the growth of a firm to other firms operating in the same 
time span, i.e., it is a relative measure. Second, it provides information on both public and 
private firms.  
 I collected data on the annual top 500 technology companies for the period 1996 to 2005. 
The variable high-growth firm equals 1 if in the year of the alliance, or in the previous year, 
one of the firms participating in an alliance is incorporated in the Deloitte Technology Fast 
500, and 0 otherwise. 
4.3.5 Control variables 
Size asymmetry. A large difference in sizes indicates a dependence of the smaller alliance 
partner on its larger counterpart (Park and Ungson, 2001),33 and consequently might influence 
the degree to which partners are equally motivated to ‘work things out’.34 As such, I deduct 
the logarithm of the number of employees of the smaller firm from its larger counterpart. 
 R&D asymmetry. Although I expect no specific relationship between asymmetry in 
partners’ R&D expenses and their propensity to stipulate internal dispute resolution and/or 
arbitration provisions, I do want to control for possible effects. As such, I use a measure 
similar to size asymmetry by deducting the logarithm of R&D expenses of the partner firm 
with the smallest R&D expenses from its larger counterpart.  
 Alliance experience asymmetry. I obtained the prior R&D alliance experience of both 
firms in a five year window prior to the start of their R&D alliance (see also Gulati, 1995). 
                                                 
33 In unreported analyses I also considered an asymmetry measure based on net income and a more direct 
measure for the interdependence of activities based on the R&D plan. Both variables have no significant 
influence on the dependent variables, and leave the presented results unaltered. Due to the large number of 
control variables already present in the analyses, these additional control variables are therefore omitted. 
34 When asked about the different types of dispute resolution and when certain modes are preferred over others, 
one manager from a small biopharmaceutical company states: “…My experience after 20 years in large Pharma 
(…), medium sized Pharma (…) and small biotech (…) is that the answer is different for different companies. 
The larger the company the more important it is for there to be an "escalation clause" in which a more senior 
person than someone who is involved in the day-to-day operations of the collaboration can drive resolution of 
disputes (…). Stated differently, when an employee of a big company has to involve his boss or his boss's boss, 
they are more motivated to be reasonable and resolve any disputes…”. 
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Firms might learn from previous alliance experiences, and adapt consequent contracts 
accordingly. Also, firms with more alliance experience are more likely to possess dedicated 
alliance personnel (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). As such, these firms might benefit from 
dedicated legal personnel tasked with drafting dispute resolution clauses. Substantial 
asymmetry in alliance experience between partners may be indicative of different preferences 
for particular dispute resolution mechanisms. Firms with more alliance experience might 
prefer more formal, legal-based, methods of dispute resolution while firms with less alliance 
experience might prefer more informal mechanisms. As such, I control for alliance experience 
asymmetry by subtracting the alliance experience of the firm with the least alliance 
experience from the alliance experience of its counterpart. 
 Early stage research. The PharmaDeals database provides information on the stages of 
the innovation process underlying each deal. In alliances that focus on early stage research, 
collaborating firms face a range of research options and, therefore, a variety of directions for 
their joint research projects (Freeman and Soete, 1997; Nelson, 1961; 1982). In general, the 
open nature of the range of options that firms still have at this early stage indicates that there 
is little or no information on the concrete new products and processes that will eventually be 
developed. When parties have different interpretations about the material aspects of their 
collaboration, disputes might be more prone to occur. Indeed, Argyres and Mayer (2007) and 
Argyres, Bercovitz and Mayer (2007) suggest that over time parties more clearly stipulate 
roles and responsibilities in their contract to avoid disputes from occurring during their 
collaboration. This would hint at the proposition that disputes are especially likely to occur in 
the more early research stages when many aspects of a collaboration are non-contractible. I 
control for the innovation stage of an alliance by using a dummy variable that equals 1 if an 
alliance focuses on early stage research, and 0 otherwise. 
 R&D Plus. I control for any additional activities undertaken within the scope of an 
alliance. These additional activities might complicate the alliance (Sampson, 2004b), and lead 
to more misunderstandings between parties. As such, parties may be inclined to spend more 
effort on drafting elaborate dispute resolution procedures when the scope of an alliance is 
broader. I therefore include a dummy variable that equals 1 if any additional activities (e.g. 
marketing) are included besides R&D and 0 otherwise.  
 Equity. Based on information provided by PharmaDeals, I control for whether or not 
equity is involved. As the acquisition of a part of a firm generates control in the R&D alliance 
(Oxley, 1997), this could be reflected in the dispute resolution mechanisms that parties 
stipulate. For instance, the incentive alignment induced by an equity stake might decrease the 
need for more formal methods of dispute resolution. I control for a possible effect of equity on 
different types of dispute resolution by including a dummy variable that equals 1 if one of the 
firms takes an equity stake in its partner and 0 otherwise. 
 Competition. Alliances involve a careful balancing act between cooperation and 
competition (Das and Teng, 2000a). Parties that are direct competitors in their product 
markets may exhibit non-cooperative behavior thereby negatively affecting the stability of 
their alliance (Das and Teng, 2000a). As such, alliances between competitors seem to be 
especially susceptible to the emergence of disputes during contract execution. I control for the 
level of competition between alliance participants based on their SIC codes (Mowery, Oxley 
and Silverman, 1996). Using data from Thomson ONE Banker, this variable takes on a value 
of 2 if both parties operate in the same primary 4-digit SIC code, 1 if both parties do not 
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operate in the same primary 4-digit SIC code but do operate in the same 3-digit SIC code, and 
0 otherwise. 
 Interstate alliance. In the subset of domestic alliances, I want to control for the possibility 
that parties to interstate alliances experience more environmental uncertainty. In the 
regressions only involving domestic alliances, I therefore include a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if parties operate in different states and 0 otherwise. 
 Prior ties. I control for any previous collaborations between parties in a five-year window 
before the focal alliance, as familiarity can increase the willingness to ‘work things out’ 
(Lumineau and Oxley, 2012). In the context of this study, this could indicate that repeat 
collaborators are more likely to promote internal dispute resolution, while shunting external 
dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration. Using the CATI database, I searched for 
the number of prior ties between alliance partners, counting back five years from the start of 
the R&D alliance (see also Gulati, 1995). 
 Value. For each R&D alliance, PharmaDeals gives information about the (potential) deal 
value if available. In addition, I collected additional deal value data from the LexisNexis 
database. I expect that a larger deal value is reflected in parties’ desire to work things out 
when disagreements occur. As such, I include the value of the alliance in millions of dollars. 
Because the distribution of this variable is highly skewed, I perform a logarithmic 
transformation. This variable takes on a value of zero if information concerning deal value is 
missing. 
 Value dummy. I only have information concerning the deal value of alliances in about 
55% of the cases and as such want to control for the other 45%. Therefore I include a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if information about the deal value is missing and 0 otherwise.35  
 Year fixed effects. I control for temporal trends in alliances and include dummy variables 
for the period 1996-2005 with the year 1996 as the reference year.  
4.3.6 Analysis 
In the following, I use Probit models and a Bivariate Probit model using robust standard 
errors with inclusion of an internal dispute resolution clause and/or an arbitration clause as my 
dependent variables. Standard errors are clustered by firm. In the section on alternative 
explanations and robustness checks I alternatively use multinomial logit and probit models. 
4.4 Results 
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics of all the variables included. None of the bivariate 
correlations exceed the usual 0.7 cut-off value, except for the correlation between value and 
value dummy. I refer to footnote 35 for a more elaborate discussion of this issue. Table 4.2 
                                                 
35 Although frequently used (see, for instance, Bastos (2010), Griliches (1976), Khorana, Servaes and Tufano 
(2009), Singh (2008); Smith and Huang (1995)), this method of dealing with missing values has its drawbacks, 
as do alternative methods. In unreported analyses, I use four other methods to deal with missing values to 
investigate whether or not results change depending on which method I use. First, I run a regression without 
controlling for value. Second, I run a regression in which I only control for whether or not information on value 
is missing. Third, I limit the sample to only those observations for which I was able to retrieve information on 
the value of alliances. Fourth and last, based on a host of observable variables, I estimate the value of an alliance 
if this information is missing, and use these estimates in the full model. Results were not strikingly different and 
in general agreed with the results reported here.  
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shows the results of the probit and bivariate probit estimations. Model 1 in Table 4.2 refers to 
the basic model with only control variables included and with internal dispute resolution as 
the dependent variable. In subsequent models 2 and 3, I individually add each variable 
relating to hypotheses 1 and 2. Model 4 in Table 4.2 refers to the basic model with only 
control variables included and with arbitration as the dependent variable. In subsequent model 
5 I include the variable relating to hypothesis 3a. Model 6 introduces a joint estimation with 
both internal dispute resolution and arbitration as dependent variables, with all independent 
variables relating to hypotheses 1 to 3a and all control variables included. This joint 
estimation allows us to take into account the correlation of error terms of the internal dispute 
resolution and arbitration equations. Models 7 to 10 are models that focus on a subsample of 
the total sample. Model 7 is run on a subsample of international alliances in which I include 
all control variables. In model 8, I add the variable relating to hypothesis 3b. Model 9 is run 
on a subsample of domestic alliances in which I include all control variables. In model 10, I 
add the variable relating to hypothesis 4. 
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Hypothesis 1 states that there is a positive association between the technological complexity 
of an alliance and the likelihood of observing an internal dispute resolution clause in a 
contract. In models 2 and 6, I find support for the proposition that technological complexity is 
positively associated with the inclusion of an internal dispute resolution clause. Referring to 
models 3 and 6, I also find support for hypothesis 2 which predicted that parties to a time-
bound alliance are less likely to include an internal dispute resolution clause in their contract. 
Hypothesis 3a predicted that parties operating in different countries are more likely to 
stipulate an arbitration clause in their contract. Models 5 and 6 show the expected significant 
positive effect. Hypothesis 3b predicted that, compared to alliances in which parties operate in 
more distinct legal regimes, international partners that operate in similar legal regimes are less 
likely to stipulate an arbitration clause in their contract. Although bivariate correlations 
support the expected negative relationship at the 10% level, this result does not hold up in the 
regression analyses. Model 8 shows no significant negative relationship between the similar 
legal regimes variable and arbitration. I do find support for my hypothesis 4 which predicted 
that in domestic alliances, parties to an alliance that involve a high-growth firm are more 
inclined to stipulate an arbitration clause in their contract. Model 10 shows the expected 
significant positive effect. 
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Table 4.2 Probit or Bivariate Probit model estimation results of internal dispute resolution and/or arbitration 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
IDR IDR IDR ARB ARB IDR ARB ARB ARB ARB ARB
Variable
Technological complexity 0.171 ** 0.186 ** -0.007
(0.084) (0.082) (0.065)
Time-bound -0.619 ** -0.637 *** -0.107
(0.247) (0.240) (0.216)
International alliance 0.597 *** 0.037 0.582 ***
(0.216) (0.207) (0.224)
Similar legal regimes 0.051
(0.290)
High-growth firm 0.685 ***
(0.255)
Size asymmetry 0.047 0.060 0.052 -0.059 -0.049 0.069 -0.053 -0.142 * -0.142 * -0.044 -0.039
(0.062) (0.064) (0.064) (0.055) (0.055) (0.066) (0.055) (0.083) (0.083) (0.081) (0.082)
R&D asymmetry -0.068 -0.073 -0.061 0.096 0.052 -0.069 0.061 0.032 0.033 0.134 0.174
(0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.060) (0.062) (0.058) (0.063) (0.077) (0.077) (0.122) (0.126)
Alliance experience asymmetry -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.031 *** -0.035 *** -0.007 -0.036 *** -0.039 *** -0.039 *** -0.042 ** -0.042 **
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018)
Early stage research 0.147 0.098 0.191 -0.204 -0.143 0.150 -0.139 -0.116 -0.117 -0.139 -0.219
(0.200) (0.203) (0.197) (0.164) (0.161) (0.197) (0.164) (0.283) (0.282) (0.220) (0.225)
R&D Plus -0.018 0.000 -0.003 -0.210 -0.278 0.016 -0.250 0.043 0.043 -0.449 * -0.573 **
(0.213) (0.219) (0.215) (0.201) (0.198) (0.221) (0.196) (0.328) (0.328) (0.255) (0.265)
Equity 0.223 0.214 0.217 -0.054 0.014 0.207 0.007 0.099 0.099 -0.018 -0.007
(0.159) (0.163) (0.160) (0.168) (0.165) (0.169) (0.168) (0.308) (0.306) (0.249) (0.245)
Competition 0.114 0.125 0.062 0.045 0.087 0.078 0.079 0.003 0.002 0.157 0.142
(0.093) (0.097) (0.100) (0.104) (0.107) (0.105) (0.107) (0.147) (0.148) (0.139) (0.134)
Interstate alliance 0.316 0.407
(0.267) (0.270)
Prior ties 0.642 0.642 0.836 ** 0.026 0.054 0.893 * 0.078 -0.325 -0.341 0.119 0.143
(0.433) (0.450) (0.422) (0.254) (0.269) (0.459) (0.274) (0.333) (0.344) (0.344) (0.318)
Value 0.173 ** 0.138 0.170 ** -0.044 -0.036 0.126 -0.042 0.052 0.055 -0.086 -0.119
(0.085) (0.096) (0.087) (0.093) (0.097) (0.095) (0.102) (0.143) (0.145) (0.140) (0.138)
Value dummy 0.237 0.163 0.294 -0.682 * -0.627 0.181 -0.633 0.223 0.230 -1.005 * -1.089 *
(0.332) (0.364) (0.341) (0.372) (0.385) (0.374) (0.392) (0.576) (0.584) (0.568) (0.559)
Year fixed effects X X X X X X X X X X X
Constant -0.176 -0.441 -0.176 1.244 *** 1.147 ** -0.461 1.205 *** 1.972 *** 1.948 *** 0.600 0.504
(0.425) (0.485) (0.425) (0.425) (0.444) (0.494) (0.436) (0.527) (0.569) (0.709) (0.715)
rho NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Log Pseudolikelihood -156.5 -153.9 -152.7 -179.4 -173.7 -58.7 -58.7 -103.9 -100.3
Observations 304 304 304 304 304 128 128 176 176
Notes: Probit regressions where the dependent variables are Internal Dispute Resolution (models 1, 2, and 3), Arbitration (models 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10) or both (model 6).
Models 7 & 8 and 9 & 10 are run on a subsample of international and domestic alliances, respectively.
Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, in parentheses.
* significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.
Model 6
304
-317.6
0.378
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Regarding the control variables, I find that asymmetry in alliance experience has a significant 
and negative effect on the propensity of parties to opt for arbitration in their contract. Firms 
that frequently enter into alliances most likely have considerable experience with interfirm 
disputes, and possess specialized legal departments. It could therefore be that this finding 
reflects a propensity of more experienced firms to avoid alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. 
4.5 Alternative explanations and robustness checks 
In this section, I discuss some alternative explanations of my findings and deliberate on some 
additional robustness checks. 
 Involvement of CEO’s as a proxy for internal dispute resolution. Arguably, parties have 
several options available to promote internal dispute resolution. Here, based on interviews 
with legal experts, I focus on one particularly salient method of internal dispute resolution 
namely the involvement of CEO’s or heads of research (Sampson, 2004a). In that sense, this 
study aligns with research on the intrafirm level (e.g. Elangovan, 1995; Karambayya and 
Brett, 1989; Pinkley et al., 1995) that sees managers as logical internal third-parties to which 
disputants can turn when they are unable to solve a dispute. However, undoubtedly, parties 
have additional contractual mechanisms available that support internal dispute resolution. 
Here, I focus on whether or not parties establish a steering committee as stipulated in their 
contract. Although the main responsibility of these steering committees is to coordinate 
alliance activities, they are occasionally tasked with dispute resolution (Gulati and Singh, 
1998). Inclusion of this variable as an additional control variable in the regressions leaves the 
presented results unaltered. 
 High-growth firm. I run a set of different specifications of the presented models. First, I 
do not have data available on the ranking in the year 1995. As such, the variable capturing the 
presence of a high-growth firm for those alliances signed in 1996 is based on the presence of a 
firm in the Deloitte’s Technology Fast 500 ranking of the year 1996 only. I reran the 
regressions excluding those alliances in the year 1996, and results remain consistent with 
those presented. Second, I included a new measure for ‘high-growth firm’ which equals 1 if 
an alliance firm is included in the Deloitte’s Technology Fast 500 ranking in the year of the 
alliance, in the previous year, or in two years before the alliance. Running a regression on all 
alliances between 1998 and 2005, due to the increased time-lag, generates similar results. 
Third, I considered that it might be easier for small firm combinations to achieve high growth 
rates compared to somewhat larger firm combinations. I split the domestic alliances into a 
group containing firm combinations where both partners have less than 250 employees (33 
observations), a group containing firms combinations where both partners have more than 250 
employees (30 observations), and a rest group. In all three subsets there is a positive 
correlation between the high-growth variable and the propensity of parties to opt for 
arbitration. Fourth, it is possible that over time the biopharmaceutical industry has gained 
momentum, and that as a result, it becomes easier for firms to reach the Deloitte ranking. I 
split the sample into a period before 2000, and a period during and after 2000. In both 
subsamples, parties to an alliance that include a high-growth firm are more likely to include 
an arbitration provision in their contract.  
 Relationship between internal dispute resolution and arbitration. Throughout the 
analyses, I used probit and bivariate probit models to investigate the relationship between my 
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independent variables and my two dependent variables. Although the latter method 
specifically takes into account correlation of errors terms, it does not take into account that the 
likelihood of observing one particular type of dispute resolution clause (e.g. arbitration) might 
increase with the use of another type of dispute resolution clause (e.g. internal dispute 
resolution). There is some evidence of co-occurrence of these dispute resolution mechanisms 
as indicated by a weak positive correlation shown in Table 4.1. This opens up the possibility 
of not just predicting when one clause will be used, but when it might be used in conjunction 
with the other or specifically without the other. 
 
Table 4.3 Internal dispute resolution and arbitration 
 
 
In unreported multinomial logit models,36 I compare the four quadrants shown in Table 4.3. 
First I use quadrant 1 as the base category, which encompasses contracts that contain neither 
internal dispute resolution mechanisms nor arbitration provisions, after which I use quadrant 4 
as the base category, which encompasses contracts that contain both internal dispute 
resolution mechanisms and arbitration provisions. Quadrants 2 and 4, that both include 
arbitration clauses, are more likely to occur compared to quadrant 1 when firms are 
headquartered in different countries.  Quadrants 3 and 4 show the expected signs in terms of 
technological complexity and whether or not an alliance is time-bound when compared to 
quadrant 1, although these variables are not significant at conventional levels. Nevertheless, 
these variables are not far from statistical significance. Using quadrant 4 as a base category, 
quadrant 2 (only arbitration, no internal dispute resolution) is significantly less likely when 
the technological complexity of an alliance increases, and more likely when alliances are 
time-bound. Quadrants 1 and 3 (no arbitration) are significantly less likely to occur compared 
to quadrant 4 when parties are headquartered in different countries. As such, the results of 
these additional analyses correspond quite well with the results shown in Table 4.2. I also 
considered using a similar multinomial logit approach to the regressions involving subsets of 
international and domestic alliances. These analyses in general agreed with the results as 
shown in Table 4.2. However, these analyses come with a caveat as the number of 
observations per quadrant drops to non-acceptable levels thereby inhibiting the obtainment of 
reliable estimates for the parameters of interest.  
                                                 
36 I also considered multinomial probit models. A multinomial probit model relaxes certain assumptions of the 
multinomial logit model, but is often more difficult to apply because, one, the likelihood function can be 
relatively flat near its optimum, and two, estimating the unknown parameters requires approximating 
multivariate normal integrals (Dow and Endersby, 2004; Hausman and McFadden, 1984; McCulloch and Rossi, 
1994). In unreported regressions, I repeat the analyses using a multinomial probit estimator. Results remain 
consistent with those discussed in this section. 
 81
4.6 Discussion and conclusions 
The results presented in this paper add to more theoretical contributions (e.g. Hagedoorn and 
Hesen, 2007), which highlight that alliance parties have several contractual options available 
to guide resolution of their disputes. Dispute resolution properties of contracts are a 
particularly salient feature of alternative governance arrangements (Williamson, 1991). The 
results presented in this paper shed a light on different contractual dispute resolution 
mechanisms. I add to previous literature which states that most disputes are actually resolved 
by parties themselves without the use of formal, legal rules that may not be applicable to their 
dispute (Galanter, 1981; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Macaulay, 1963). Here, I 
show that alliance parties often implement contractual safeguards that promote internal 
resolution of disputes. These internal dispute resolution clauses are not randomly distributed 
across contracts, but appear to respond to various levels of exchange complexity. This paper 
also contributes to a burgeoning stream of literature that highlights methods of dispute 
resolution that seek to avoid the traditional legal system (e.g. Bernstein, 1992; Eisenberg and 
Miller, 2007; Mattli, 2001). Environmental uncertainty and the presence of a high-growth 
firm in an alliance seem positively associated with the likelihood of observing arbitration 
clauses in alliance contracts. These findings add to more general TCE literature and literature 
on neoclassical contracts (e.g. Williamson, 1991) by, first, affirming that alliance parties 
frequently opt for specialized governance features (e.g. arbitration) and, second, empirically 
investigating the conditions under which these specialized governance features are more or 
less likely to occur. 
 Technological complexity, as a first element of exchange complexity, is positively 
associated with the likelihood of observing an internal dispute resolution clause. Parties suffer 
from bounded rationality and when technologies get more complex, it becomes more difficult 
to write a complete contract. Parties themselves are best equipped to deal with disputes 
concerning highly complex technologies, as they possess idiosyncratic knowledge of the 
underlying intentions under an agreement (Williamson, 1991), and can make use of all 
information necessary in resolving a dispute (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). I 
observe internal dispute resolution clauses more frequently when alliances get technologically 
more complex. This finding adds to more theoretical literature (e.g. Klitgaard and Mussman, 
1992), which highlights that parties, when dealing with a complex technology, often 
experience uncertainty as to whether or not a third party will understand the intricacies of 
their technology. As a result, parties develop  specialized governance features (Williamson, 
1991), to cope with complex technologies (Klitgaard and Mussman, 1992). The results in this 
paper lend credence to such a claim by showing that the propensity of parties to stress internal 
dispute resolution increases as the underlying technology of their collaboration becomes more 
complex. 
 As a second element of exchange complexity, I find that parties to a time-bound alliance 
are less likely to stipulate internal dispute resolution clauses. For time-bound alliances, i.e., 
alliances with a fixed temporal duration, parties are less likely to experience changing 
conditions during contract execution (Phene and Tallman, 2012). For instance, Reuer and 
Arińo (2007) find that in time-bound alliances, parties place less emphasis on interfirm 
coordination as the need to adapt to changes during their collaboration is small (see also Ariño 
and Reuer (2004) and Crocker and Reynolds (1993)). Time-bound contracts are more 
complete and firms experience less pressure to stress internal dispute resolution in their time-
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bound contracts. These time-bound alliances are ‘meant to end’, and the long-term 
interdependence is rather low. The perceived need to preserve continuity in time-bound 
alliances is thus lower, and the attention lays more on maximizing individual gains (Ness and 
Haugland, 2005), rather than stressing cooperative dispute resolution. By comparison, open-
ended alliances increase the exchange complexity for parties as contingencies unforeseen at 
the contract signing date can interfere with the initial plan laid out in the contract. Flexible 
adjustment mechanisms are thus required. Here I find that parties are more likely to promote 
internal dispute resolution when alliances are relatively open-ended. 
 Concerning the environmental uncertainty surrounding an alliance, I find that parties 
involved in international alliances have an increased likelihood of opting for arbitration in 
their contracts, compared to domestic deals. International alliances are more uncertain as both 
parties dread the possibility of having their contract interpreted by a foreign judicial system 
applying unknown legal rules and procedures. Simply put, party ‘A’ does not want to end up 
resolving a dispute in the legal system of party ‘B’, and vice versa (Redfern, 1976). As such, 
additional contractual safeguards are warranted. By opting for arbitration, contracting parties 
essentially forego their opportunity to resolve a dispute in the traditional legal system, i.e., 
parties allow for custom rather than law to render a verdict on a potential dispute (Bonn, 
1972). As the appeal possibilities against an arbitral decree are limited, and “arbitral decrees 
are widely recognized and enforced under the New York Convention” (Eisenberg and Miller, 
2007; p. 342), arbitration is a particularly effective contractual safeguard for international 
parties to cope with different legal systems. 
 I also considered the relationship between the presence of a high-growth firm in an 
alliance and the likelihood of observing an arbitration clause in the corresponding contract. 
For alliances between domestic parties, I find strong support for the claim that if at least one 
party has experienced recent rapid growth, the alliance contract is more likely to include an 
arbitration clause. Firms that experience recent commercial success are often wary of leaking 
valuable business information to outsiders when their alliance runs into a dispute. These firms 
often possess a competitive advantage over other firms which they seek to protect from 
appropriation by (outside) competitors (Fombrun and Wally, 1989; Slaby, Chapman and 
O’Hara, 1989). When technology companies experience explosive growth, i.e., commercial 
success, they implement contractual safeguards in their alliance contracts aimed at limiting 
the outflow of information and knowledge to outside competitors. This study thus finds 
support for the claim that the confidential nature of arbitration proceedings and the award 
(Mattli, 2001), is paramount in explaining the preference of some firms to have disputes 
settled by arbitration. 
 A counterargument to the reasoning laid out before is that if high-growth firms are 
particularly keen on preventing leakage, they are also more likely to promote internal dispute 
resolution. This counterargument has merit, but is ultimately flawed. Its benefits 
notwithstanding, extensive internal dispute resolution does not limit parties in their ultimate 
choice for a mandated third party dispute resolution. Parties could therefore stress internal 
dispute resolution, but still ultimately find themselves in public forums settling their dispute. 
As such, it makes sense for high-growth firms to particularly stress arbitration as the preferred 
method of dispute resolution. In unreported regressions I checked whether or not internal 
dispute resolution mechanisms are more likely to be stipulated in an alliance contract in the 
presence of a high-growth firm. However, I find no empirical support for such a claim. 
 83
Contrary to my expectations, I find no significant relationship between the similarity of 
parties’ legal regimes and their propensity to stipulate an arbitration clause in their R&D 
alliance contract. The measure that I use, however, might pick up other cross-national 
differences that interfere with the presented results. Two particularly salient cross-national 
differences refer to differences in rule of law and national culture. According to The World 
Bank Group, rule of law partially refers to the extent to which agents have confidence in 
quality of contract enforcement (also see Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). The 
average value for the U.S. in the period between 1996 and 2005 for this rule of law measure 
equals around 1.5. Countries in my dataset with a somewhat weaker rule of law include 
Belgium, China, France, Italy, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. At first sight, in unreported 
regressions on the subset of international alliances, it indeed appears that rule of law has a 
negative correlation with the propensity of parties to stipulate an arbitration provision. This 
would indicate that when parties have more confidence in their contract rights being enforced 
by a foreign – to the U.S. firm – court, they would be less inclined to opt for arbitration in 
their contract. However, further investigation shows that this is mainly a ‘Japan effect’, i.e., 
nearly all contracts (92%) that involve a Japanese and U.S. firm include arbitration 
provisions. In some respects, the Japanese legal system differs significantly from both 
common law and civil law systems. For instance, Japanese courts possess only few coercive 
powers and Japanese companies strongly rely on extralegal methods of dispute resolution 
(Haley, 1991). As such, differences in their respective legal systems might explain why U.S.-
Japan firm pairs are so inclined to contractually stipulate that potential disputes will be 
forwarded to arbitration. In a similar vein, it could be argued that differences in national 
cultures spurs relationship conflict and hampers the development of a successful collaboration 
(Sirmon and Lane, 2004). Similar to Oxley (1999) and using Hofstede’s ‘dimensions of 
culture’ (Hofstede, 1980), I account for differences in national cultures in unreported 
regressions. It indeed appears that cultural distance is positively related to the propensity of 
international alliance parties to stipulate an arbitration clause in their agreement. Nevertheless, 
similar to the rule of law discussion, this finding can be contributed to a large ‘Japan effect’. 
In terms of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity, Japan 
differs quiet significantly from the U.S. In light of the previous arguments and findings, it is 
possible that rule of law and culture have a negative and positive, respectively, effect on the 
propensity of alliance partners to stipulate an arbitration clause in their contract. However, 
these relationships come with a caveat as they appear to be solely driven by U.S.-Japan firm 
pairs. As such, future research covering a more heterogeneous set of international firm pairs 
could seek to unravel the exact link between rule of law, cultural distance and the propensity 
of international firm pairs to opt for arbitration in their contract. 
4.7 Limitations and future research directions 
This research has certain limitations which point to interesting areas for future research. First, 
similar to other recent research on the design of contracts, I am conservative in the empirical 
inferences I draw due to possible correlations of the error terms. As I observe no relevant 
exogenous shocks during the period in which the contracts in the sample were signed, I am 
unable to claim any causal relations between exchange features and the preference of 
contracting parties for certain dispute resolution mechanisms. To generate further confidence 
in the presented results, in unreported regressions, I used firm fixed effects for the most 
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frequently occurring firms in my sample to account for unobserved firm effects (Lerner and 
Malmendier, 2010). Presented results remain unaltered. We can thus be relatively confident in 
the finding that elements of exchange complexity drive the choice for internal dispute 
resolution, rather than certain types of companies entering into more or less complex alliances 
while simultaneously placing more or less emphasis on internal dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, additional analyses using longitudinal data could yield interesting 
supplemental results. Second, parties can deviate from the contract when a dispute arises. 
Further research is necessary to uncover how contractual clauses are translated into dispute 
resolution when a dispute actually occurs.37 Third, more research is necessary into the 
consequences of CEO involvement in disputes, as lower organizational levels get 
disempowered, possibly leading to more and more disputes being forwarded to higher 
hierarchical levels.38 Fourth and last, I focus on firm growth because “[f]irms grow by 
successfully identifying, pursuing, and capturing a competitive advantage in an 
environmental niche” (Fombrun and Wally, 1989; p. 110). Firms seek to protect the source(s) 
of their competitive advantage, especially from appropriation by competitors. However, I am 
currently unable to rule out that other mechanisms might actually drive this observed positive 
correlation. Do these firms face more appropriation concerns regarding their capabilities? Are 
these firms especially worried about their external image (Fombrun and Wally, 1989)? Or are 
these firms compensating for their turbulent development (Hambrick and Crozier, 1985), by 
generating control over how potential disputes will be resolved? I encourage future research 
to answer these questions. 
 
 
  
                                                 
37 As one manager from a large electronics company states: “…Parties each agree to a certain type of dispute 
resolution ex-ante, in the contract, and you never know exactly how this will work out in case a dispute actually 
arises…”. 
38 As one manager from a large biopharmaceutical company states: “…Disputes should be solved at lowest 
possible level. However, if need they [CEO involvement] are quite efficient [in] the short term as they short-cut 
the normal process and allow the outcome to be communicated from a high platform. However, the process can 
tend to be somewhat segregated from the day-to-day operation of the alliance, and if the CEO/CSO do not show 
discipline in involving their internal stakeholders (Project VP etc.) the decision might end out to be blurred, dis-
integrated with reality and hard to implement. (…). [C]are should be taken when involving CEO/CSO. 
Escalation can become a vicious circle: dis-empowering the lower organizational level in their decision-making 
capability [thereby] leading (…) to more and more escalation of lesser and lesser issues…”. 
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FIVE 
 
Current Employee, Future Competitor? 
Limiting the Outflow of Human Capital to 
Collaboration Partners39 
Abstract 
This paper explores contractual limitations on the hiring behavior of firms that participate in 
collaborative R&D alliances. I categorize these contractual limitations in terms of duration, 
scope, and definition. Interestingly, I find that many clauses may affect employees that are not 
directly involved in a collaboration. Hypotheses are tested using a dataset of 302 R&D 
alliance contracts in the biopharmaceutical industry. Results indicate that the presence of a 
firm located in a pro-mobility environment decreases the likelihood of observing contractual 
limitations on employee mobility. Furthermore, scientifically oriented firms are more likely to 
contractually limit each other’s hiring behavior. 
  
                                                 
39 This work has benefited from helpful comments and suggestions by Hans Frankort, John Hagedoorn, Katrin 
Hussinger, Fabrice Lumineau, Gerard Pfann, and participants at seminars at KU Leuven and Maastricht 
University. 
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5.1 Introduction 
In recent years a growing body of research has aimed to answer the question how firms 
combine resources to support innovation activities. In the search for a response to this 
question, research has usually focused on either alliances (Das and Teng, 2000b; Hagedoorn, 
1993), or on employee mobility (Corredoira and Rosenkopf, 2010; Somaya, Williamson and 
Lorinkova, 2008; Wezel, Cattani and Pennings, 2006), although rarely in tandem (some 
exceptions are Hess and Rothaermel, 2011; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Rothaermel and 
Hess, 2007). Both mechanisms, i.e., alliances and employee mobility, aim to tap into 
knowledge resources not currently possessed by a particular firm. As already indicated by 
Kenneth Arrow in 1962, “[m]obility of personnel among firms provides a way of spreading 
information” (Arrow, 1962; p. 615). Alliances seek to achieve a similar goal by combining 
resources, i.e., valuable information, embedded in two or more different organizations (Das 
and Teng, 2000b). Irrespective of their similarities, firms can be expected to be concerned 
about employee mobility in collaborative arrangements (Oxley and Wada, 2009). For a 
particular firm, loss of key employees can have devastating consequences (Phillips, 2002; 
Wezel, Cattani and Pennings, 2006). If information asymmetry between firms complicates the 
identification of each other’s valuable employees (Horn, 2011), and alliances reduce this 
information asymmetry (Das and Teng, 2000b; Hamel, 1991), then firms can be expected to 
try and control employee mobility to partner firms (Oxley and Wada, 2009). As a 
collaboration progresses, parties often get a good feel for each other’s resources and 
capabilities (Das and Teng, 2000b; Hamel, 1991), and are thus righteously concerned with the 
possibility of key employees being identified by the other party, and consequently hired away. 
Indeed, previous research suggests that alliances are sometimes used as a cover by firms to 
assess and appropriate knowledge outside of the initial intentions under an agreement (Das 
and Teng, 2000b; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Alliances can thus be used as a cover for firms 
to hire away knowledgeable employees of collaboration partners. Such aggressive hiring 
practices are no exception. Kerstetter (2000) illustrates this point nicely when stating: “If you 
have trouble with the competition, simply raid its talent” (Kerstetter, 2000; p. 43). Similarly, 
de Rond and Bouchikhi (2004) describe an alliance where the pharmaceutical firm hired away 
an employee of its alliance partner, a biotechnology firm, during their collaboration. This 
employee had been actively involved in their collaboration and had taken the lead in several 
joint projects (de Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004). As a direct consequence of this employee 
poaching by the pharmaceutical firm, trust immediately broke down, and the alliance 
destabilized. Over the course of the collaboration, the biotechnology firm continued to allege 
the pharmaceutical firm of attempting to hire away its key personnel. This paper sets out to 
investigate contractual safeguards that aim to limit the unintended outflow of information, in 
the form of employees, in arrangements intended to share information, i.e., alliances. In doing 
so, I move beyond a more general focus on joint venture establishment by alliance parties as a 
mechanism to increase control over employee mobility (Oxley and Wada, 2009), and 
specifically focus on the design and antecedents of contractual mechanisms aimed at 
discouraging employee mobility between alliance partners. 
 At this point it is worthwhile to mention that although the central tenet underlying this 
paper is that the loss of key personnel can have negative consequences for firms, this arguably 
represents a somewhat truncated view of the literature. Recent evidence by Corredoira and 
Rosenkopf (2010) suggests that employee mobility can have positive consequences for source 
 87
firms, especially when employees move to geographically distant alters. This raises the 
question why firms would want to limit employee mobility to their alliance partner. First, 
recent literature on alliances indicates that control over employee mobility is especially 
important for firms participating in an alliance as failure to do so significantly increases the 
risk of unintended knowledge leakage (Oxley and Wada, 2009). Second, when employees 
move to a new employer, they transfer not only knowledge but also other resources and 
routines (Philips, 2002). As such, while the source firm, i.e., the firm from which the 
employees depart, might experience some benefits in terms of knowledge transfer through 
employee mobility (Corredoira and Rosenkopf, 2010), the net effect for this source firm might 
still be negative (Philips, 2002; Wezel, Cattani and Pennings, 2006). Third, it is doubtful 
whether existing findings on the beneficial effects of employee mobility hold for those firm 
pairs that are currently engaged in a collaboration or recently were. Indeed, most previous 
findings on the beneficial effects of employee mobility for source firms seem to be predicated 
on the assumption that mobility ties can be used to access distant and non-redundant 
information. The departing employee creates a communication channel between the old and 
new employer, and makes the old employer aware of the potentially valuable knowledge 
possessed by the new employer (Corredoira and Rosenkopf, 2010). It is difficult to imagine 
that similar benefits accrue to the old employer when its employees depart to its collaboration 
partner. In that case, the communication channels have already been established as part of 
their collaboration, and they are at least partially aware of each other’s knowledge and 
expertise. The departing employee adds little to the social capital of the source firm causing a 
human capital argument, i.e., a departing employee signals a loss of human capital for the 
source firm, to dominate. De Rond and Bouchikhi (2004) describe a case in which a 
pharmaceutical firm approached and hired an employee of a biotechnology firm during their 
collaboration. The employee was actively involved in their collaboration, and possessed a lot 
of know-how. The source firm, i.e., the biotechnology firm, was not pleased with losing 
human capital to its alliance partner which lead to a total breakdown of trust in a once trusting 
relationship (De Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004). In light of these arguments, I acknowledge that 
employee mobility can have beneficial effects for (source) firms, but maintain that these 
beneficial effects are unlikely to dominate in this particular context.  
 I aim to contribute to existing research on four points. First, by focusing on clauses that 
limit employee mobility between alliance partners, I seek to combine extant research on 
alliances (e.g. Das and Teng, 2000b; Gulati, 1995; Hagedoorn, 1993) with research on 
employee mobility (Corredoira and Rosenkopf, 2010; Somaya, Williamson and Lorinkova, 
2008; Wezel, Cattani and Pennings, 2006). Firms constantly seek to add human capital to 
their labor force to reinforce their existing knowledge base, but are often constrained by 
impermeable firm boundaries. Individual contributions of employees to the success of a firm 
are often unclear from the outside. An alliance diminishes the information asymmetry 
between firms and allows for a much more accurate assessment of each other’s key 
employees. Therefore, in this contribution, I specifically focus on clauses that aim to prevent 
mobility of employees between alliance partners. 
 Second, although the effects of employee mobility have received considerable attention 
over the last years (Corredoira and Rosenkopf, 2010; Somaya, Williamson and Lorinkova, 
2008; Wezel, Cattani and Pennings, 2006), specific safeguards in alliance contracts that seek 
to restrain the hiring behavior of firms remain less explored. Labor economists have 
investigated, mostly from a theoretical perspective, the optimal contract structure for the 
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retention of scientific employees that are hired to work on a project but can depart at some 
point to use their gained knowledge in a rival enterprise (Pakes and Nitzan, 1983). The results 
of Pakes and Nitzan (1983) imply that formal restrictions on employee mobility are actually 
irrelevant, as an employer should always be able to outbid a rival enterprise or a new start-up 
(Hyde, 2012). Nevertheless in practice, contractual restrictions on employee mobility are 
commonplace (Horn, 2011). Until now, attention for the role of interfirm contracts in 
retaining employees seems absent. This is somewhat disconcerting as previous literature 
already noticed that contractual limitations on the hiring behavior of firms occur frequently in 
alliance contracts (e.g. Reuer and Arińo, 2007), and aggressive hiring practices are the rule 
rather than the exception in knowledge-intensive industries such as the biopharmaceutical 
industry (Horn, 2011). Case in point is the complaint filed by Affymetrix, Inc. against Pacific 
BioSciences, Inc. stating that the latter firm enticed employees of the former firm, bound by 
their employment contracts, to abandon their employment in order to access their (scientific) 
knowledge and gain an unfair competitive advantage.40 Recent literature highlights that one 
way of limiting unintended knowledge leakage via employee mobility is for alliance partners 
to opt for more hierarchical governance structures (Oxley and Wada, 2009). Control of 
employee mobility is important as it reduces the possibility of unwanted knowledge leakage 
as a negative byproduct of an alliance (Oxley and Wada, 2009). Here I explore another 
method of limiting unwanted employee mobility, i.e., voluntary contractual safeguards that 
restrain the hiring behavior of firms participating in an alliance.  
 Third, I seek to investigate the design of clauses that limit employee mobility between 
alliance partners. Recent research has expressed concern that overly broad anticompetitive 
clauses allowed under procompetitive agreements (R&D alliances), might decrease 
competition between collaborating partners in other markets (Cooper and Ross, 2007). 
Inspired by this line of research, I provide more information on how limitations on employee 
mobility found in alliance contracts are constructed in terms of duration, scope, and 
definition. 
 Fourth, Human Resources (HR) literature signals that over the last years competitor 
recruitment has become an important mechanism for firms to try and gain a competitive 
advantage (for a comprehensive overview of the literature on competitor recruitment, see 
Horn (2011)), especially for those firms active in research-intensive industries such as the 
biopharmaceutical industry. Although this literature acknowledges the role of information 
asymmetry between firms in complicating the competitor recruitment process, it remains 
somewhat silent on the role of alliances in overcoming this information asymmetry. 
Competitor recruitment usually involves a costly information search on what candidates to 
approach for employment (Horn, 2011). These costly information searches are avoided when 
a firm identifies skilled employees of its collaboration partner, and consequently hires these 
employees away during or after the collaboration. As such, I believe that a more in-depth 
understanding of the contractual mechanisms used by alliance parties to limit each other’s 
hiring behavior has the potential to significantly advance the burgeoning stream of literature 
on competitor recruitment. 
 I find that, in my sample, 50% of all clauses that aim to limit interfirm employee mobility 
are not specified with regard to the employees they affect. This could indicate that many 
                                                 
40 Affymetrix, Inc. vs. Pacific Biosciences, Inc. Case No : 110CV186536. (Superior Court of the State of 
California, County of Santa Clara November 3, 2010), (Demand for jury trial).  
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clauses have an influence on the mobility of employees that were not directly involved in a 
collaboration. I also find that the propensity of firms to include contractual limitations on 
interfirm employee mobility declines when at least one firm is located in a pro-mobility 
environment. In addition, more scientifically oriented firm pairs appear to be especially prone 
to try and limit interfirm employee mobility via their contract. The results have implications 
for the literatures on alliances, employee mobility, and employee poaching.   
5.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Human assets, such as talented scientists and managers, can bring about a sustainable 
competitive advantage for a firm (Coff, 1997). However, human assets differ from traditional 
assets as the former are not owned by a firm and can therefore leave to (competing) firms. As 
a result, managing human assets as a sustainable competitive advantage poses significant 
challenges for a firm (Coff, 1997). These difficulties are exacerbated when a firm enters into 
an alliance. Previous literature on alliances indicates that a major driver behind alliance 
formation is the combination of distinct resources and technological complementarity (Das 
and Teng, 2000b; Hagedoorn, 1993). During a collaboration firms may learn about each 
other’s capabilities and resources (Frankort, Hagedoorn and Letterie, 2012; Hamel, 1991), and 
more in particular, about each other’s valuable employees. Even more worrisome for firms are 
observations made in previous literature that alliances are sometimes used as a cover to 
appropriate knowledge that is not directly part of a collaboration (Baughn et al., 1997; Das 
and Teng, 2000b; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Hill (1992) refers to this unintended 
knowledge leakage as the risk of second-order diffusion of technological know-how. To 
counter the hazard of unwanted employee mobility, previous literature suggests that parties 
take recourse to a more hierarchical governance structure such as a JV (Oxley and Wada, 
2009). The formal disconnect between a joint venture and parent organizations allows for 
more control over employee mobility. Although employee mobility has a slightly different 
interpretation in this study compared to that of Oxley and Wada (2009), the basic tenet 
remains the same, i.e., it is both difficult and important for firms that participate in an alliance 
to control the movement of their employees. 41 
 In a nutshell, the above indicates that managing human assets can be troublesome and not 
a straightforward task for firms. Taking the difficulty of managing human assets as a given, 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) studies how parties cope with certain hazards that are 
associated with particular exchange relationships (Shelanski and Klein, 1995), while 
simultaneously acknowledging the influence of the institutional environment in which parties 
operate (Oxley, 1999; Roberts and Greenwood, 1997; Williamson, 1991; 1992). TCE predicts 
that farsighted alliance parties design contracts that reflect underlying exchange hazards 
(Williamson, 1993). In the context of this study, alliance parties can be expected to 
supplement their contract with limitations on interfirm employee mobility, when they 
perceive the risks and consequences of unwanted interfirm employee mobility to be especially 
great. Nevertheless, firms are constrained by the environment in which they operate (Oxley, 
1999; Roberts and Greenwood, 1997; Williamson, 1991; 1992; 1993), i.e., whereas some 
                                                 
41 This study focuses on unwanted employee mobility between firms in terms of hiring behavior while Oxley 
and Wada (2009) seem to focus more on unwanted interactions between employees of collaborating firms. 
90 
environments are supportive of clauses that intend to limit interfirm employee mobility, 
others are not. 
5.2.1 Pro-mobility environment 
Firms do not operate in a vacuum, but are influenced by larger institutional environments in 
which they reside. More specifically, these institutional environments can restrain choices 
made by firms (Roberts and Greenwood, 1997; Williamson, 1992). The definition of an 
institutional environment employed here is that it is “[t]he set of fundamental political, social, 
and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange, and 
distribution...” (Davis and North, 1971; p. 6). In the context of the current study, the 
institutional environment in which firms reside is expected to have a profound impact on the 
propensity of these firms to limit employee mobility via their alliance contract. More 
specifically, I posit that when at least one firm is located in a pro-mobility environment the 
likelihood of observing contractual limitations on employee mobility declines. It is important 
to note that the following arguments do not imply, and it would strain credulity to do so, that 
contractual limitations regarding employee mobility ancillary to procompetitive agreements 
are per se unenforceable when a firm from a pro-mobility environment is involved. Rather, I 
refer to a more general tendency of a certain environment to disapprove contractual 
limitations on employee mobility. 
 One crucial element in explaining an environment’s antipathy towards contractual 
restrictions on employee mobility refers to the legal ground rules of that environment (Marx, 
Strumsky and Fleming, 2009). Case in point is California with its California’s Business and 
Professions Code section 1660042 which states that “[E]very contract by which anyone is 
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that 
extend void”.43 One cannot directly infer from the aforementioned legal rule that all clauses 
ancillary to procompetitive agreements restricting the hiring behavior of firms are per se 
unenforceable.44 Instead, such a legal rule signals a strong public policy in favor of employee 
mobility,45 casting doubt on the extent to which limitations on the mobility of employees will 
                                                 
42 As stated by Hyde (1998), some states have similar statures as California’s Business and Professions Code 
section 16600. Nevertheless, California is a good example for two reasons. First, in the context of the 
biopharmaceutical industry, California houses two of the largest biotechnology regions in the world. As such, 
Californian firms are quite prevalent in my sample compared to states which might have similar legal statures, 
but no significant presence in the biotechnology sector. Second, although a few states have similar statures to 
California’s Business and Professions Code 16600, they have been interpreted quite loosely by their courts 
(Hyde, 1998). 
43 See United States vs. Adobe Systems Inc., Apple Inc., Google Inc., Intel Corporation, Intuit Inc., and Pixar. 
Case No: 1:10-cv-01629. (DOJ Sept 24, 2010), (competitive impact statement). Here, it states that non-
solicitation clauses as ancillary to pro-competitive agreements are not prohibited per se, although a footnote 
indicates that these clauses might run afoul of the California’s Business and Professions Code section 16600.  
44 See VL Systems, Inc. vs. Unisen, Inc. Case No: G037334. (Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, 
California, June 25, 2007). In this particular case the Court of Appeal reversed an earlier decision by a lower 
Court and decided that a no-hire clause as implemented in a consulting contract between VL System Inc. and 
Unisen Inc. was unenforceable as a matter of law. In its explanation of the verdict, the Appellate Court 
specifically mentioned that more narrowly drawn clauses could pass muster under California law. One specific 
point the Appellate Court emphasized was that due to the broadness of the clause, the no-hire clause could 
impact employees that did not perform actual work under the contract. 
45 See Application Group, Inc. vs. Hunter Group, Inc. Case No: A071528. (Court of Appeal, First District, 
Division 3, California, February 23, 1998). Here, a Californian Court refused to enforce a non-compete 
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be enforced, which could in turn transform itself into a local set of beliefs, i.e., culture, 
whereby high turnover rates and aggressive hiring practices are considered part of doing 
business (Audretsch, 2001; Casper, 2007; Fallick, Fleischman and Rebitzer, 2006; Gilson, 
1999; Kerstetter, 2000; Saxenian, 1994). It follows that conditional on being located in a pro-
mobility environment, a firm’s general tendency to restrain the mobility of its employees can 
be expected to be low. 
Hypothesis 1. There is a negative association between the inclusion of a firm located in a 
pro-mobility environment in an alliance, and the likelihood of observing a contractual 
restriction on employee mobility in an R&D alliance contract. 
5.2.2 Geographical distance 
Previous literature highlights the important role of geographical distance in explaining 
informal linkages and intensity of information exchange between teams within an 
organization, and between alliance parties. In terms of organizational teams, social contact 
and face-to-face communication substantially decreases when teams are more geographically 
dispersed (e.g. Polzer et al., 2006). A similar observation has been made in the literature on 
alliances. Geographical proximity makes informal contact between managers and scientists of 
collaborating firms more likely (Almeida, Dokko and Rosenkopf, 2003; Arita and McCann, 
2000; Bengtsson and Ravid, 2009; Decarolis and Deeds, 1999; Gittelman, 2007; Rosenkopf 
and Almeida, 2003), and increases the intensity by which information is exchanged (Arita and 
McCann, 2000). As a result, via informal linkages and face-to-face communication 
(Gittelman, 2007), firm boundaries of geographically proximate alliance partners can become 
relatively permeable, and firms will be in a better position to assess each other’s critical 
employees and their abilities. In addition, if employees in general exhibit a tendency to move 
within the same geographic area (Decarolis and Deeds, 1999), then firms ought to be more 
concerned about unwanted employee mobility when collaborating with a geographically 
proximate firm. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2. There is a negative association between the geographical distance between 
partner firms, and the likelihood of observing a contractual restriction on employee 
mobility in an R&D alliance contract. 
5.2.3 Scientific orientation 
Science forms the foundation of many high technology industries. In these industries, firms 
need to maintain and expand their scientific capabilities in order for them to ensure long-term 
survival. For instance, science aids biopharmaceutical firms in developing new methods to 
advance through drug development by acting as a knowledge repository (Almeida, Hohberger 
and Parada, 2011; Gittelman and Kogut, 2003). “[T]he most important source of new 
technological opportunities has been the advance of scientific knowledge. (…). [S]cientists 
                                                                                                                                                        
agreement between a Maryland employer and employee when the latter moved to work for a Californian firm 
thereby violating the non-compete. This case exemplifies that California’s strong public policy in favor of the 
free movement of employees can even affect parties when a contract designates law of another state or country 
to govern interpretation of the contract.  
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and engineers engaged in industrial R&D employ science as a set of tools and stock of 
knowledge to be tapped in problem-solving” (Klevorick et al., 1995; p. 189). However, the 
above also creates appropriation concerns. Recent literature illustrates the difficulty of 
managing human assets (Coff, 1997), and scientists more in particular (Younge, 2012). Hiring 
away employees from other firms is a particularly effective method of acquiring knowledge 
(Levin, 1988). The above arguments point towards the proposition that scientifically oriented 
firms that engage in joint R&D will be concerned about losing scientific knowledge tied up in 
their employees to each other. Indeed, “…intense competition for (…) know how in 
biotechnology creates incentives for rival firms to appropriate scientific knowledge that is not 
already protected…” (Liebeskind et al., 1996; p. 429). 
 Recent research suggests a role for science, embedded in scientific publications, in 
attracting talented scientists and other research oriented employees (Cockburn and Henderson, 
1998; Liu and Stuart, 2010; McMillan and Deeds, 1998; Younge, 2012). For instance, 
Cockburn and Henderson (1998) state that “[t]he highest quality scientists in a field are often 
reluctant to work for private firms if they will not be able to publish and thus maintain their 
personal scientific reputations” (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; p. 163). A similar point is 
made by Liu and Stuart (2010) who, based on interviews, state that private sector firms often 
try to mimic university-like atmospheres to attract researchers, and McMillan and Deeds 
(1998) who state that “[a] ranking by our respondents of their top three prospective employers 
mirrored a ranking of those companies’ publication records” (McMillan and Deeds, 1998; p. 
299). If scientifically oriented firms attract skilled scientific labor (Mahroum, 2000), and two 
scientifically oriented firms collaborate in R&D, it follows that these firms are likely to be 
concerned about unwanted employee mobility as a negative byproduct of their alliance. 
Empirical corroboration of this hypothesis would add credence to claims made by Liu and 
Stuart (2010) linking scientific publications to employee retention mechanisms. 
Hypothesis 3. There is a positive association between the scientific orientation of partner 
firms, and the likelihood of observing a contractual restriction on employee mobility in an 
R&D alliance contract. 
5.2.4 Competitors 
Human assets can be a valuable resource for a firm, although managing human assets as a 
sustainable competitive advantage poses some significant challenges (Coff, 1997). For 
instance, employees can terminate their employment in response to an employment offer by a 
competitor. According to Kerstetter (2000), employees are often traded like commodities 
between rival high-technology companies, as illustrated by the phrase: “If you have trouble 
with the competition, simply raid its talent” (Kerstetter, 2000; p. 43). When key employees 
leave to competitors, the negative consequences for the firm losing the employees can be 
especially severe. In their study, Somaya, Williamson and Lorinkova (2008) find that, in 
terms of new business obtained, employee mobility has beneficial effects for a law firm when 
their patent attorneys leave to client organizations, but harmful effects when patent attorneys 
leave to competitors of that law firm. Phillips (2002) finds that the greater the overlap in 
activities between a parent firm and its progeny, i.e., the greater the degree to which firms can 
be labeled as direct competitors, the larger the likelihood of failure on the side of the parent 
firm. Similarly, Coff (1997) and Somaya, Williamson and Lorinkova (2008) mention the 
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example of Kidder Peabody & Co. which was devastated when key employees left to 
competitors, taking with them valuable knowledge. In terms of alliances, firms that are 
competitors, or that perceive loss of knowledge through an alliance to significantly impair 
their competitive position, will be more prone to protect their knowledge (Baughn et al., 
1997; Norman, 2002). In light of these arguments, I expect that: 
Hypothesis 4. There is a positive association between the level of competition between 
partner firms, and the likelihood of observing a contractual restriction on employee 
mobility in an R&D alliance contract. 
5.3 Data, methods, and sample description 
5.3.1 Sample description 
The preliminary sample comprised 587 deals for the period 1996-2005 obtained from 
Pharmaventures, a UK-based information and consulting firm. Pharmaventures has identified 
thousands of alliances in the biopharmaceutical sector in their PharmaDeals database. The 
collected deals are grouped into a number of categories, such as collaborative R&D, 
distribution/marketing, manufacturing/supply, and business acquisition. For each agreement, 
the PharmaDeals database provides information on the names of the partners, type of 
contractual relationship, date deal signed, equity investment, relevant product areas and 
technology fields, press releases and, where available, the actual contracts. Pharmaventures 
acquired these actual contracts from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
filings and their clients. To avoid unnecessary heterogeneity, I excluded all agreements 
where: 
• one of the parties is a government agency or university 
• the alliance is, as stated in the contract, a renegotiation or restatement of a previous 
alliance between the firms 
• there is no R&D component to the alliance 
• one firm has a controlling interest in the other firm (greater than 50%) 
• contracts involve more than two parties. 
 The final contract database contains a set of 304 contracts between unique partner sets 
which was reduced in the model specifications to 302 contracts due to missing values. The 
dataset covers R&D alliance contracts and additional information for the period 1996 through 
2005. In addition, all alliances fall within the biopharmaceutical industry. The 
biopharmaceutical industry is a particularly interesting arena to study the proposed theoretical 
associations as it is characterized by frequent collaborations between firms, an important role 
for science, and aggressive hiring tactics between firms (Audretsch, 2001; Hess and 
Rothaermel, 2011; Prevezer, 1997; Swann and Prevezer, 1996; Whittington, Owen-Smith and 
Powell, 2009). In addition, by specifically focusing on the biopharmaceutical industry, we can 
be assured that variation in contracting terms does not come from a variation in the underlying 
contracting setting. 
 The agreements include both U.S. (domestic) contracts, i.e., the contracting parties are 
both U.S.-based firms (176 alliances), and international contracts, i.e., a U.S.-based firm 
collaborates with a non-U.S. based firm (128 alliances). A total of 284 firms were involved in 
the 304 contracts and about 55% of the agreements were concluded between a biotechnology 
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firm and a pharmaceutical or a chemical firm. The complete dataset combines information 
from PharmaDeals with data retrieved from firm annual reports, the Cooperative Agreements 
and Technology Indicators (CATI) database, Datastream, Compustat, LexisNexis, Corptech, 
USPTO, and PubMed.  
5.3.2 Dependent variable 
Employee mobility restriction. I measure restrictions on employee mobility by investigating 
each R&D contract on the presence of non-solicitation clauses, also called non-poaching 
agreements. These non-solicitation clauses restrict employee mobility by prohibiting alliance 
parties to actively approach each other’s employees for employment. For instance, consider 
the following excerpt from the R&D alliance contract between Innogenetics and Cepheid 
(1998):  
“NON-SOLICITATION. During the term of the R&D Collaboration, each Party agrees 
not to induce any employee of the other Party participating in the R&D Collaboration to 
discontinue its employment with that Party in order to become employed by or associated 
with any business, enterprise, or effort that is associated with its own business”.  
Recently, non-solicitation agreements caused quite an upheaval when the Department of 
Justice accused several large technology firms (e.g. Apple Inc. and Google Inc.) of agreeing 
not to cold call each other’s employees outside of collaborative endeavors. 
 I include a dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 if an employee mobility 
restriction is present in an R&D alliance contract, and 0 otherwise. 
5.3.3 Independent variables 
Pro-mobility environment. Using information provided by PharmaDeals, I am able to 
determine whether or not a firm from California is involved in an alliance. California is a 
quintessential example of a pro-mobility environment because of its strong public policy 
towards promoting the free movement of employees. According to California’s Business and 
Professions Code section 16600 “[E]very contract by which anyone is restrained from 
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extend void”, with a 
few notable exceptions such as the sale of ownership interest in a business. Californian firms 
are situated in an environment where contractual limitations on employee mobility are under 
close scrutiny (Gilson, 1999), and where, at least in Silicon Valley, non-linear career paths are 
standard (Saxenian, 1994). I include a dummy variable which equals 1 if an alliance includes 
at least one firm from California, and 0 otherwise. 
 Geographical distance. Previous literature has measured the geographical distance 
between two regions or cities in various ways. Most common are driving time, driving 
distance, and geodetic distance (Breschi and Lenzi, 2010; Gittelman, 2007; Whittington, 
Owen-Smith and Powell, 2009). I here use the direct great circle distance (‘as the crow flies’). 
Given the latitudes and longitudes of two cities, distance is calculated as: 
 
ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁ = ߮ ∗ ߱, with;  
߮ = ݁ܽݎݐℎ	ݎܽ݀݅ݑݏ 
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߱ = arccos(cos(90 − ݈ܽݐଶ) cos(90 − ݈ܽݐଵ) + sin(90 − ݈ܽݐଶ) sin(90 − ݈ܽݐଵ) cos(݈݋݊ଶ −
݈݋݊ଵ))	  
And ݃݁݋݃ݎܽ݌ℎ݈݅ܿܽ	݀݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁ = log	(1 + ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁) 
 
I add plus one to the distance to account for a few firms that are located in the same city. 
 Scientific orientation. Several recent contributions have focused on the scientific 
publishing behavior of firms, especially in the biopharmaceutical industry (e.g. Almeida, 
Hohberger and Parada, 2011; Decarolis and Deeds, 1999; Gittelman, 2007; Gittelman and 
Kogut, 2003; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Liebeskind, 1996). I use the PubMed database 
to retrieve scientific publications for each firm in my dataset (see Casper (2007), Casper and 
Murray (2005) and Furman et al. (2005) for similar approaches in retrieving scientific 
publications for biopharmaceutical firms). PubMed incorporates over 22 million citations to 
journal articles in the fields of biomedicine and the life sciences. It includes prestigious 
journals such as Nature and Cell. In addition, the PubMed database incorporates MEDLINE. 
As stated by MEDLINE, it includes a host of different subject areas such as life sciences 
(including biotechnology) and chemical sciences. 
 Similar to patent counts, I take the number of published scientific articles of each firm in 
a five year window prior to the starting date of an alliance. This approach resembles that of 
Gittelman and Kogut (2003) who look at the publication count of firms between the years 
1988 and 1994. I linked scientific publications to firms by investigating firm affiliations of 
first authors. As previous literature indicates, the total number of scientific publications 
authored by employees of a firm is an adequate proxy for the scientific quality of that firm 
(Almeida, Hohberger and Parada, 2011). Given alliance parties A and B, I define scientific 
orientation as: 
 
Scientific	orientation = 	Number	of	publications୅Number	of	publications୅ +	
Number	of	publications୆
Number	of	publications୆	 
 
 Competition. Defining whether or not two firms can be labeled as competitors is an 
inherently subjective exercise, especially with large diversified firms, and no full-proof 
method exists. Previous contributions have mainly used overlap in primary SIC codes as an 
indication of the level of competition between firms (e.g. Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Park and 
Russo, 1996). Park and Russo (1996) find that joint ventures established between direct 
competitors, i.e., firms operating in the same primary 4-digit SIC code, more often fail. Oxley 
and Sampson (2004) proxy product market competition by whether or not firms operate in the 
same primary 4-digit SIC code and find that competitors limit the scope of their joint alliance 
activities. 
 Inspired by these previous contributions, I construct a measure based on the SIC 
classification of alliance parties using data from Thomson ONE Banker. This variable equals 
2 if both parties operate in the same primary 4-digit SIC code, 1 if both parties operate in the 
same primary 3-digit SIC code but not in the same primary 4-digit SIC-code, and 0 otherwise. 
5.3.4 Control variables 
Size asymmetry. Previous literature on alliances indicates that large size asymmetries between 
firms are suggestive for differences in risk perceptions (for instance Berg, Duncan and 
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Friedman, 1982; Mytelka, 1991). This literature suggests that the smaller firm perceives more 
risk due to potential opportunistic behavior on the side of the larger partner.46 I control for the 
size asymmetry between alliance parties by taking the logarithmic value of the number of 
employees of the firm with the largest number of employees, minus the logarithmic value of 
the number of employees of the other firm. 
 Alliance experience asymmetry. Based on the CATI database (see Hagedoorn, 2002), I 
obtained data on the prior R&D alliance experience of firms in a five year window prior to the 
start of an alliance. A five year window is widely accepted in the literature as adequately 
capturing alliance experience of firms (see Gulati, 1995). Previous literature suggests that 
alliance experience affects contract design (Argyres, Bercovitz and Mayer, 2007), and could 
therefore influence the variable of interest. For instance, firms with considerable alliance 
experience may have some familiarity with collaboration partners hiring away valuable 
employees, while inexperienced firms do not. As such, I include the absolute difference in 
alliance experience between firms. 
 Scientific orientation asymmetry. In support of hypothesis 3, I argue that partner firms 
that are more scientifically oriented are more likely to include a clause in their R&D alliance 
contract to limit the unintended outflow of employees to each other. To assure that findings 
regarding the scientific orientation of firms can be attributed to their total scientific 
orientation, I control for scientific orientation asymmetry between firms. Assume X being the 
most scientifically oriented firm and Y the other firm, this variable is defined as:  
 
Scientific	orientation = 	Number	of	publicationsଡ଼Number	of	publicationsଡ଼ −	
Number	of	publicationsଢ଼
Number	of	publicationsଢ଼	 
 
 R&D budget asymmetry. Especially for scientists, interfirm asymmetry in R&D budgets 
might influence job mobility. Research oriented employees might favor employers that have a 
large R&D budget which they can partly use to fund their future research and/or development 
endeavors. In addition, firms that spend copious amounts of funds on R&D are most likely 
characterized by a learning attitude (Schoenmakers and Duysters, 2006), which might be 
reflected in their propensity to opt for contractual limitations on employee mobility. As such, 
I control for asymmetry in R&D budgets, i.e., technological sizes (Stuart, Ozdemir and Ding, 
2007), between two collaborating firms by taking the logarithmic value of the R&D expenses 
of the firm that spends the most on R&D, minus the logarithmic value of the R&D expenses 
of the other firm. 
 Prior ties. Previous research illustrates that firms which have previously collaborated 
choose different governance structures for future collaborations (e.g. Gulati, 1995). Prior ties 
could signal a certain level of trust between collaboration partners, lessening the need to 
stipulate restrictions on hiring behavior, or it could signal learning over time, whereby parties 
amend future contracts based on their previous collaboration(s). Therefore, based on the 
CATI database, I control for the number of previous collaborations between two firms in a 5-
year period before their current alliance. 
                                                 
46 Size asymmetry is also indicative of the level of interfirm dependence between parties whereby the small firm 
is usually dependent on financial support from the larger firm. I considered a more direct measure for the level of 
interfirm dependence between parties based on their R&D plan. This variable did not appear to have any 
significant influence on the variable of interest, and neither did it change any of the presented results. Due to the 
large number of control variables already incorporated in the regressions, I therefore omit this variable. 
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 Equity. For each alliance in the sample, PharmaDeals reports whether or not equity is 
involved. Equity generates control in an alliance (Oxley, 1997), that might allow partner firms 
to more closely observe each other’s employees. Baughn et al. (1997) state that firm 
boundaries become more or less permeable dependent on the governance structure of an 
alliance. Oxley and Wada (2009) show that in joint ventures unlike contracts, knowledge 
transfers unrelated to alliance activities tend to be more constrained ex-post. In line with these 
arguments, we might observe contractual limitations on employee mobility more often when 
alliances involve equity investments. Therefore, I include a dummy variable which equals 1 if 
equity is involved, and 0 otherwise. 
 R&D plus. Many alliances in the sample include, besides R&D, additional activities such 
as marketing and distribution. Although, a priori, I do not expect a specific association 
between inclusion of these additional activities in alliances and the likelihood of observing 
employee mobility restrictions in R&D alliance contracts, I do wish to control for a possible 
effect as additional activities have been shown to influence the governance mode of alliances 
(Sampson, 2004b). Therefore, I include a dummy variable that equals 1 if any additional 
activities are included in an alliance besides R&D and 0 otherwise. 
 Early stage research. For each alliance contract in the sample, PharmaDeals makes a 
distinction between an early collaborative research phase, and a later co-development phase. 
Parties involved in early stage research still have a wide variety of research directions 
available and their collaborative activities are characterized by their experimental nature 
(Freeman and Soete, 1997; Nelson, 1961; 1982). By comparison, alliance partners that focus 
on a later co-development stage usually start from a predefined set of technologies that will be 
developed further (Freeman and Soete, 1997). It is likely that knowledge embedded in 
employees plays a more prominent role in an earlier research stage compared to a later 
development stage. Therefore, I include a control variable that equals 1 if an alliance focuses 
on early stage research and 0 otherwise. 
 Time-bound. Literature suggests two possible and conflicting associations between 
whether or not an alliance is time-bound and the likelihood of observing clauses that limit 
employee mobility. First, Reuer and Arińo (2007) find that in time-bound alliances parties 
place less emphasis on interfirm coordination. This could hint at a negative association 
between the time-boundedness of an alliance and the likelihood of observing contractual 
employee mobility restrictions, as firms will have more difficulty gauging each other’s 
competitive advantages in terms of skilled employees (Baughn et al., 1997). Second, alliances 
with a pre-defined ending date are ‘meant to end’. In alliances that are ‘meant to end’, 
attention of partners shifts from attainment of collaborative goals to individual gain 
maximization (Ness and Haugland, 2005). This individual gain maximization could manifest 
itself in firms attempting to raid each other’s human capital, especially when their alliance 
approaches its pre-defined ending date. I include a dummy variable that equals 1 if an alliance 
has a pre-defined ending date as stated in the contract, and 0 otherwise. 
 Value. Based on information provided by PharmaDeals and LexisNexis, I take into 
account the value of an alliance. Greater value indicates that parties will be more willing to 
incur additional contracting costs to safeguard their collaboration. Because this variable is 
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highly skewed, I take the logarithmic value of the alliance in millions of dollars. In case I am 
unable to retrieve the value of an alliance, this variable takes on a value of zero.47 
 Value dummy. I include a dummy variable that equals 1 if information about the value of 
an alliance is missing, and 0 otherwise. 
 Focus area. In some focus areas, relevant knowledge is concentrated in a small number of 
firms or persons (Chesbrough, 1999; Pisano, 1990). Based on information provided by 
PharmaDeals and similar to Shan and Song (1997), I therefore include dummy variables for 
certain non-mutually exclusive focus areas in my sample. These focus areas are alimentary 
and metabolism, anti-infective, cardiovascular, drug delivery, genomics, 
inflammation/musculoskeletal, neurological, and oncology. A focus area was included in the 
regression analyses if it was present in more than 10% of the alliances in my sample. 
Possibly, firms operating in these focus areas are less concerned about unwanted employee 
mobility as relevant knowledge is spread out over many firms or persons.  
 Year fixed effects. I include dummy variables for the period 1996-2005 with the year 1996 
as the reference year to control for temporal trends in alliances. 
5.3.5 Analysis 
In the following, I use Probit models with robust and clustered standard errors. In all models, 
the dependent variable indicates whether or not a contractual employee mobility restriction is 
stipulated by alliance parties. PharmaDeals makes a distinction between the primary 
technology supplying firm, which is the firm that is the main supplier of the technology used 
or developed further in an alliance, and the partner firm. Not accounting for error correlations 
within firms can lead to downward biased standard errors (see Wooldridge, 2003). Therefore, 
I cluster standard errors based on the ID numbers of partner firms, as these have the highest 
likelihood of repeat occurrence in the sample. Alternatively, clustering the standard errors by 
primary technology supplying firm leaves the results unaltered. 
 Additionally, in unreported analyses, I rank firms based on their frequency of occurrence 
in my sample, and include firm fixed effects for the most frequently occurring firms. Results 
are similar to those reported here. An additional benefit of this approach is that it, at least to 
some extent, controls for the effects of unobserved firm characteristics on the dependent 
variable (Lerner and Malmendier, 2010). I will further elaborate on this approach in the 
section on alternative explanations and robustness checks.  
5.4 Results 
Table 5.1 shows a detailed overview of how clauses aimed at preventing interfirm employee 
mobility are constructed. Three observations are apparent with regards to their duration, 
                                                 
47 Although frequently used (see, for instance, Bastos (2010), Griliches (1976), Khorana, Servaes and Tufano 
(2009), Singh (2008); Smith and Huang (1995)), this method of dealing with missing values has its drawbacks, 
as do alternative methods. In unreported analyses, I use four other methods to deal with missing values to 
investigate whether or not my results change depending on which method I use. First, I run a regression without 
controlling for value. Second, I run a regression in which I only control for whether or not information on value 
is missing. Third, I limit my sample to include only those observations for which I was able to retrieve 
information on the value of alliances. Fourth and last, based on a host of observable variables, I estimate the 
value of an alliance if this information is missing, and use these estimates in the full model. Results do not 
materially change from those presented here. 
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scope, and definition. First, the duration of most clauses seem to be directly related to the term 
of the agreement or research period, with only few clauses still in effect more than two years 
after a specific collaboration term. Second, in terms of their scope, the applicability of clauses 
that aim to prevent interfirm employee mobility is only limited to specific employees in 50% 
of all cases. By extension, in the other 50%, contractual limitations on interfirm employee 
mobility could affect employees that are not directly involved in a collaboration. Regarding 
their definition, general advertisements aimed at the general public are only excluded from the 
definition ‘not to approach each other’s employees’ in 38% of all clauses. 
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Table 5.1 Design of contractual employee mobility restrictions 
 
  
¹ Excerpt taken from alliance contract between Antex Biologics and Smithkline Beecham (1999)
² Excerpt taken from alliance contract between Genome Therapeutics and Amgen (2002)
Limitation Primary subdivision Secondary subdivision Tertiary subdivision
Duration
No duration limits (2%)
Duration limits (98%)
Related to term agreement
or research term (92%)
# Years from starting date (4%)
Whole employment term (2%)
Applies only during term (26%)
Plus 6 months after term (2%)
Plus 1 year after term (37%)
Plus 2 years after term (13%)
Plus 3 years after term (2%)
Plus 5 years after term (2%)
Plus x years after term (10%)
Scope
Limited to employees that
are involved in the alliance, have
specific technical expertise areas,
or occupy specific hierarchical
positions (50%)
Applicable to all employees (50%)
Definition
General advertisements aimed
at the general public specifically
exempted (38%)
General advertisements aimed
at the general public not
specifically exempted (62%)
advertising employment opportunities in any manner that does not
directly target the other Party or its Affiliates…" ²
Examples
"This restriction shall be limited to those individuals who have been 
actively and directly involved in the R&D Program…" ¹
"This provision shall not restrict either Party or its Affiliates from 
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Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables included in terms of their mean, 
standard deviation, and bivariate correlations. Not surprisingly, two sets of variables appear to 
be highly correlated. First, there is a -0.877 correlation between value and value dummy. I 
refer to footnote 47 for a further elaboration on this issue. Second, there is a 0.861 correlation 
between scientific orientation and scientific orientation asymmetry. Controlling for scientific 
orientation asymmetry is crucial, as I want to rule out that any findings for the scientific 
orientation variable can be attributed to asymmetry in scientific orientation. We can assess the 
severity of multicollinearity by investigating the VIF’s which indicate how much of the 
variance is inflated because of collinearity between predictors. The VIF’s for value, value 
dummy, scientific orientation, and scientific orientation asymmetry remain under the usual 
cut-off value of 10. The mean VIF equals around 3.5. Simply omitting the variable relating to 
scientific orientation asymmetry only strengthens the results for the scientific orientation 
variable. Table 5.3 shows the results of the probit estimations. Model 1 in Table 5.3 refers to 
the base model only including control variables. In models 2 to 5, I individually add each 
hypothesis related variable to the base model. Finally, in model 6, I include all independent 
variables and control variables. 
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Hypothesis 1 states that when at least one alliance party is located in a pro-mobility 
environment, one is less likely to observe restrictions on employee mobility in alliance 
contracts. Models 2 and 6 show the expected negative and significant sign. Of the 51 alliances 
that include restrictions on employee mobility, 15 alliances include Californian firms (about 
29%). Of the 251 alliances that do not include restrictions on employee mobility, 122 
alliances include Californian firms (about 49%). Hypothesis 2 predicts that with increasing 
geographical distance between firms, the propensity to include  employee mobility restrictions 
in R&D alliance contracts will decline. Models 3 and 6 show the expected sign, but the effect 
of geographical distance is not significant at conventional significance levels. Hypothesis 3 
poses that more scientifically oriented alliance parties are more likely to stipulate contractual 
restrictions on employee mobility. Models 4 and 6 show the expected positive and significant 
sign. Last, hypothesis 4 predicts that direct competitors are more likely to include clauses in 
their R&D alliance contracts that restrict interfirm employee mobility. I find no support for 
this claim in models 5 and 6. 
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Table 5.3 Probit model estimation results of employee mobility restrictions 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable
Pro-mobility environment -0.635 *** -0.648 ***
(0.208) (0.219)
Geographical distance -0.040 -0.023
(0.043) (0.051)
Scientific orientation 2.782 ** 2.968 **
(1.270) (1.160)
Competition 0.117 -0.009
(0.138) (0.125)
Size asymmetry 0.099 0.084 0.094 0.151 ** 0.099 0.134 **
(0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.069) (0.064) (0.066)
Alliance experience asymmetry -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Scientific orientation asymmetry 2.049 *** 2.369 *** 2.099 *** -0.544 2.099 *** -0.340
(0.752) (0.774) (0.759) (1.431) (0.788) (1.374)
R&D budget asymmetry -0.120 * -0.115 * -0.110 * -0.140 ** -0.117 * -0.127 **
(0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061)
Prior ties 0.288 0.463 0.289 0.312 0.246 0.503
(0.350) (0.357) (0.355) (0.355) (0.344) (0.367)
Equity 0.489 ** 0.590 ** 0.492 ** 0.527 ** 0.512 ** 0.633 ***
(0.225) (0.235) (0.225) (0.230) (0.229) (0.241)
R&D plus 0.065 0.066 0.078 0.080 0.059 0.094
(0.252) (0.256) (0.254) (0.245) (0.252) (0.254)
Early stage research -0.299 -0.323 -0.306 -0.335 -0.310 -0.373
(0.231) (0.243) (0.231) (0.224) (0.233) (0.241)
Time-bound 0.336 0.358 0.327 0.478 0.387 0.509
(0.286) (0.286) (0.287) (0.300) (0.301) (0.316)
Value 0.257 *** 0.259 *** 0.248 *** 0.245 ** 0.253 *** 0.242 **
(0.093) (0.095) (0.090) (0.095) (0.092) (0.096)
Value dummy 0.383 0.439 0.348 0.331 0.374 0.373
(0.445) (0.441) (0.442) (0.457) (0.440) (0.451)
Alimentary and metabolism -0.095 -0.037 -0.077 -0.114 -0.090 -0.050
(0.298) (0.316) (0.296) (0.301) (0.293) (0.319)
Anti-infective -0.537 * -0.664 ** -0.542 * -0.570 * -0.617 ** -0.699 **
(0.308) (0.323) (0.309) (0.307) (0.310) (0.323)
Cardiovascular -0.865 ** -0.852 ** -0.843 ** -0.874 ** -0.852 ** -0.843 **
(0.381) (0.388) (0.380) (0.384) (0.378) (0.380)
Drug delivery -0.317 -0.281 -0.331 -0.321 -0.348 -0.295
(0.322) (0.328) (0.319) (0.318) (0.322) (0.316)
Genomics 0.134 0.221 0.147 0.207 0.196 0.308
(0.303) (0.298) (0.303) (0.304) (0.305) (0.310)
Inflammation/musculoskeletal -0.497 * -0.586 ** -0.485 * -0.496 * -0.530 ** -0.579 **
(0.270) (0.275) (0.269) (0.266) (0.262) (0.258)
Neurological -0.443 -0.507 * -0.451 -0.388 -0.458 * -0.458
(0.272) (0.271) (0.277) (0.285) (0.275) (0.287)
Oncology -0.449 ** -0.515 ** -0.424 ** -0.560 *** -0.461 ** -0.618 ***
(0.214) (0.213) (0.213) (0.203) (0.207) (0.205)
Year fixed effects X X X X X X
Constant -1.249 ** -1.040 ** -0.967 * -1.445 *** -1.313 *** -1.085 *
(0.499) (0.522) (0.560) (0.542) (0.504) (0.645)
Log Pseudolikelihood -110.5 -106.3 -110.2 -107.8 -110.1 -103.4
Observations 302 302 302 302 302 302
Notes: Probit regressions with dependent variable contractual clause limiting employee mobility
Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, in parentheses.
* significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.
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I find consistent results for a small number of control variables. First, I find a significant and 
negative association between asymmetry in R&D budgets and the propensity of firms to 
stipulate contractual limitations on employee mobility. Second, there is a positive and 
significant association between the presence of equity in an alliance and the likelihood of 
observing contractual employee mobility restrictions. Third, there is a positive correlation 
between the value of alliances and the propensity of parties to implement contractual 
employee mobility restrictions. Fourth, controlling for different focus areas seems to be 
important as anti-infective, cardiovascular, inflammation/musculoskeletal, and oncology are 
all negatively related to the presence of clauses intended to hinder interfirm employee 
mobility.  
5.5 Alternative explanations and robustness checks 
In this section I explore a number of plausible alternative explanations for the findings 
reported in this study and perform some additional robustness checks. 
 Pro-mobility environment. Given the prevalence of Californian firms in my sample, I 
investigated how many dyads are between two Californian firms. This is an important 
question because for CA-CA dyads the theory supporting Hypothesis 1 contradicts the theory 
supporting Hypothesis 2. As such, a CA-CA dummy variable may be necessary to tease out 
these contradicting effects. Additional analyses reveal that 22 firm pairs are between two 
Californian firms. I create two new dummy variables. The first dummy variable equals 1 if 
both alliance firms are located in California, and 0 otherwise. The second dummy variable 
equals 1 if one of the alliance firms is headquartered in California but not both, and 0 
otherwise. Both dummy variables are significantly and negatively related to the inclusion of 
employee mobility restrictions in alliance contracts, while the insignificant result for 
geographical distance remains.  
 I also investigated how the results for pro-mobility environment hold up in the subsample 
of domestic deals. Although significance levels vary depending on the specification, results 
seem to generally agree with those presented here. Additionally, simply including a dummy 
variable that indicates whether or not firms are headquartered in different countries in the 
main regressions leaves the presented results unaltered. 
 Geographical distance. There are strong reasons to believe that representing geographical 
distance as a dichotomous variable rather than a continuous variable might be more suitable 
(Gittelman, 2007). Indeed, firms may be particularly concerned about unwanted employee 
mobility to geographically proximate partner firms. Using different dummy variables with 
cut-off values of 25, 50, 100, and 200 miles respectively, does not materially change the 
presented results. Alternatively, I include a quadratic distance term in the final model to 
investigate the presence of a non-linear association between distance and the likelihood of 
observing a contractual limitation on employee mobility. However, no such association was 
found. 
 I also considered the possibility that specific national effects interfere with my 
geographical distance measure. I include dummy variables for the most frequently occurring 
countries. These country dummy variables are in general not significant, and the presented 
results remain unaltered. 
 Scientific orientation. Although the PubMed database has previously been used in the 
context of the biopharmaceutical industry (Casper, 2007; Casper and Murray, 2005; Furman 
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et al., 2005), one concern is that firms with no publications drive the results. These firms may 
not see scientific publications as a serious research outlet, or publish in journals not captured 
by PubMed. In unreported regressions I therefore include a dummy variable which equals 1 if 
I was able to find at least one scientific publication for both alliance firms in the relevant 
timeframe, and 0 otherwise. Results remain similar to those presented here. 
 The PubMed database includes many journals, and its coverage can slightly change over 
time. For instance, new journals can be added to the database. Therefore I also investigated 
whether there is any significant time trend in the scientific orientation and scientific 
orientation asymmetry variables. First, I regress both scientific orientation and scientific 
orientation asymmetry variables on a linear time trend. Only the scientific orientation variable 
seems to slightly increase over time. Second, I regress both variables on individual year 
dummies with the year 1996 as the base category. Except for the year 2001, there is little 
evidence to support the claim that in time, irrespective of the specific cause, the variables 
scientific orientation and scientific orientation asymmetry have steadily increased.  
 As argued for in the third hypothesis, science stands at the base of the biopharmaceutical 
industry and firms rely on scientific knowledge to help them advance through drug 
development (Gittelman and Kogut, 2003). As such, scientifically oriented firms may perform 
better, and better performing firms may choose to limit the outflow of human capital. 
Therefore in unreported regressions I control for asymmetry in financial constraints by taking 
the absolute difference between firms’ (Net Income/Total Assets) ratio. It turns out that this 
variable is negatively associated with the propensity of firms to opt for contractual restrictions 
on employee mobility, while leaving the presented results unaltered. 
 Competition. As previously indicated, measuring the level of competition between highly 
diversified firms is problematic (Oxley and Sampson, 2004). Although I have no direct 
measure on the level of diversification of firms in my sample, and thus no formal way of 
limiting the sample on rather focused firms, larger firms can be assumed to be more 
diversified on average. Therefore, I rerun the final model on the subsample of firms excluding 
‘Global’ firms as indicated by PharmaDeals. Results remain similar to those presented here. 
Also, in unreported regressions, I use cruder measures for my competition variable by 
investigating whether or not firms are active in the same primary 3-digit, 2-digit, or 1-digit 
SIC codes. Results remain similar to those presented here. 
 Unobserved firm effects. It is possible that unobserved firm characteristics interfere with 
the presented results. For instance, Coff (1997) discusses several firm strategies to aid a firm 
in retaining its most valued employees, such as a specific corporate culture or compensation 
schemes. To try and remedy any effect this may have on the variable of interest, I include 
dummy variables for the most frequently occurring firms in my sample (see Lerner and 
Malmendier (2010) for a similar approach). I indeed find that a small number of firms are 
significantly more or less likely to opt for clauses that limit interfirm employee mobility. 
Nevertheless, the presented results remain unaltered.  
5.6 Discussion and conclusions 
This paper sought to align literature on alliances (Gulati, 1995; Hagedoorn, 1993; Hamel, 
1991) with research on employee mobility (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Somaya, Williamson 
and Lorinkova, 2008; Wezel, Cattani and Pennings, 2006) by focusing on contractual clauses 
in alliance contracts aimed at discouraging interfirm employee mobility. In doing so, I aimed 
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to shed a light on both the design of these clauses, and on their antecedents. The findings 
reported in this paper add to the literature on the design of contracts. For instance, Reuer and 
Ariño (2007) indicate that contracts sometimes include specific clauses intended to limit 
employee mobility between collaborating firms, but leave a more careful examination of these 
clauses to future research. De Rond and Bouchikhi (2004) sketch a real-life example where a 
pharmaceutical company actively approached and recruited a promising chemist that was 
employed by its collaboration partner, a biotechnology firm. The particular chemist had taken 
the lead in several joint projects and as such the pharmaceutical company was quite familiar 
with his or her knowledge and skills (de Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004). However, de Rond and 
Bouchikhi (2004) remain silent on contractual mechanisms that would have prevented the 
employee poaching from occurring. The results of this paper identify how and where 
contractual restrictions on interfirm employee mobility are used. Firms are often concerned 
with the possibility that their collaboration partners appropriate knowledge outside the scope 
of their initial agreements (Hamel, 1991). Contractual limitations on hiring practices can help 
soften this concern. However, descriptive statistics seem to indicate that such contractual 
limitations on hiring practices are probably used in less than 20% of all alliance contracts. 
Results hint at the proposition that firms located in a pro-mobility environment, or partner 
with a firm located in a pro-mobility environment, need to find alternative ways of limiting 
employee mobility besides relying on formal contracts. 
 In terms of the design of clauses that impair free movement of employees between 
collaborating firms, I made a distinction based on their duration, scope, and definition. In 
nearly all cases, the duration of clauses limiting interfirm employee mobility is spelled out in 
the contract. This duration rarely exceeds two years after the term of an alliance. In terms of 
their scope, many clauses seem to be open for substantial interpretation. Firms appear to limit 
the scope of these clauses to employees that actually perform work under an agreement, 
possess specific technical expertise areas, or occupy specific hierarchical positions within a 
firm, in only 50% of all cases. By extension, in 50% of all cases, no specific limitation 
regarding scope is specified. This could indicate that in 50% of the cases in which a 
contractual limitation on hiring practices is stipulated, employees that are not directly 
involved in a collaboration are still affected by receiving less offers for employment by 
partner firms of their current employer. It is exactly this broadness which is often critized.48 
Firms explicitly exclude general advertisements aimed at the general public from the 
prohibition on approaching each other’s employees in about 38% of all cases. 
 In terms of explaining the occurrence of clauses that hinder firms in approaching each 
other’s employees for employment, two conditions appear to be of crucial importance. The 
first condition refers to the institutional environment in which firms reside (Davis and North, 
1971; Roberts and Greenwood, 1997; Williamson, 1991; 1992; 1993). Institutional 
environments are sets of social and legal ground rules (Davis and North, 1971), which 
influence alliance parties, and can act as restraints on their behavior (Williamson, 1991; 1992; 
1993). In the current context, I find that when at least one firm participating in a collaboration 
is located in a pro-mobility environment, the chance of observing a contractual limitation on 
                                                 
48 See United States vs. Adobe Systems Inc., Apple Inc., Google Inc., Intel Corporation, Intuit Inc., and Pixar. 
Case No: 1:10-cv-01629. (DOJ Sept 24, 2010), (competitive impact statement). In this statement, the defendants 
were criticized on the fact that their agreements not to approach each other’s employees did not only involve 
employees that were actively involved in collaborative projects, but also extended to employees that were barely 
involved in any collaboration.  
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employee movement between partners decreases. This association is already evident from 
simple descriptive statistics. In the subset of alliances involving no firms located in a pro-
mobility environment, employee mobility restrictions occur on average in around 22% of all 
R&D contracts. In the subset of alliances involving one, but not two, firms located in a pro-
mobility environment the average occurrence of employee mobility impairing clauses equals 
around 12%. Last, in the subset of alliances involving two firms located in a pro-mobility 
environment, about 5% of all contracts include limitations on the hiring behavior of partner 
firms. This finding highlights that when studying the design of contracts, the institutional 
environment of firms is often of crucial importance. In the past, TCE has been criticized for 
not explicitly taking into consideration the institutional environment of firms (see Oxley 
(1999) for a similar observation). Here, inspired by recent TCE literature (Oxley, 1999; 
Williamson, 1991; 1992; 1993), I show that when explaining the occurrence of contractual 
limitations on interfirm employee mobility, the institutional environment of firms, i.e., 
whether or not a firm from a pro-mobility environment is involved in an alliance, is of 
paramount importance. This finding aligns with recent literature on employee poaching (see 
Horn, 2011), which recognizes the importance of taking the institutional environment of firms 
into account. The presented results extrapolate observations made in the employee poaching 
literature to the realm of alliances. 
 The second condition found crucial in explaining the occurrence of contractual limitations 
on interfirm employee mobility refers to the scientific orientation of partner firms. From a 
TCE viewpoint, alliance parties can be expected to supplement their contract with additional 
contractual safeguards regarding unwanted employee mobility, when they perceive the risks 
and consequences of unwanted employee mobility to be especially great. Here, I find that 
partner firms are more likely to include contractual limitations on employee mobility, when 
they are more scientifically oriented. Previous research indicates that, especially in high 
technology industries, a strong scientific orientation is important for firms (Almeida, 
Hohberger and Parada, 2011; Deeds, Decarolis and Coombs, 1997; Decarolis and Deeds, 
1999; Gittelman and Kogut, 2003; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Kaplan, Murray and 
Henderson, 2003; Koenig, 1983). Firms that are characterized by their high scientific quality 
and a significant possession of know-how, are wary of unwanted employee mobility as it 
would erode at least some of their knowledge stock (Younge, 2012). Many firms actively 
encourage their scientists to publish in scientific journals, as illustrated by a quote from a 
manager working in the biopharmaceutical industry: “[W]e need for our scientists to have 
great reputations in order to bring others like them to the firm” (Zucker and Darby, 1997; p. 
438). A firm’s policy regarding scientific publications can attract scientists (Cockburn and 
Henderson, 1998; Liu and Stuart, 2010; McMillan and Deeds, 1998; Younge, 2012; Zucker 
and Darby, 1997). When two firms are strongly scientifically oriented, each party will 
perceive the risk of unwanted employee mobility to be substantial, and thus favor contractual 
safeguards effectively limiting interfirm employee mobility (Williamson, 1993). This finding 
lends support to claims made by Liu and Stuart (2010) who conjectured that there might be a 
positive association between scientific publications and employee retention strategies.  
 However, the above finding comes with two caveats. First, in unreported analyses, I am 
unable to distinguish between the number of patents and the number of scientific publications 
of firms. In hindsight this is not surprising as “[i]n the case of biotechnology (…) basic 
scientific discoveries and commercially viable products are typically indistinguishable” 
(Liesbeskind et al., 1996; p. 438). In that sense, the positive association between the scientific 
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orientation of partner firms and their propensity to include contractual limitations on 
employee mobility may be interpreted in terms of joint innovativeness. Indeed, hiring 
employees of innovating firms can be a particularly effective method of learning about new 
products and processes (Levin, 1988). The findings of this paper might be interpreted as such, 
i.e., innovating firm pairs are inclined to limit the outflow of human capital to each other. 
Second, I control for the difference in scientific orientation between partner firms while 
investigating the association between the total scientific orientation of partner firms and their 
propensity to include contractual limitations on employee mobility. Descriptive statistics in 
table 5.2 indicate that the correlation between the difference in scientific orientation between 
partner firms and their total scientific orientation equals around 0.86. This indicates that many 
firm pairs with a jointly high scientific orientation are actually comprised of highly 
asymmetric firms in terms of scientific orientation. Although joint scientific orientation 
remains positive and significant when controlling for the difference in scientific orientation 
between firms, I note that the former variable adds little explanatory power to the second 
variable as they are nearly econometrically equivalent.  
 Surprisingly, I find no significant association between the geographical distance between 
firms and the likelihood of observing contractual employee mobility restrictions. Also, there 
appears to be no significant association between the level of competition between firms and 
their propensity to include contractual limitations on hiring practices. I expected that 
collaborating firms located in close geographical proximity to each other would be more 
concerned with the unintended outflow of employees to each other, and thus, would try to 
limit this outflow via their contract. Also, I anticipated that firms which are direct competitors 
in their primary market would try to limit interfirm employee mobility by contract. For both 
suggested effects I find no direct empirical support. One explanation is that these factors work 
in tandem. Wezel, Cattani and Pennings (2006) find that the dissolution risk of a firm 
experiencing the departure of key employees is highest when these employees start a new 
competing business in close geographical proximity to the existing firm. Similarly, for Silicon 
Valley law firms, Phillips (2002) finds that the failure rate of the parent company is highest 
when the progeny firm is a direct competitor, i.e., when the progeny firm and the parent 
company have a large overlap in business activities. As a corollary to these findings, it is 
possible that geographical distance between parties only has a negative effect on their 
propensity to stipulate an employee mobility restriction in their contract when these firms are 
direct competitors. However empirically, I find no support for such claim. 
 Another explanation for why both geographical distance and the level of competition 
between alliance partners appear to have no significant associations with the inclusion of 
contractual limitations on employee mobility can be found in the literature on employee 
poaching. Firms located in close geographical proximity to each other might be reluctant to 
approach each other’s employees because of mutual forbearance, i.e., they might have agreed 
to some sort of gentlemen’s agreement not to aggressively recruit each other’s employees 
(Horn, 2011, de Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004). As such, and opposed to the second hypothesis, 
alliance firms located in close geographical proximity to each other might not be particularly 
concerned about unwanted interfirm employee mobility during or after their collaboration. 
The fourth hypothesis predicted that direct competitors would be more inclined to restrain 
each other’s hiring behavior by contract. The empirical results provide no support for this 
claim. A possible explanation for the lack of empirical support for hypothesis four is that 
many firms already include non-compete clauses in their employment contracts which 
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prohibit key employees from departing to direct competitors (Horn, 2011), rendering 
additional contractual safeguards in collaboration contracts superfluous. As such, the findings 
in this paper do not negate the possibility that direct competitors are especially concerned 
about unwanted employee mobility (see Somaya, Williamson and Lorinkova, 2008).  
 Initially a byproduct of my four hypotheses, analyses show that controlling for the focus 
area of an alliance is of crucial importance in explaining the likelihood that alliance parties 
will opt for an employee mobility restriction in their contract. I included dummy variables for 
those focus areas that occurred in more than 10% of all alliances in my sample. Model 6 in 
Table 5.3 shows that parties to an alliance that involve the focus areas ‘Anti-infective’, 
‘Cardiovascular’, ‘Inflammation/Musculoskeletal’, or ‘Oncology’ are significantly less likely 
to include limitations on interfirm employee mobility. One explanation for this finding relates 
to the small-number-bargaining situation highlighted in TCE literature (e.g. Pisano, 1990). In 
a nutshell, small-numbers-bargaining hazards occur when a firm partners with another firm 
that possesses knowledge in a particular technological field for which limited alternative 
partners exist. In such a setting, the collaboration partner could behave opportunistically in 
contract renegotiation phases. In the context of this study, each party could fear opportunistic 
hiring practices when operating in a biopharmaceutical area where knowledge resides in a 
limited number of individuals or firms. Previous research indicates that relevant R&D 
capabilities and knowledge are rather concentrated in some therapeutic areas (Pisano, 1990), 
while being more dispersed in other areas. Chiaroni, Chiesa and Frattini (2009) highlight the 
therapeutic areas oncology, cardiovascular diseases, and central nervous system diseases, as 
the three major technological fields in which many biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms 
are active. These results are corroborated by Dorsey et al. (2009) who look at the funding for 
biomedical research by different therapeutic areas. By and large, in the period between 1995 
and 2005, most funding was directed to biomedical research in the areas of neuroscience, 
oncology, and cardiovascular diseases (Dorsey et al., 2009). In light of these arguments, the 
concentration of knowledge workers in particular therapeutic areas could be of crucial 
importance in explaining the occurrence of clauses in alliance contracts that limit employee 
mobility.  
5.7 Limitations and future research directions 
This study is not without its limitations. Each limitation however, points to interesting 
avenues for further research. First, this study focuses on the design and occurrence of clauses 
that aim to limit employee mobility between alliance partners, and thus sheds no light on the 
consequences of these clauses for collaborating parties. Future research could try to examine 
the effects of these clauses on employee mobility between former collaboration partners. 
Another option would be to relate the broadness of employee mobility restrictions drafted by 
collaboration partners to their hiring behavior in markets unrelated to the focal collaboration. 
Second, I proxy pro-mobility environment by investigating whether or not a firm from 
California is involved. The state of California is well known for its antipathy towards 
restrictions on employee mobility. However, due to the cross-sectional nature of my analysis, 
I can never fully rule out the possibility that unobserved (state) effects actually drive the 
results. In line with the explorative nature of this paper, the findings regarding California 
should therefore be interpreted carefully in the sense that other explanations as those 
presented here are possible. It is for instance difficult to disentangle the effects of California’s 
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legal environment from its regional local culture (Gilson, 1999; Saxenian, 1994). Similarly, 
California could be characterized by a more loose ‘contracting style’ (Bengtsson and Ravid, 
2009; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003), having an impact on the variable of interest. Although I 
maintain that labeling California as a pro-mobility environment offers the most fertile ground 
for explaining the proclivity of Californian firms to shunt contractual limitations on employee 
mobility, I urge future research to more carefully disentangle different explanations. Third, 
due to the strong reliance on science in the biopharmaceutical industry, the findings for 
scientific orientation might be an industry-specific effect. Future research might investigate 
the use of clauses that limit interfirm employee mobility in different industrial contexts. 
Fourth and last, as discussed in the section on alternative explanations and robustness checks, 
a firm’s number of scientific publications and number of patents are highly correlated. As 
such, in the current contribution I am unable to reliably distinguish between measures for 
scientific orientation based on scientific publications, or on patents. Nevertheless, it could be 
argued that while scientific publications are a more adequate proxy for basic science, patents 
are a better proxy for more applied science. As such, we need more research to understand the 
precise relationship between the scientific orientation of partner firms and their propensity to 
limit employee mobility via their collaboration contract. 
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SIX 
 
Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
This dissertation sought to answer the question what factors influence, or are associated with, 
the design of R&D alliance contracts in the biopharmaceutical industry. Most previous 
research on the governance of alliances has differentiated between alternative governance 
arrangements along relatively crude scales (Reuer and Ariño, 2007), such as an equity/non-
equity divide (e.g. Gulati, 1995). Such classifications are only accurate to the extent to which 
the contracts accompanying these alliances are fairly homogeneous within groups (e.g. non-
equity alliances), and fairly heterogeneous between groups (e.g. non-equity versus equity 
alliances). Discriminating between alternative governance arrangements based on relatively 
crude scales is unlikely to adequately represent the plethora of different contractual supports, 
i.e., contractual clauses, available to alliance partners (Reuer and Ariño, 2007), and we thus 
need a more in-depth investigation of contracting between companies in a ‘real-world setting’ 
(Coase, 1992; Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007). Moreover, an answer to this broader research 
question is relevant as the contractual design of R&D alliances is associated with many of the 
core constructs studied in alliance research such as alliance adaptation, knowledge transfer, 
alliance failure, and more (Reuer and Ariño, 2007).  
 In this dissertation I (perhaps implicitly) move away from a classical contracting 
perspective towards a more neoclassical contracting perspective which signals my conviction 
that R&D alliance contracts in the biopharmaceutical industry are not discrete transactions, 
are not mere risk allocation mechanisms, are not complete, and are, from the perspective of 
contract parties, not preferably enforced by the courts. The inherent uncertainty and 
complexity of many real world exchanges coupled with transaction costs makes the drafting 
of complete contracts prohibitively costly (Williamson, 1985; 1996). Recognizing that many 
contracts are inevitably incomplete (Williamson, 1985), recent contributions to the field of 
alliance contract design sought to explain the complexity of contracts (Mellewigt, Decker and 
Eckhard, 2012). Referring back to figure 1.2, many previous contributions that study the 
design of alliance contracts focus on contractual complexity which encompasses a myriad of 
different provisions (Parkhe, 1993), and contractual functions. I deliberately side-step such an 
approach in this dissertation, and seek to provide an overall picture of alliance contract design 
by answering four more specific sub research questions that, in my opinion, highlight 
different functions of (neoclassical) alliance contracts, such as, dividing ‘control’ and 
facilitating ‘coordination’. To answer my four sub research questions, I relied on several 
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theoretical perspectives and literatures including, but not limited to, a bargaining power 
perspective on R&D alliances in Chapter 2, literature on coordination within firms in Chapter 
3, transactions costs economics theory in Chapter 4, and literature on employee poaching in 
Chapter 5. As the study of contractual provisions in alliance agreements is important, but has 
thus far received only scant attention in the literature (Kale and Singh, 2009), I expect that 
answering my four sub research questions has the potential to significantly contribute to our 
knowledge about the contract design of R&D alliances, and alliances more in general. 
 In this concluding chapter, I first elaborate on the major findings of my four empirical 
studies, then provide some theoretical and managerial implications, and finally discuss the 
limitations of this dissertation and some potential avenues for future research. 
6.2 Major findings 
Here I will elaborate on the major findings of my four empirical studies. 
6.2.1 Study 1 
My first sub research question is formulated as follows: 
How is the bargaining power of initial, primary technology supplying firms associated 
with the number of intellectual property control rights allocated to these firms in R&D 
alliance contracts? 
Chapter 2 formed expectations regarding the number of intellectual property control rights 
allocated to the initial, primary technology supplying firm based on a bargaining power 
perspective of R&D alliances. In that sense, inspired by the Aghion and Tirole (1994) 
qualification of the classical Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) approach to property rights 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), I take the bargaining power of the initial, 
primary technology supplying firm as a strong indication of the number of intellectual 
property control rights it retains (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). I pose that the bargaining 
power of the initial, primary technology supplying firm depends on both firm level attributes 
as on transaction attributes. I find moderate support for such an extended bargaining power 
perspective.  
 At the firm level, results indicate that asymmetry in innovative capabilities, from the 
perspective of the initial, primary technology supplying firm, is positively associated with the 
number of intellectual property control rights this firm retains. I expected that a large 
asymmetry in innovative capabilities is indicative of the extent to which the primary 
technology supplying firm is instrumental to the success of an alliance. As also recently 
suggested by Bosse and Alvarez (2010), asymmetry in innovative capabilities appears to be 
more relevant in explaining retention of intellectual property control rights compared to the 
more traditional notion of size asymmetry. At the transaction (alliance) level, results indicate 
that the technological breadth of an R&D alliance, based on the initial technology input from 
the primary technology supplying firm, is positively associated with the number of 
intellectual property control rights this firm retains. Considerable technological breadth can 
signal latent demand for a technology and put the technology provider in a stronger 
bargaining position. Interestingly, auxiliary regressions reveal that the above results do not 
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hold when considering a set of non-intellectual property control rights, providing merit to the 
treatment of IPR control rights as a subset of control rights sui generis.   
 In short, the bargaining power of the initial, primary technology supplying firm, and in 
particular when based on interfirm asymmetries in innovative capabilities or relating to the 
breadth of the technology scope, appears to be of importance in explaining the number of 
intellectual property control rights allocated to this firm.  
6.2.2 Study 2 
My second sub research question is formulated as follows: 
What factors are associated with the stipulation of more or less interfirm coordination 
provisions in R&D alliance contracts?  
Chapter 3 formed expectations regarding the degree to which alliance parties stipulate 
contractual governance mechanisms that serve to facilitate interfirm coordination during 
execution of their agreement. Drawing on extant work I suggested that contracts, besides their 
legal role in setting out contractual promises of which the law gives a remedy (Goldberg, 
1976; Macneil, 1974), also serve as a framework to guide collaboration between firms and 
promote adaptability to unforeseen events (Williamson, 1979). Inspired by organizational 
economics, strategy, and organization literatures on the design on contracts, I suggested that 
the nature of the alliance activities undertaken within an R&D alliance, the geographical 
distance between partners, and the alliance experience of firms can serve as predictors of the 
level of interfirm contractual coordination. I find that transactional complexity, the task 
interdependence between alliance parties, and the alliance experience of firms are positively 
related to the level of interfirm contractual coordination. 
 Yet, auxiliary regressions add nuance to relationship between transactional complexity, 
i.e., whether or not additional activities are included in an R&D alliance, and the degree to 
which alliance parties stipulate mechanisms to facilitate coordination in their contracts, i.e., 
some additional activities seem to be unrelated to the number of coordination committees. 
The positive relationship between the level of task interdependence and the number of 
coordination committees stipulated in an alliance contract adds to studies on the intrafirm 
level that suggest a similar relationship (e.g. van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig, 1976), and 
confirms recent predictions in the literature on the design of alliance contracts that postulated 
the existence of the aforementioned relationship (Mellewigt, Decker and Eckhard, 2012). 
Results also indicate that (the minimum) previous alliance experience of partners is positively 
related to their propensity to stipulate a larger number of coordination committees in their 
current contract. Over time, through alliances with other parties, firms learn about best 
practices, attain a more complete overview of their internal resources and how to use these 
resources to support alliance objectives (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002; Kotabe, Martin and 
Domoto, 2003), and make available more personnel dedicated to supporting alliance 
endeavors (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). This finding extends a 
burgeoning stream of literature on firm learning in the context of interfirm contracts (e.g. 
Argyres, Bercovitz and Mayer, 2007; Argyres and Mayer, 2007; Luo, 2002; Reuer, Ariño and 
Mellewigt, 2006; Ryall and Sampson, 2009). Implicit in many of the arguments underlying 
Chapter 3 is that more interfirm coordination is better. I challenge this assumption in auxiliary 
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regressions where I find that in the subset of non-equity alliances, i.e., those alliances in 
which the level of interfirm control is relatively low (Pisano, 1989), firms that can be labeled 
as direct competitors, compared to firms that cannot, stipulate fewer coordination committees 
in their contract. These additional results hint at the proposition that competitors in alliances, 
that lack control and incentive alignment through equity participation, consciously try to limit 
the number of interaction points during execution of their agreement to avoid the unintended 
loss of knowledge. 
 In short, I find that inclusion of certain additional activities besides R&D, increasing the 
transactional complexity of an alliance, task interdependence, and alliance experience are 
positively related to the number of coordination committees that firms stipulate in their 
alliance contracts. 
6.2.3 Study 3 
My third sub research question is formulated as follows: 
What factors are associated with the stipulation of particular dispute resolution clauses 
in R&D alliance contracts? 
Chapter 4 formed expectations regarding the relationships between exchange complexity, 
environmental uncertainty, and the presence of a high growth firm on the one hand, and 
internal dispute resolution via hierarchy and arbitration, both stipulated in the R&D alliance 
contract, on the other hand. Parties to an alliance characterized by substantial complexity and 
uncertainty inevitably have to deal with disputes emerging during their collaboration (Mayer 
and Teece, 2008), and on average two thirds of all alliances run into serious disputes within 
the first two years of collaboration (Das and Teng; 2000a; Koza and Lewin, 2000). I therefore 
expected that parties would foresee the possibility of their alliance ending in a dispute and 
design, based on certain factors, their contracts accordingly. Because parties to an alliance 
characterized by substantial exchange complexity often possess idiosyncratic knowledge 
about their collaboration and dispute, which often resolves around initial unmet interests and 
expectations that are difficult to transfer to a neutral third-party (Edelman, Erlanger and 
Lande, 1993; Sampson, 2004a; Williamson, 1991; 1994), I suggested that there is a positive 
association between exchange complexity and the propensity of firms to promote internal 
dispute resolution via hierarchy in their contracts. The results suggest that elements of 
exchange complexity, i.e., the inclusion of a relatively complex technology (e.g. Klitgaard 
and Mussman, 1992) or an open-ended alliance (e.g. Phene and Tallman, 2012), are positively 
related to the stipulation of clauses that promote internal dispute resolution via hierarchy. This 
finding adds to previous literature which has already stated that “in many instances the 
participants can devise more satisfactory solutions to their disputes than can professionals 
constrained to apply general rules on the basis of limited knowledge of the dispute” (Galanter, 
1981; p. 4; Williamson, 2002). Arbitration is defined as a voluntary arrangement between 
parties to refer disputes to a neutral third party and to be bound by the decision of that third 
party (Bonn, 1972; Mattli, 2001). Because arbitration allows custom rather than law to guide 
resolution of disputes (Bonn, 1972), and arbitration awards are confidential (Allison, 1990; 
Mattli, 2001), Chapter 4 argues that we are more likely to observe arbitration clauses in 
alliance contracts if parties experience substantial environmental uncertainty, or if a high-
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growth firm is involved. Environmental uncertainty, i.e., whether or not firms participating in 
an alliance are headquartered in the same country, is positively associated with the presence 
of arbitration clauses in alliance contracts. This indicates that parties are wary of having their 
disputes interpreted by a foreign and usually unknown legal system (Redfern, 1976). I also 
expected that in the subset of international alliances, firms from more similar legal regimes 
would be less inclined to opt for arbitration in their contracts compared to firms from more 
different legal regimes. I find no empirical support for such a claim. However, additional 
analyses reveal the presence of a strong ‘Japan effect’, i.e., contracts between U.S. and 
Japanese firms are significantly more likely to contain arbitration clauses compared to other 
international alliance contracts. The Japanese legal system differs considerably from both 
common and civil law traditions which might be reflected in the propensity of U.S.-Japan 
firm pairs to opt for arbitration in their contracts. Results also indicate that in the subset of 
domestic alliances, the presence of a high-growth firm in an interfirm collaboration is 
positively related to the chance of observing an arbitration clause in the alliance contract. This 
could indicate that firms which have experienced recent and rapid growth are especially 
concerned about valuable business information leaking out to the general public when their 
alliance runs into a dispute, and design contractual safeguards accordingly. 
 In short, I find a positive relationship between certain elements of exchange complexity 
and the propensity of alliance parties to promote internal dispute resolution via hierarchy in 
their contract. Also, results indicate that both environmental uncertainty and the presence of a 
high-growth firm in an alliance are positively related to the proclivity of parties to opt for 
arbitration in their alliance contract. 
6.2.4 Study 4 
My fourth sub research question is formulated as follows: 
What factors are associated with the stipulation of employee mobility restrictions in R&D 
alliance contracts? 
Chapter 5 formed expectations regarding the use of contractual restrictions on the hiring 
behavior of firms participating in an R&D alliance. Furthermore, Chapter 5 gives an overview 
of how contractual limitations with regards to employee mobility are constructed in terms of 
duration, scope, and definition. I started from the baseline prediction that contractual 
safeguards are a reflection of underlying exchange hazards (Shelanski and Klein, 1995), while 
acknowledging the role of the institutional environment in which firms reside (Oxley, 1999; 
Roberts and Greenwood, 1997; Williamson, 1991; 1992). As such, I anticipated that firms are 
more likely to implement contractual limitations on employee mobility when they perceive 
the risks and consequences of employee mobility to be great, but less likely when located in 
an environment not supportive of contractual limitations on employee mobility. Results 
indicate that the presence of an alliance firm located in a ‘pro-mobility environment’ 
substantially decreases the likelihood of observing a contractual restriction on employee 
mobility in an R&D alliance contract. Additionally, scientifically oriented firm pairs, that 
undoubtedly possess considerable knowhow crucial for survival in the biopharmaceutical 
industry (Almeida, Hohberger and Parada, 2011; Deeds, Decarolis and Coombs, 1997; 
Decarolis and Deeds, 1999; Gittelman and Kogut, 2003; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; 
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Kaplan, Murray and Henderson, 2003; Koenig, 1983; Younge, 2012), are more likely to 
include contractual restrictions on the mobility of employees between each other. In terms of 
the design of contractual clauses that seek to limit interfirm employee mobility, results 
indicate that only in 50% of all cases these clauses are limited to employees that actually 
perform work under an agreement, possess specific technical expertise areas, or occupy 
specific hierarchical positions within a firm. Additional inspection of the results also reveal 
that certain frequently occurring focus areas are significantly and negatively related to the 
propensity of parties to limit interfirm employee mobility. This could indicate that firms are 
less protective of their human capital when operating in a focus area where knowledge is 
spread out over a relatively large number of firms or persons. 
 In short, I find that the presence of a firm located in a ‘pro-mobility environment’ and 
more scientific partner firms decrease and increase, respectively, the likelihood of observing 
contractual limitations on interfirm employee mobility in R&D alliance contracts.  
6.3 Implications 
Here, I will elaborate on the theoretical and managerial implications of my four empirical 
studies. First, recent contributions by Kale and Singh (2009) and Mellewigt, Decker and 
Eckhard (2012) highlight the scant attention previous research has paid to contractual 
provisions in alliance agreements, and call for more research on the content of alliance 
contracts. In this dissertation I worked towards addressing this call by carefully selecting four 
elements of alliance contracts that individually represent little researched areas of contract 
design, while together constituting a comprehensive overview of contractual functions. In that 
sense and as suggested by Poppo and Zenger (2002), I purposely sidestep previous 
approaches in the field of alliance contract design that have mainly focused on contractual 
complexity (Anderson and Dekker, 2005; Barthélemy and Quélin, 2006; Luo, 2002; Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002; Reuer and Ariño, 2007; Ryall and Sampson, 2009; Sobrero and Roberts, 
2002). Indeed, there appears to be room for moving away from a focus on more general 
aggregate measures of contractual complexity towards more targeted investigations regarding 
specific, sets of, clauses. 
 Second, and related to the first, “the possibility exists that established empirical 
relationships between the what (e.g. resources being exchanged, scope of collaboration, etc.), 
the how (e.g. governance), and the who (e.g. partner selection) of strategic alliances, as well 
as their effects on performance, might be subject to misattributes without accounting for the 
various contractual provisions that firms can put into collaborative agreements” (Reuer and 
Ariño, 2007; p. 326). As such, a closer examination of the contractual provisions firms 
implement in their collaborative agreements has the potential to significantly add nuance to 
previous empirical findings in the field of alliances. Indeed, interesting questions emerge. For 
instance, does previous general alliance experience really directly increase the performance of 
R&D alliances (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005), or does previous general alliance experience 
indirectly increase performance by first affecting the degree of interfirm coordination 
(Chapter 3), and then performance (Doz, 1996, Park and Ungson, 2001; Sarkar et al., 2001)? 
Also, do equity arrangements, i.e., JV’s, unlike contracts, directly constrain unintended 
knowledge transfer ex-post (Oxley and Wada, 2009), or does equity participation indirectly 
limit unintended knowledge transfer ex-post by first affecting the propensity of firms to 
include clauses that limit their hiring behavior (Chapter 5), which then in turn limits the 
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(unwanted) spread of information between firms (Arrow, 1962). The theory implication is 
this: without a proper understanding of the various contractual provisions firms can 
implement in their alliance contracts, established empirical findings in the field of alliances 
might misrepresent actual relationships (Reuer and Ariño, 2007). I believe there is ample 
room for further research that seeks to investigate the plethora of contractual options available 
to collaborating firms (see the shaded area in figure 1.2), and their antecedents and effects. 
 Third, the results of this dissertation strongly suggest that R&D alliance contracts are not 
to be seen as mere legal devices, but instead seem to adhere to the ‘contract as a framework’ 
notion proposed by Llewellyn (1931). In that sense, R&D alliance contracts are characterized 
by their high degree of adjustability, their informative nature on how the relationship between 
contract parties should work and develop, and their private ordering geared towards problem 
solving. To illustrate the foregoing, and in line with Williamson (2001) who points out the 
benefits of arbitration, Chapter 4 indicates that the majority of parties to interfirm 
arrangements elect to have their disputes settled by arbitration and thus voluntarily avoid 
(parts of) the traditional legal system. This finding agrees with other contributions that 
illustrate the prominent usage of non-traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in a variety of 
contexts, such as, the diamond industry (Bernstein, 1992). Such findings may have 
implications for legislators. For instance, the prevalence of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms in R&D alliance contracts may point towards the sub-optimality of the traditional 
legal system in enforcing contracts in the current business environment (Hesen, 2010). There 
is considerable room left for more research that seeks to unravel the how, why, and where of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.  
 Fourth, contract design is unequivocally complicated, as suggested by many studies 
documenting strong experience effects in the drafting of contracts (e.g. Argyres, Bercovitz 
and Mayer, 2007; Argyres and Mayer, 2007). Managers with none or little experience in the 
interfirm contracting process are likely to benefit from a minimum awareness of relevant 
clauses in alliance contracts. Although some of that knowledge can be provided by employing 
(external) lawyers to aid in the drafting process of alliance contracts, many contract terms 
require specific input from managers and engineers (Argyres and Mayer, 2007). Absent some 
basic knowledge regarding contract design, managers and engineers might either (1) not be 
aware of the existence of certain kinds of contract terms, or (2) be aware of the existence of 
certain kinds of contract terms but not willing to aid in the actual drafting of contracts thereby 
leaving contract design solely to lawyers, or (3) be aware of the existence of certain kinds of 
contract terms and also willing to participate in the drafting of the actual contract(s), but not 
able to link certain kinds of contract terms to specific circumstances. I believe this dissertation 
provides some guidance for managers in all three categories. For managers in the first 
category, I believe this dissertation provides a comprehensive overview of contract terms that 
seek to control (mainly Chapters 2 and 5), coordinate (Chapter 3), and guide dispute 
resolution (Chapter 4). For managers in the second category, this dissertation might suggest 
that input from managers in the drafting process of contracts can be beneficial for firms when 
these firms, for instance, decide on how much interfirm coordination (Chapter 2) is needed to 
support alliance activities. For managers in the third category, this dissertation establishes 
some basic relationships that help managers to decide when certain contractual supports are 
appropriate. 
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6.4 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Some general limitations emerge from individual chapters. I chose to highlight five. First, all 
studies in this dissertation are susceptible to the criticism that unobserved heterogeneity 
and/or omitted variables influence the relationships of interest, i.e., affect both dependent and 
independent variables simultaneously. For instance in chapter 5, it is possible that unobserved 
firm characteristics idiosyncratic to Californian firms – such as specific technological 
expertise areas – influence the negative relationship between the presence of a Californian 
firm in an alliance and the likelihood of observing a contractual limitation on employee 
mobility. According to Stinchcombe (1987), one condition necessary for establishing causal 
relationships is temporal precedence of the causal variable to the dependent variable. In this 
dissertation, this condition is often not met. For instance in Chapter 3, the number of 
coordination committees – the dependent variable – and the level of interfirm dependence – 
the independent variable – are part of the same contract. It is conceivable that other 
unobserved transaction attributes might influence this relationship, or that the dependent 
variable also influences the independent variable. I sought to minimize the risk of unobserved 
factors tampering with the proposed relationships by (1) employing a host of control variables 
that can potentially affect both independent and dependent variables (2) testing for the 
robustness of the results proposed in each chapter, similar to Lerner and Malmendier (2010), 
by including ‘firm fixed effects’ for the most frequently occurring firms in my sample and (3) 
employing a careful sample selection strategy that produces a sample free of undesirable 
unobserved heterogeneity (Lerner and Merges, 1998). Despite these conscious efforts to 
decrease the risk of unobserved heterogeneity and/or omitted variables affecting my results, I 
am ultimately conservative in the empirical inferences I draw similar to other recent 
contributions in the field of (alliance) contract design (Bengtsson, 2011).49 I believe 
establishing conditional correlations between my variables of interest is a logical first step 
towards the ultimate goal of establishing causal relationships. 
 Second, we have little understanding on how certain contractual provisions are used ex-
post by alliance parties. In Chapter 3, I investigated the number of coordination committees 
that alliance parties stipulate in their contract. It is yet unknown how intensively parties use 
these committees ex-post to communicate and adjust to unforeseen contingencies. In Chapter 
4, I investigated specific dispute resolution clauses in R&D alliance contracts. When a dispute 
arises, parties can deviate from the contract and opt for a more satisfactory solution based on 
information that was not yet available at the contract signing date, i.e., firms that initially 
opted for arbitration can jointly decide to have their dispute settled in court. As such, it would 
be worthwhile to investigate the ex-post usage of certain contractual clauses. 
 Third, it would be worthwhile to replicate this study in a different industrial contracting 
environment. The biopharmaceutical industry is an interesting high-technology industry as it 
accounts for a large share of the total alliance activity. Furthermore, the inherent uncertainty 
and complexity, coupled with substantial potential pay-offs, of biopharmaceutical projects 
assures us that contract design is unlikely to be characterized by a haphazard collection of 
clauses. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to see how the results presented in this 
dissertation hold up in different industrial contexts. 
                                                 
49 As stated by Bengtsson (2011), firm level instruments are generally not convincing because one could argue 
that they affect the whole contract, including individual provisions. 
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Fourth, the empirical results in this dissertation are based on U.S.-U.S. and U.S.-International 
firm pairs. It would be interesting to see whether or not the results of my analyses would be 
generalizable to International-International dyads. For instance, it could be that U.S. firms are 
systematically different from other firms in terms of their contract design behavior. Also, 
contracts that include at least one firm from the U.S. are typically relevant in the U.S. context 
as they fall under, or are affected by, the U.S. legal regime. Given the current international 
context of many alliances, an interesting topic for future research is to be found in the 
comparison of alliance contracts executed between U.S.-U.S., U.S.-International, and 
International-International firm pairs. 
 Five, I believe there is substantial room for improving construct validity in the field of 
alliance contract design. Constructs are abstractions from reality created by researchers to 
conceptualize a latent variable and are thus necessarily subject to different interpretations in 
different contexts. For instance, researchers in other disciplines have used firm age as a proxy 
for reputation (Gompers, 1996), flexibility and management efficiency (Fok, Chang and Lee, 
2004), innovation inertia (Zona, Zattoni and Minichilli, 2012), resource scarcity 
(Castrogiovanni, Combs and Justis, 2006), and more. The constructs used in this dissertation 
can, to some extent, also be interpreted differently in different contexts. For instance, based 
on relevant literature, I interpret the number of technological interest areas as the number of 
potential technology applications in Chapter 2, but also as technological complexity in 
Chapter 4. These interpretations can offer different explanations for the presented results in 
this dissertation. Parties might not be more inclined to supplement their contract with 
additional mechanisms supporting internal dispute resolution in reaction to technological 
complexity (Chapter 4), but rather prefer to solve disputes internally when the benefits, i.e., 
number of potential technology applications (Chapter 2), are great. I encourage future 
research to further refine proxies used in the literature on alliance contract design.  
 Despite these limitations, I expect this dissertation to significantly add to our 
understanding of the design of R&D alliance contracts. 
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Samenvatting  
Deze dissertatie bevat vier empirische studies op het gebied van onderzoeks- en 
ontwikkelingsallianties (R&D-allianties) en bijbehorende contracten in de biotechnische en 
farmaceutische industrie. In elk van de vier empirische studies hier beschreven, behandel ik 
een specifiek aspect van R&D-alliantiecontracten. Mijn algemene onderzoeksvraag luidt als 
volgt: welke factoren bepalen, of zijn geassocieerd met, de manier waarop R&D-
alliantiecontracten tussen bedrijven worden vormgegeven? Om deze onderzoeksvraag te 
beantwoorden tracht ik vier, meer specifieke, vragen te beantwoorden, namelijk: 
Hoe beïnvloedt de onderhandelingspositie van het bedrijf, dat initieel de bulk van de 
technologie aanlevert voor een verdere coöperatie, het aantal controlerechten met 
betrekking tot intellectueel eigendom (IP), zoals bepaald in het R&D-alliantiecontract, 
dat dit bedrijf uiteindelijk verkrijgt? 
 
Welke factoren beïnvloeden de mate waarin contractpartijen de nadruk leggen op 
coördinatie in een R&D-alliantiecontract?   
 
Welke factoren beïnvloeden de beslissing van partijen om bepaalde dispuut resolutie 
clausules op nemen in een R&D-alliantiecontract?  
 
Welke factoren beïnvloeden de beslissing van contractpartijen om elkaars 
rekruteringsbeleid via een R&D-alliantiecontract tijdens, en vaak na, een samenwerking 
te beperken? 
Om deze vier vragen te beantwoorden maak ik gebruik van een deelverzameling van 
bedrijven die tussen 1996 en 2005 een samenwerkingsverband op het gebied van R&D 
afsloten in de biotechnische en/of farmaceutische industrie en hiervoor een contract opstelde. 
Zoals reeds eerder genoemd, onderzoekt de eerste studie in essentie hoe de onder-
handelingspositie van een bedrijf van invloed is op het aantal controlerechten dat dit bedrijf 
verkrijgt, zoals bepaald in een R&D-alliantiecontract. Controlerechten geven een bedrijf 
bepaalde rechten met betrekking tot eigendom en/of het maken van beslissingen. De studie is 
gebaseerd op het idee dat bedrijven in een sterkere onderhandelingspositie gunstigere 
contractvoorwaarden kunnen uitonderhandelen. Vergeleken met voorgaande studies 
onderzoek ik (1) een meer specifieke set van controlerechten, id est, IP-controlerechten, en (2) 
een breder scala aan factoren die bijdragen aan een sterkere onderhandelingspositie voor een 
bedrijf, (3) welke ik bekijk vanuit het perspectief van het bedrijf dat initieel de bulk van de 
technologie aanlevert als basis voor een verdere samenwerking. De empirische resultaten in 
hoofdstuk 2 lijken te bevestigen dat bedrijven in een sterkere onderhandelingspositie 
gunstigere contractvoorwaarden kunnen bedingen. Ten eerste behouden meer innovatieve 
bedrijven meer IP-controlerechten. Innovatieve bedrijven zijn vaak cruciaal voor het succes 
van R&D-allianties en staan dus in een sterkere positie om meer IP-controlerechten te eisen. 
Ten tweede behouden de bedrijven die initieel de bulk van de technologie inbrengen, meer IP-
controlerechten als de technologie meer toepassingsgebieden kent. De implicatie is dat de 
onderhandelingspositie van bedrijven niet alleen bepaald wordt door hun grootte, maar ook 
door de innovatieve kracht en de technologie die ze inbrengen. 
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De tweede studie onderzoekt welke factoren bijdragen aan het bepalen van meer of minder 
contractuele mechanismen, id est, coördinatiecommissies, die de coördinatie tussen partijen 
gedurende hun samenwerking zou moeten bevorderen. Ik karakteriseer allianties daarbij op 
een meer coöperatieve manier vergeleken met voorgaande studies. Enkele wetenschappers 
suggereren dat een tekort aan coördinatie tussen partijen kan leiden tot het uiteindelijke falen 
van een alliantie. Omdat contracten nooit compleet zijn, is het van belang dat alliantiepartijen 
bepaalde contractuele mechanismen bepalen die het mogelijk maken om in een later stadium 
– als nieuwe informatie beschikbaar komt – bepaalde veranderingen te implementeren. 
Voorgaande impliceert dat hoofdstuk 3 afstand neemt van klassieke contracttheorieën waarin 
contracten worden beschreven als alomvattende documenten welke naadloos huidige en 
toekomstige omstandigheden beschrijven. Voorspellingen met betrekking tot het aantal 
coördinatie commissies welke partijen bepalen zijn gebaseerd op relevante literaturen op het 
gebied van coördinatie binnen bedrijven, geografische afstand en alliantie management 
leerprocessen. Hoofdstuk 3 presenteert drie bevindingen. Ten eerste, bepalen partijen meer 
coördinatie commissies in contracten wanneer de complexiteit van de alliantie groter is, id est, 
wanneer partijen behalve R&D nog andere activiteiten uitvoeren. Echter, additionele analyses 
suggereren dat dit mogelijk niet geldt voor alle additionele activiteiten. Ten tweede, 
extrapoleer ik bevindingen op het gebied van coördinatie binnen bedrijven naar coördinatie 
tussen bedrijven door empirisch te bevestigen dat partijen geneigd zijn meer coördinatie 
commissies vast te leggen in hun contract als ze voor de uitvoering van hun activiteiten meer 
afhankelijk van elkaar zijn. Ten derde wijzen de empirische resultaten uit dat partijen met 
meer alliantie-ervaring meer coördinatie commissies bepalen. Additionele analyses laten 
bovendien een interessante nevenbevinding zien: directe concurrenten die samenwerken in 
R&D en waar bovendien geen van beide partijen een minderheidsbelang in de andere partij 
heeft, bepalen minder coördinatie commissies. Dit zou erop kunnen duiden dat concurrenten 
bewust het aantal contactpunten minimaliseren om zo het risico op ongewenste kennisstromen 
te verlagen.  
 De derde studie onderzoekt welke factoren ten grondslag liggen aan de keuze van 
alliantiepartijen om specifieke dispuut resolutie clausules te implementeren in een R&D-
alliantieovereenkomst. Veel wetenschappers suggereren dat, en beschrijven hoe, contract 
partijen vaak zelf in staat zijn disputen op te lossen door middel van idiosyncratische dispuut 
resolutie mechanismen. Partijen kunnen er bijvoorbeeld voor kiezen om disputen intern op te 
lossen via hiërarchie en/of via arbitrage. Beide methoden hebben voor- en nadelen. Een 
voordeel van interne dispuut resolutie via hiërarchie is dat partijen facetten kunnen laten 
meewegen in hun beslissing die normaal gesproken ontoelaatbaar als bewijs zouden zijn. 
Bovendien is interne dispuut resolutie vaak amicaal van karakter. Als partijen voor arbitrage 
kiezen, betekent dit dat toekomstige disputen beslist worden door particuliere rechters. Twee 
voordelen van arbitrage zijn dat (1) de partijen minder afhankelijk zijn van een specifiek 
rechtssysteem en (2) dat arbitrage zittingen en uitspraken in principe confidentieel zijn. 
Hoofdstuk 4 toetst in essentie twee ideeën. Ten eerste, de voordelen van interne dispuut 
resolutie via hiërarchie doen vermoeden dat partijen vaker voor dit soort dispuut resolutie 
zullen kiezen in een R&D-contract wanneer de technologische complexiteit van een alliantie 
hoog is, of wanneer er vooraf geen specifieke einddatum van de samenwerking is 
afgesproken. De empirische resultaten bevestigen deze vermoedens. Ten tweede, gezien de 
voordelen van arbitrage, lijkt het aannemelijk dat partijen kiezen voor arbitrage wanneer ze 
gesitueerd zijn in verschillende landen, id est, internationale allianties, wanneer beide 
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rechtssystemen minder op elkaar lijken en wanneer tenminste één van de deelnemende 
bedrijven in een alliantie recentelijk een spectaculaire groei heeft doorgemaakt. De 
empirische resultaten bevestigen de eerste en derde verwachting. Aangezien disputen tussen 
alliantiepartijen frequent voorkomen in complexe en onzekere omgevingen, kunnen 
bovengenoemde resultaten een belangrijke bijdrage leveren aan bestaande kennis met 
betrekking tot alternatieve dispuut resolutie mechanismen in de context van R&D-allianties in 
de biofarmaceutische industrie. 
 De vierde en laatste empirische studie onderzoekt welke factoren bijdragen aan de 
beslissing van contractpartijen om elkaars rekruteringsbeleid via een R&D-alliantiecontract 
tijdens, en vaak na, een samenwerking te beperken. Een alliantie wordt gekenschetst door 
zowel competitieve als coöperatieve elementen. Een voorbeeld van een competitief element is 
opportunistisch rekruteringsbeleid waarbij partijen elkaars medewerkers actief benaderen en 
aanzetten tot het verlaten van hun huidige werkgever. Dit risico is groot, omdat een alliantie 
de informatieasymmetrie tussen partijen verkleint en het derhalve eenvoudig maakt elkaars 
waardevolle medewerkers te identificeren. De studie neemt daarom aan dat bedrijven 
contractuele beperkingen ten aanzien van elkaars rekruteringsbeleid implementeren wanneer 
de risico’s en kosten met betrekking tot ongewenste mobiliteit van medewerkers substantieel 
zijn. Echter, de studie stelt ook dat partijen beperkt worden door de omgeving waarin zij 
opereren. De resultaten geven aan dat de waarschijnlijkheid waarmee alliantiepartijen 
contractuele restricties ten aanzien van hun rekruteringsbeleid implementeren een functie is 
van (1) de omgeving waarin partijen zich bevinden en (2) de wetenschappelijke oriëntatie van 
deelnemende bedrijven aan een R&D-alliantie. Bovendien geven de resultaten aan dat 
contractuele restricties met betrekking tot rekruteringsbeleid vaak verrassend breed 
geconstrueerd zijn, id est, ook medewerkers die niet direct betrokken zijn bij een R&D-
alliantie kunnen mogelijk (negatieve) effecten ondervinden van contractuele restricties met 
betrekking tot de mobiliteit van medewerkers tussen alliantiepartijen.  
 De vier empirische studies illustreren dat bedrijven die participeren in een R&D-
samenwerkingsverband verscheidene contractuele opties hebben om hun collaboratie vorm te 
geven. Een eenzijdige focus op contractuele complexiteit van R&D-allianties mist veel 
(contractuele) nuances die ik heb getracht in deze dissertatie (deels) te extraheren.  
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